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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
A New Grammar of Images: Werner Herzog and the Contemporary Philosophy of Cinema 
By 
David Michael Lamme 
Doctor of Philosophy in German Studies 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor David Tse-Chien Pan, Chair 
In his central mission of working on “a new grammar of images,” the German film director 
Werner Herzog presents a challenge to the philosophy of cinema. Pairing Herzog’s work 
with Deleuzian film theory, I argue against the prevalent secondary literature that Herzog’s 
oeuvre engages with an anti-romantic and non-ironic material philosophy in order to 
provide ethical challenges to a contemporary, connected world. Specifically focusing on 
spatiotemporal formations derived from empirical science, I demonstrate that Herzog’s 
approach to cinema utilizes a four-tiered semiotic that is at its core not merely a film 
theory, but rather an entire material philosophy of nature with profound ethical and 
political implications. 
1 
Introduction 
This dissertation begins with the problem of how our conceptions of the world relate to 
empirical reality and what role film can play in that process. The problematics of the transcendental 
– of Kantian critique founded on human conceptions of space and time – have seeped over the
centuries into everyday life, presenting practical and embodied difficulties for contemporary, 
connected society. Yet, while these problems – both within and for the individual, both within and 
for political society – have gradually continued to mount, the logical capacities of the Western world 
have struggled to find the means to appropriately grasp them, to face them head on. Still clinging to 
the identity and national politics of a foregone era, humankind now asks global questions and faces 
global risks. Climate change, rapidly proliferating technologies and inhuman intelligences, nuclear 
arsenals and overpopulation: these are just a few of the problems that threaten not only the 
individual, but the species. And until a logical, practical philosophy is developed that can begin to 
address both transcendental critique and empirical reality, that can keep up with societal change and 
scientific progress or at the very least finds itself capable of charting their movements, thought will 
forever lag behind what is being demanded of it. 
In hopes of signaling vital steps we might take in critiquing the logical approach we take to 
such species-wide dangers, I turn to the films of Werner Herzog. Relying on Gilles Deleuze’s 
philosophical formulations concerning cinema, I argue that Werner Herzog’s films are not simply a 
reflection of reality, but that empirical reality already has in itself an image structure. As we slowly 
discover more of this structure through the efforts of artists, scientists, critics and philosophers, we 
alter not only our factual understanding of that image structure, but also the foundations of human 
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thought itself. While cinema might seem at first of limited purview in the realm of global threats, in 
light of the entrenching nationalisms that have reappeared, newly clad and newly armed with far 
reaching, globally connective technologies, I argue that in fact it has never had more practical or 
theoretical importance. While cinema is but an aspect of the global media sources that inform us and 
reform society in their very process, the cinema holds within itself the glimmer of potential to 
change the way we think, or at the very least bring awareness to the inherent and often autocatalytic 
problems of contemporary thought. 
Certain films, including but not limited to Herzog’s, participate in empirical structures as a 
further manifestation of them rather than mere representation; they form a monstration of empirical 
reality that tests and aims at exceeding the limits of human knowledge. Herzog’s landscapes, for 
example, merge outer landscapes with the subject’s inner mental landscapes so that the inner vision 
manifests the structures of the outer one: the result is not a representation of some “true” landscape 
of the self, but rather a correlative and probabilistic causality derived from empirical experience. 
Alternatively, I argue that one should read Lo and Behold not just as a documentary about 
informatics but rather as an attempt to establish a particularly human perspective forged in the film 
sequence itself that would encompass informatics and subject its seeming independence to an ethical 
vision that informatics seeks desperately to avoid. In other words, this dissertation takes upon itself 
the task to provide an understanding of how Herzog’s film work matches with Deleuze’s 
philosophical project of linking human conceptions with empirical reality’s own structure of images 
and, by extension, how Herzog’s oeuvre might be utilized to develop new avenues of research in the 
philosophy of cinema. This dissertation charts the commonalities and interruptions of a new 
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grammar of images and a new image of thought, encouraging us to think differently with the cinema 
rather than merely about it. 
While pairing Deleuze and Herzog has thus far received scant attention, the pairing of 
philosophy and film is gaining ground. The work of Stanley Cavell in particular has done much in 
recent years to advance thought in this area. Likewise, In Film as Philosophy, an edited volume from 
2017 that heavily features concepts from Deleuzian philosophy of cinema, Noël Carroll analyzes and 
argues for the possibility of “philosophy in cinema,” no matter how difficult or rare that possibility 
might be (265). Moreover, Carroll invokes Herzog directly as a prime example of how this could 
potentially be seen, though he does little to truly develop that argument. Herzog is cited as a director 
that should be considered “philosophical” and whose films might be used by philosophers to 
“illustrate the tenet in question which is unbeknownst, so to speak, to the creator of the motion 
picture,” specifically in reference to the structural paradigm of language in Herzog’s Kaspar Hauser to 
“Lacan’s theory of language” (Carroll 266). While I would disagree with this reading and argue that 
in fact Kaspar Hauser critiques and moves beyond the Lacanian theory language (based as it is on a 
Saussurean structuralism from which nothing of the human escapes) through its treatment of direct 
sensation, Carroll’s assessment that with Herzog’s films “the philosopher brings a theoretical grid to 
the film” is beyond doubt (ibid.). If Carroll ultimately contends that Herzog should be considered 
philosophical in that “he constantly defamiliarizes human life, examining it from a position detached 
and quizzical, and, therefore, philosophical,” I can only agree, but also add that a director like 
Herzog should only be mapped along with a given philosopher or particular tenet insofar as their 
structural semiotics align (Carroll 283). It is never a point of “doing” the same thing or somehow 
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supplying a bald metaphor for a given film or philosophical theory, but rather a matter of the 
empirically specific ways in which film and philosophy intersect and parallel one another: it is a matter 
of charting the parallels, overlaps and interferences between their respective affects, percepts, 
concepts and – should they be investigating them, as Herzog does – even functions. It is a matter of 
allowing varied fields to communicate with and challenge one another. 
In this study I bring together Werner Herzog and Gilles Deleuze as two independent 
thinkers investigating similar subjects through different means: a new grammar of images, a new 
image of thought. I argue that the affects and percepts of Herzog’s films complement and challenge 
Deleuze’s conceptual apparatus, while that same machinic assemblage hones Herzog’s images and 
makes comprehensible aspects of his oeuvre that have up to this point remained enigmatic. Upon 
close inspection, the sheer number of similarities between the two in terms of structure are staggering. 
Yet these are achieved by separate and very different avenues of thought and action. This must 
continually be kept in mind. There are obvious and important distinctions that separate Herzog and 
Deleuze, but I firmly believe that bringing them together, reading the philosophy with the films and 
vice versa, opens new avenues of investigation, analysis, and experimentation for both fields. 
Straining to create a new grammar of images and a new image of thought respectively, Herzog and 
Deleuze arrive at similar points diagrammatically – that is, they arrive at certain structures that align 
in their functioning, built, as it were, from different parts, but always drawn from the world around 
them. Much like DeLanda argues in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, analyzing Herzog’s 
films in the manner presented here therefore does not offer a “direct interpretation” but rather a 
“reconstruction” of Deleuze’s philosophy (xii). Such a “reconstruction” is not merely to make 
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Deleuze’s “ideas seem legitimate to my intended audience” of philosophy, film, and German 
scholars, but to show that Deleuze – and as I argue Herzog’s – works do not depend on their 
“particular choice of resources, or the particular lines of argument” (ibid.). They are instead “robust 
to changes in theoretical assumptions and strategies” (ibid.). And, just like DeLanda, I must 
underscore that, “clearly, if the same conclusions can be reached from entirely different points of 
departure and following entirely different paths, the validity of those conclusions is thereby 
strengthened” (ibid.). 
What I am trying to make patently clear is that – this time akin to DeLanda’s example of 
“the storm in the computer” in Philosophy and Simulation – the experimental efforts of Herzog’s 
films and Deleuze’s concepts are aligned insofar as they share actual and virtual empirical structures: 
the “mechanism-independence” that might at first seem accidental, coincidental, or even miraculous 
within their work can be explained “by the fact that their possibility spaces share the same structure” 
(16-18). They are looking at the same, empirically identifiable and comprehensible universe. Herzog 
and Deleuze tap into and explore nearly isomorphic semiotic structures, the same types of 
topological, nonmetric space, the same types of nonlinear time that is “out of joint.” In other words, 
the arguments and comparisons presented here arise from the fact that they both draw on a similar 
conception of spacetime to ground their efforts. This in turn makes the conception of spacetime the 
fundamental key to understanding and building upon their efforts. It also allows the conception of 
spacetime to ground my critique.1 
 
1 It should be noted upfront that when I speak of science and its relationship to modern cinema, we I am arguing for 
“intensive science” as defined by Manuel DeLanda, rather than utilizing “science” as the specific manner in which a 
given scientific field might define science in general. In the afterword of The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and 
Philosophy, DeLanda explains this type of science succinctly, by and large critiqued for its positivism: “For a capacity to 
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Yet, time and space are notoriously difficult to write or speak about for the simple fact it is 
impossible to provide meaning to any utterance, any action without invoking them. Space and time, 
as Kant himself well knew, require a conceptualization before one can even bring themselves to 
speak, before one can even conceptualize themselves as an individual being. This difficulty, however, 
has never halted the efforts of philosophers or scientists and there are perhaps more comments 
concerning the nature of space and time within human literature than any other topic. Space and 
time house us as subjects, they chart our changes, acting as the metric by which we measure our 
endeavors and our very lives. Time in particular is wrought with subjective nuances and is, at 
bottom, a subjective and relative experience, both in our own understanding and in empirical fact. 
And this empirical fact is what is key. Space and time are deeply ingrained human realities, formed 
through the interaction of our physical forms and most notably our brains with material nature. 
Nonetheless, these realities arise in the empirical sense out of a unified spacetime, a reality deeper 
and more extensive than can likely ever be comprehended by our limited human senses. Spacetime 
inherently contains a logic of sense that extends beyond the three-dimensional capacities of the 
human senses, provides alternative perspectives on causality and change that defy the linear 
 
 
 
affect, to become actual, [something] must be coupled with a capacity to be affected. A metaphysics or ontology of 
science based on these two concepts is an entirely different thing than the official metaphysics of science based on laws” 
(326). DeLanda continues “the virtual plane of immanence would be like a topological or ordinal space from which the 
actual world with its quantitative relations would emerge by a similar process or progressive differentiation...The 
problem with scientists is that many of them embrace an impoverished philosophy of science known as ‘positivism,’ 
according to which they are not only in the business of revealing the true ontology of the world but only creating 
compact descriptions that are useful to make predictions and to increase our degree of control over laboratory 
phenomena. This is good for public relations...but it makes for bad philosophy” (327-328). In light of recent scientific 
discoveries, this critique of positivism and new framing of science should not be too difficult to grasp even from within 
scientific disciplines, as it has similar conceptualizations in theoretical entities such as, for example, the Higgs Field. The 
point is, for cinema to play an affective/effective role in science and for science to do the same for cinema, a mutual 
semiotic operation of the actual-virtual system must be in place. 
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narratives we create around our day to day lives. By thinking spacetime rather than space and time 
individually and as separate concepts, we take the important, initial steps of forming an ethics that 
can keep up with contemporary physics, which hauls philosophy in tow. 
In order to form such an ethics, we must, as critics and philosophers, cease shying away from 
empirical findings, but rather continually update our thinking with their findings and presenting 
those same findings with metaphysical and ethical challenges. And this means thinking spacetime in 
addition to the separate concepts of time and space. This is, for the most part the task that Gilles 
Deleuze set for himself before penning Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, the most rigorously empirical books 
on cinema and its purview to date. Similar to DeLanda, I read Deleuze as taking a “realist 
ontological stance” in these works by providing a conceptual apparatus through which “for the first 
time...the autonomy of material entities from the human mind was asserted without any sense of 
postmodern irony” (Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, vii). Yet, like most philosophers to date, 
Deleuze concentrated most fully on theorizing time and the subjective rather than space and the 
objective. And this is something that needs to be remedied. Both space and spacetime deserve further 
consideration in the philosophy of cinema. And, in the end, I believe that this is in turn precisely 
what the films of Werner Herzog in particular accomplish: while maintaining a realist ontological 
perspective like Deleuze, Herzog shifts the careful critics attention from temporal conceptualizations 
to the spatial, not to give primacy to the latter, but to demonstrate the necessity of thinking them 
together, of thinking spacetime. 
On the final page of Cinema 2, Deleuze writes that “the theory of cinema does not bear on 
the cinema, but on the concepts of the cinema,” yet these concepts “are not given in cinema” and 
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must be produced by philosophy as “conceptual practice” (280). Deleuze often likened his work in 
philosophy to the search for a new image of thought, a new means of philosophical expression that 
might reinvigorate and remap our understanding of and relationship to thinking. In the preface to 
Difference and Repetition (1968) this issue is addressed very directly, where Deleuze claims that our 
logical legacy as human beings, up to and including Kant himself, as well as more recent thinkers 
from Hegel and Marx to Freud, find limited means to address superindividual concerns by failing to 
critique our image of thought itself, instead reducing logic to a propositional Reason that grounds 
itself in human language rather than the physical senses.2 For Deleuze, rigorous thinking – including 
or even especially thought found in the cinema – has to have a critique of thought and its aims as 
part of its endeavors. It is precisely because of this problematic that Deleuze considers Difference and 
Repetition seminal and claims that “all that I have done since is connected to this book, including 
what I wrote with Guattari;” forging a new image of thought is at the heart of all Deleuzian 
philosophy (Difference and Repetition xv). 
From the very beginning, Deleuze argued that creating a new image of thought cannot be 
undertaken in isolation, that “philosophy cannot be undertaken independently of science or art” and 
“creates and expounds its own concepts only in relation to what it can grasp of scientific functions 
 
2 We think according to an image of thought. By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but 
also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals when we try 
to think. For example, we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and the thinker a good will (naturally to ‘want’ 
the true); we take as a model the process of recognition – in other words, a common sense or employment of all the 
faculties on a supposed same object; we designate error, nothing but error, as the enemy to be fought; and we suppose 
that the true concerns solutions – in other words, propositions capable of serving as answers. This is the classic image of 
thought, and as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult to conceive of thought as 
encompassing those problems which point beyond the propositional mode; or as involving encounters which escape all 
recognition; or as confronting its true enemies, which are quite different from thought; or as attaining that which tears 
thought from its natural torpor and notorious bad will, and forces us to think. A new image of thought… (DR xvi). 
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and artistic constructions” (Difference and Repetition xvi). Instead, the three “daughters of Chaos” as 
he would later refer to them with Guattari – art, science, and philosophy – must find ways to 
interact with one another, even if their particular realms of creation remain distinct: concepts for 
philosophy, affects and percepts for art, functions or prospects for science (What is Philosophy? 24). 
In Deleuzian thought, only the connections and interruptions between philosophy, art, and science 
were capable of providing a new image of thought. Creating a “taxonomy” of cinematic images 
therefore proved essential for many of the shifts in direction one sees in Deleuze’s late work, just as 
Deleuze’s interest in the philosophy of cinema back to its foundations in previous works, especially 
Logic of Sense. In this light, Deleuze’s efforts in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image should be read as an extension of his search for a new image of thought rather than an 
aberration when compared with more traditional philosophical works. If Kant and Hegel were able 
to accurately describe an image of thought and logic with human reason at its core, they were, for 
Deleuze, unable to articulate an appropriate natural philosophy, a philosophy indifferent to human 
aims or human reason, a logic of becoming rather than being. And this, in turn, presented Deleuze 
with his central aim: beginning from the fundamental axiom that difference and repetition are the 
same thing, Deleuze turned to the works of Spinoza and Nietzsche to serve as his foundations and 
set about forging his own philosophy, a logic not of reason, but of sense3. 
 
3 Deleuze was always rather blunt about philosophy and its role, even if it was not until his final collaboration with 
Guattari that this was laid out succinctly. Philosophy was for Deleuze “the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating 
concepts” (What is Philosophy? 2). But what, then, is a concept? Concepts are for Deleuze (and Guattari) complex 
multiplicities and “there are no simple concepts” (What is Philosophy? 15). That is, concepts do not and cannot stand 
alone – there are no pure, transcendent concepts. Concepts are not to be confused with Ideas. Instead, “every concept 
relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or current connections” (What is Philosophy? 
19). A concept is “a heterogenesis” – an original, epigenetic becoming of an event that has an origin, like all things for 
Deleuze, “in the middle and only once it is established” (What is Philosophy? 20). A concept is “an incorporeal, even 
though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies” (What is Philosophy? 21). It “speaks the event, not the essence or the 
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While changing the image of thought might at first glance seem rather abstract, it gains 
clarity once one sees how philosophical thought links up with and complements the percepts and 
affects of art, as well as the prospects and functions of science. The latter are perhaps easiest to grasp 
and most distinct. The functionality of scientific understanding has become a part of our everyday 
lives to the extent that it largely goes unnoticed; we interact with intricate systems of scientific 
prospects every time we flip a light switch, ignite a stovetop, take a train, open a laptop. “Science 
passes from chaotic virtuality to the states of affairs and bodies that actualize it” (italics in original. What 
is Philosophy? 156). That is, prospects are the “propositional” or logical functions of the actual world 
as a referential system of knowledge, as Logic, the universe as an organized system with natural laws. 
Moreover, it is from these laws that we draw the functionality of technology and our contemporary 
understanding of ourselves, our species, our planet, and even our place in the universe. Science 
creates such propositions by drawing on, but then prescinding the chaotic, virtual force of 
philosophical concepts in favor of predictability and observable behavior, be it direct or indirect. 
Science allows us to ignore, for the moment and seemingly paradoxically, that which we are unaware 
of; it lets us concentrate fully on what we can see and measure beyond the limits of our knowledge in 
order that we might see and measure more of the universe. It does so at a cost. “In becoming 
propositional, the concept loses all the characteristics it possessed as philosophical concept: its self-reference, 
its endoconsistency and its exoconsistency” (italics in original. What is Philosophy? 137-138). 
 
 
thing” (ibid.). That is, concepts must have virtual components and all concepts are “real without being actual, ideal 
without being abstract” (What is Philosophy? 23). Concepts are the speaking of events and their topological forming, they 
are the (sur)faces under which and upon which events occur – “the concept is the contour, the configuration, the 
constellation of an event to come” (What is Philosophy? 32-33). Concepts are crystalized probability spaces, a way of 
thinking that informs the image of thought itself, and with it affects certain probabilities concerning human futures. 
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Scientific thinking becomes wholly comparative and referential. Prospects function only within the 
realm of an a priori subject/object distinction and with it the simultaneous establishment of 
true/false propositions taken from an abstracted and universally shared “objective” point of view. 
Prospects function within the logic of being, while philosophical concepts operate within becoming; 
prospects are always linked to “a state of affairs, a time and variables, with their relations depending 
on time4” (What is Philosophy? 158). Scientists are of course aware of this reduction, but often set it 
aside as unimportant to their aims, conceding that progress in their individual field is more 
important than the physical “realities” that exist at a different scale. While this practical move is 
appropriate to their aims, Deleuze felt that the same affordance could not be extended to philosophy 
in its efforts to pose self-referential questions to science and art in order to realize its aim of 
conceptualizing a new image of thought. 
Percepts and affects, for their part, are a bit more complicated. A work of art for Deleuze and 
Guattari is “a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself” (What is Philosophy? 164). That 
is, instead of an objectively viewed proposition with a corresponding and constant function, what is 
preserved in the work of art is a “bloc of sensations,” a bloc of percepts and affects that act within and 
upon the human body that views or creates the work, changing both the subjective state and physical 
body of the one that experiences them (ibid.). Artworks do not simply change a particular way of 
 
 
4 The vast majority of scientific prospects are indeed temporally “aware” and include time as a variable in their 
calculations and equations. However, Deleuze was incorrect to state that all science does so. As I shall demonstrate in my 
conclusions, there are several emergent fields - all related to some sort of combinatorial or unifying work involving both 
general relativity and quantum mechanics - where time no longer serves as a variable but mathematics is still possible. 
These are not, as of yet, directly observable and discrete phenomena, but do indeed take place at scales - in particular the 
quantum scale - where time does not occur in the manner it does in three-dimensional, physical space (in fact, time can 
be said not to really ‘exist’ at all at this scale). 
12  
thinking or feeling, they act upon the total body, causing subtle changes in individual personality 
and perception alongside the natural, neurological and chemical releases of the senses. Percepts and 
affects are discrete blocs of sensation for Deleuze and Guattari, that is, they can be conceived of as 
beings themselves rather than simply objective qualities of a given work; they have their own forces, 
their own life, that can change drastically over time5. In short, percepts and affects are points of 
contact with the nonhuman in the human, the manner in which humans are able to connect 
sensations that extend beyond themselves. The percept could therefore be thought of as a shifting 
point of view – a landscape, but also a view of a landscape, foreign or familiar, that makes the very 
ground beneath our feet feel different. An affect could be conceived of as a “zone of indetermination, 
of indiscernibility” that “immediately precedes…natural differentiation,” those mutative experiences 
after which, should we look in a mirror, we would find ourselves unrecognizable (What is Philosophy? 
173). An affect is the physical shock of the artwork that marks the probabilistic moment of change, 
the actual neural impulses that change us autocatalytically: our artistic sensibilities form the horizon 
of our affectual perception, which allows us to be shocked and, in the process, changed. Percepts and 
affects are what house us as subjects and continually alter that house. But as Deleuze and Guattari are 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Deleuze and Guattari argue that these beings “could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught 
in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects” (What is Philosophy? 164). For our 
purposes, it is important to underscore that percepts and affects are the source of both literal and figurative grounding, of 
topology, of (sur)face, of spirit, and of change. Deleuze and Guattari write that “the percept is the landscape before man, 
in the absence of man…the nonhuman landscapes of nature” (What is Philosophy? 169). Affects, on the other hand, are 
the “nonhuman becomings of man,” the shocks of sensation that force one to become foreign to themselves. Percepts are 
“landscapes” and “visions;” affects are “faces” and “becomings” (What is Philosophy? 177). The artist – no matter the 
medium – is always capturing and/or envisioning new sensations, new landscapes, calling some forth while destroying 
others, and simultaneously through the force of their becomings rearranging the face as the organizing principle of self- 
conception. I will return to this issue of landscape and face in Chapter III. 
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keen to point out, such a house “does not shelter us from cosmic forces; at most it filters and selects 
them” (What is Philosophy? 182). 
There is always something outside of our experience, something both natural and inhuman 
that extends beyond us and is capable of changing us. Whereas science furnishes the world and our 
understanding of it by prescinding functional prospects from nature in order to achieve a universal 
field of reference, the percepts and affects of art ceaselessly reimagine the world and the place of the 
human in it by drawing on nonhuman forces, by injecting a bit of chaos into the order of established 
law. If art achieves something like the transcendent viewpoint achieved by science (and, it should be 
added, religion, which will be explored in more detail in Chapter IV), it does so through the senses, 
internally and subjectively rather than externally and objectively; it does so intensively. Percepts and 
affects produce aesthetics and its cultural antecedents – myth and politics – the houses through 
which we filter and select our modes of everyday existence, but they also, with the aid of philosophy, 
beg the question of ethical use. 
Just like philosophy and the arts, science, too, has an important connection to any rigorous 
philosophy of cinema and in particular to the films of Werner Herzog, who often investigates 
scientific subjects as well as scientists themselves in his work. All sciences share similarities with 
modern cinema and many even remarkable similarities. While this is perhaps not a traditionally 
accepted approach, one must not hesitate to utilize the findings of one field to aid in the 
development of another. For Deleuze, this was so much the case that he had no qualms about 
making comparisons with cinema and a vast array of different scientific disciplines: 
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I don’t feel it’s outrageous to say that Resnais comes close to Prigogine, or that Goddard, for different reasons, 
comes close to Thom. I’m not saying that Resnais and Prigogine, or Goddard and Thom, are doing the same 
thing. I’m pointing out, rather, that there are remarkable similarities between scientific creators of functions 
and cinematic creators of images. And the same goes for philosophical concepts, since there are also concepts of 
these spaces. (Negotiations 124-125) 
Many of these similarities stem from the mutual, creative endeavors of both the scientist and film 
director, and, as Deleuze reminds us, the philosopher too; each in their own way, they confront 
chaos, confront the virtual. Yet their respective approaches place them in entirely different camps. 
Many people have had varied political reasons for keeping each discipline separate from one another. 
As a result, the productive similarities and challenges that science presents to the philosophy of 
cinema have been relatively neglected, undervalued, and under-researched up to this point, though 
this is thankfully beginning to change. 
One simple way to begin to correct this error of judgement is to utilize the findings of the de 
facto third volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, What is Philosophy? to supplement Deleuze’s 
philosophy of cinema found in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. In this book, published six years after 
Deleuze’s Cinema 2, Deleuze and Guattari explicate the “functions” (or their constituent parts, 
functives) of science and present them as creative works, just like the concepts of philosophy and the 
affects and percepts of art. Deleuze and Guattari give science a very specific role: to create “functions 
that are presented as propositions in discursive systems” (What is Philosophy? 118). That is, 
functions, actual mathematical functions, are seen as the medium through which science is able to 
express and communicate its findings. While philosophy might reveal concepts intimately related to 
scientific functions and serve as a platform to challenge fundamental scientific assumptions, 
15  
functions themselves draw upon the fantastic slowing down of material processes to make them 
appear rigid and provide a platform for a spatiotemporal causality to be created. In other words, even 
though the movements of the physical world are unceasing, science is capable of creating still-frame 
schematics of certain aspects of empirical reality: functions. Take, for example, snapping two photos 
of a speeding comet captured with a powerful telescope. By creating a spatiotemporal referencing 
framework between the comet and another body in space, scientists can use previously established 
physical laws to calibrate the distance and time traveled between the two photos, determining 
properties such as the comet’s velocity in the process. From this, scientists can then make 
spatiotemporal predictions, can write functions: if the comet is at point A at x time and at point B at 
y time, it is traveling at z speed. And, when considering other factors (the gravity of nearby objects, 
for example), they can then accurately describe the spatiotemporal path of the comet, can determine 
where it will be at an exact time, provided something unforeseen does not interact with the comet, 
that there isn’t, for example, an unknown planet in its path that the comet might crash into or 
deflect off, which would invalidate the function. 
With functions, it is therefore always the case of establishing a literal frame of reference with 
every bit of information available, while simultaneously acknowledging this information as 
incomplete. That is, functions are and always will be invalidated and in need of revision: it is the 
unforeseen or the unexplainable in the frame of reference that always creeps back into the equation 
from the outside, as it were, and charts the progress of scientific progress. This is essentially achieved 
by their constituent parts, functives, comprised in turn through “limits and variables,” because the 
limits and variables involved in a particular interaction actually supersede the function – the frame of 
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reference is not the action, it is a way to calculate the probability spaces of the future (What is 
Philosophy? 118.). The relationship between limit and variable grounds the function and as such, the 
function is always catching up to the realities of the limits and variables involved. This is especially 
important to underscore for our purposes here. Consider this extended passage: 
Sometimes the constant-limit itself appears as a relationship in the whole of the universe to which all the parts 
are subject under a finite condition (quantity of movement, force, energy)...It is these first limits that constitute 
slowing down in the chaos or the threshold of suspension of the infinite, which serve as endoreference and carry 
out a counting: they are not relations but numbers, and the entire theory of functions depends on numbers. We 
refer to the speed of light, absolute zero, the quantum of action, the Big Bang...Such limits do not apply through the 
empirical value that they take on solely within a system of coordinates, they act primarily as the condition of 
primordial slowing down that, in relation to infinity, extends over the whole scale of corresponding speeds. 
(italics mine. What is Philosophy? 119) 
Limits like the speed of light or absolute zero are not just numerical explanations, they are physical 
barriers, at the very least in terms of the scale we as humans are capable of looking at them. We 
cannot produce anything colder than absolute zero. Even saying “below absolute zero” 
temperature is a nonsensical and utterly meaningless term, empirically speaking. It is these initial, 
fundamental limits that functions always bump up against and they are of vital importance because 
they calibrate the shifting forms of reference, we use within scientific functions to explain and 
manipulate natural phenomena to human ends. 
Within such thinking, the functions of science therefore do not form a closed system, but 
rather a permeable one, based on number, that in turn forms new functions as it encounters limits 
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and new variables.6 This is why science, too, can be said to be truly creative. The mistake of seeing 
science as direct access to physical reality is common and inevitably takes on religious forms if one is 
not careful; that is to say, science – perhaps even more than philosophy – quite often lapses into the 
reification of its own findings and the deification of its fundamental assertions, especially number.7 As 
Gregory Flaxman puts it, “science is no less liable – and, arguably, even more – to lapse into 
molarization than philosophy, which circumscribes and regulates chaos out of existence” (Force of the 
Virtual 201). However, science’s most creative aspects are quite literally heretical in this sense: they 
push back against referential limits by confronting the immanent chaos of the virtual, reimagining 
the relation of thought to such limits in the process. 
The central point of these assertions is that science shares the same underlying field and logic as 
philosophy and art: they all draw on the same source for their creations, what Deleuze often refers to 
as “chaos,” “the outside,” or “the virtual.” In The Force of the Virtual, Peter Gaffney states that, for 
Deleuze, “science, like matter, does not escape the logic of becoming: its object is not a static world, 
but one that remains always in the process of (qualitative) change” (2-3). That is, in a realist 
 
 
6 For Deleuze and Guattari, “science does not carry out any unification of the Referent but produces all kinds of 
bifurcations on a plane of reference that does not preexist its detours or its layouts (What is Philosophy? 123). Science is 
not in any way a totalizing explanation of the universe as - just like art and philosophy - it interacts with information that 
lies beyond its current frame of reference: it is informed by limits and unknown variables. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari 
believe that within scientific fields, “it is as if the bifurcation were searching the infinite chaos of the virtual for new 
forms to actualize by carrying out a sort of potentialization of matter: carbon introduces a bifurcation into Mendeleev’s 
table, which, through its plastic properties, produces the state of organic matter” (ibid.). By learning about naturally 
occurring processes of organization, science can seek to catalyze or produce foreign ones. Because of the plastic properties 
of carbon that we have discovered, we now can explain why environments that lack carbon (along with water, etc.) seem 
to remain lifeless. Moreover, should be find ourselves capable of recreating these conditions through technology and 
human endeavor, we should likely see the organization of the constituent parts into organic matter. 
7 Mathematics, for example, is often seen as a universal language, even though it is more appropriately a wide-reaching 
language attuned to our bodily and technological senses. It is quite possible and even probable that with a drastic 
difference in scale or different processing of spacetime that mathematics will be revealed to be an insufficient model. 
And, indeed, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems indicate this to the careful reader. 
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Deleuzian ontology, science “cannot occupy a position of neutrality vis-à-vis its object, nor, strictly 
speaking, can it presume that this object already exists. At most we can say that a particular 
(historically specific) body of scientific thought has a reciprocal relationship with the object it 
determines” (Force of the Virtual 3). Deleuze’s logic of becoming applies not merely to some 
particular pattern of human thinking, but to the material universe itself in both its actual 
interactions and virtual potentialities: in short, the universe is becoming regardless of what we think 
about it. Becoming is – as far as we can tell – not opinion but empirical fact. Whether we are artists, 
scientists, philosophers or some amalgam of each, all of us draw on a common reality indifferent to 
our personal aims. 
How then might we account for science in cinema? How might the findings of 
contemporary science be incorporated into what cinema is and what it does in a practical way, 
especially into a cinema like Werner Herzog’s? As one of the three “daughters of chaos” alongside 
philosophy and art, science acts as a “fantastic slowing-down” through its functions in order to “gain 
a reference able to actualize the virtual,” proceeding chiefly through the prospects of logic (ibid.).8 
 
8 Deleuze and Guattari assert that the common logic of science is “reductionist not accidentally but essentially” and 
wants “to turn the concept into a function” (What is Philosophy? 135). While the limits necessary for functions were 
covered in the footnote above, with logic and prospects it is essentially a matter of variables. Deleuze and Guattari 
present the propositional function of “x is human”as an example, which they believe “clearly shows the position of an 
independent variable that does not belong to the function as such but without which the function is incomplete” (ibid.). 
That is to say, propositions and functions cannot be concepts because they lack any sort of radical self-referentiality and 
must always fall back upon a structure relating back to a set of axioms, of limits. Therefore, because scientific logic 
“considers empty reference in itself as simple truth value, it can only apply it to already constituted states of affairs or 
bodies, in established scientific propositions or in factual propositions (Napoleon is the one who was defeated at 
Waterloo) or in simple opinions (X thinks that…). All types of propositions are prospects, with an information value. 
Logic has therefore a paradigm...which is no longer that of religion or science but like the recognition of truth in prospects 
or informative propositions” (What is Philosophy? 138). This sort of logic, which “kills the concept twice over” by 
attempting to place concepts in a discursive system and providing them with some sort of grounding reference, therefore 
becomes - and is frequently utilized as - an autocatalytic market strategy that feeds on information in order to sell truth 
claims, sell opinion (What is Philosophy? 140). Information technology, for example, and even or especially the logic of 
the standard computing model, are bound up within an economy of opinion that they cannot escape or even critique 
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Science acts in many ways like a “freeze-frame” within cinema, a singular photograph prescinded 
from moving images that makes actual some aspect of the virtual by providing a universal plane of 
reference (What is Philosophy? 118-119). Science attempts to halt the infinite speeds of chaos by 
providing a still picture of the universe, functioning under mathematical law, whose creative efforts 
lie in the rewriting of limits set by that frame of reference: “science is haunted not by its own unity 
but by a plane of reference constituted by all the limits or borders through which it confronts chaos” 
(What is Philosophy? 119). This can be juxtaposed with the concepts of philosophy which provide 
“the virtual a consistency specific to it,” or the affects and percepts of art that “create the finite that 
restores the infinite [chaos]” through its “aesthetic figures” (What is Philosophy? 197). But the 
question of how science, art, and philosophy come together and interact within cinema is one that is 
just beginning to be seriously posed. This is best accomplished by first examining several 
fundamental concepts of cinema developed by Deleuze in some detail. 
In Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, Deleuze provides a sweeping account of classical and modern 
cinema. Focusing his thought on two major categories drawn chiefly from Bergson – the movement- 
image and the time-image – Deleuze sets out to develop a taxonomy of cinematographic images, to 
define and refine the concepts of cinema. To reiterate Deleuze’s points from the conclusion of 
Cinema 2, “cinema’s concepts are not given in cinema. And yet they are cinema’s concepts, not 
theories about cinema” (280). That is to say, cinema’s concepts are part the medium’s materiality as 
much as its technological aspects: cinema’s concepts are quite literally “blocs of space-time” with 
 
 
without radical social and semiotic adjustment, a change in their conceptual makeup. This is the role that philosophy 
and art can play in the furthering of scientific functions - providing them with conceptual, affective and perceptive 
imagination. This will be addressed more fully in my analysis of Herzog’s 2016 documentary, Lo and Behold. 
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space and time its fundamental realities (Cinema 1 61). If it is, as Deleuze argues, the task of 
philosophy to “produce” such concepts as a “conceptual practice” then these concepts would have to 
be philosophical explanations of empirically validated points of view on space and time, as well as 
spacetime (Cinema 2 280). Yet, as one can imagine, this was no easy task for Deleuze himself, nor is 
it for his readers today. The two volumes took him roughly a decade to complete and are replete 
with an almost encyclopedic breadth of comments taken from literary texts, philosophical works, 
scientific articles, and, of course, from cinema itself. From the latter, Deleuze cites almost a thousand 
different films and hundreds of directors, but after closer reading, one can identify key examples for 
Deleuze’s overall theory and general argument. As is often the case with Deleuze, however, many of 
these key examples are brushed over quickly or mentioned almost in passing, leaving the reader to 
trace the line of thought themselves or – and sometimes dangerously – to simply take Deleuze at his 
word. Unfortunately, mastering Deleuzian terminology is no easy task and Deleuze at times employs 
a frustratingly individualized use of vocabulary that necessitates careful and near-constant 
reexamination. As Martin Schwab puts it, “Deleuze’s basic concepts…are always deployed with a 
spin intended to differentiate them from standard definitions” (113). The greatest impediment to 
understanding Deleuze’s system is not that he deploys such “spin,” however, but rather coming to 
terms with the vast literature outside of philosophy that Deleuze utilized to create his concepts and 
in particular scientific literature. Because Deleuze felt free to make comparisons between philosophy, 
art, and science, many of the concepts he develops are based not just on the philosophical traditions 
his work arose out of. Deleuze’s fundamental usage of “space” and “time” in particular benefit from 
scientific examination rather than purely philosophical speculation: a fact all too rarely recognized. 
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Nonetheless, the philosophical lineage Deleuze harks back to – and in particular the formulations of 
Kant’s critical philosophy – is important to understand before more contemporary notions of space 
and time can be adequately understood. 
As a 20th Century thinker, Deleuze had an image of space and time that was remarkably 
different than his philosophical predecessors, but nonetheless followed in the footsteps of Kantian 
Critique. As part of his Transcendental Aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states very 
clearly what has become an untenable position in light of scientific discoveries from the last two 
centuries: space and time are aspects of the subject rather than empirical realities on their own.9 
General relativity and quantum mechanics have since taught us that Kant was remarkably on the 
right track but faltered in certain, important aspects; Einstein himself read Kant extensively before 
ultimately disagreeing with his formulations of space and time in favor of an empirically relative 
concept of time that salvaged an unassailable practicality for science and diminished the importance 
of critical philosophy as an encompassing system.10 
 
 
 
9 In The Critique of Pure Reason space is “not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience,” 
but rather as a “necessary representation a priori, forming the foundation of all external intuitions...a condition of the 
possibility of phenomena, not as a determination produced by them” (23-24). Space is for Kant at this point strictly 
three-dimensional, a “pure intuition” that is “represented as an infinite quantity” and is the a priori of intuition itself 
rather than a concept created by thought or philosophy (24-25). Likewise, time is for Kant “not an empirical concept 
deduced from any experience,” due to the fact that intuition itself would be impossible without time as a given a priori 
(Critique of Pure Reason 29). Time is instead a “pure form of sensuous intuition” that has “only one dimension; different 
times are not simultaneous but successive, while different spaces are never successive, but simultaneous” (ibid.). And, 
furthermore, as a pure form of sensuous intuition a priori to representations, “time is therefore simply a subjective 
condition” and “apart from the subject, nothing” (Critique of Pure Reason 32). 
10 More specifically, general relativity invalidates once and for all that Kant’s synthetic a priori could be empirically 
accurate. This is especially important to note, because this is precisely the line that Deleuze is able to draw between 
science and philosophy, that tasks philosophy with extending beyond Kantian critique, as well as negative dialectics, and 
continually create new concepts appropriate to the age and contemporary state of science. For Einstein’s full explanation 
see: Albert Einstein, "Elsbach's Buch: Kant und Einstein," Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 1 (1924): cols. 1685–169. Doc. 321 in 
Collected Papers of Albert Einstein: Volume 14: The Berlin Years: Writings & Correspondence, April 1923-May 1925. Ed. 
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Kant’s positions on space and time were utterly revolutionary at the time of their formation 
and have been highly influential, remaining so in some sectors to this day. In fact, these initial 
Kantian contentions are by now a deeply ingrained way of seeing space and time by many and one 
that is rather easy to lapse back into if one is not careful. Deleuze starts his own analysis of space and 
time in his early work Kant’s Critical Philosophy precisely from the Kantian spatiotemporal position, 
taking account of the perhaps unintentional consequences of Kantian critique and in the process 
provides key starting points for contemporary philosophical theorization. In his Preface, Deleuze 
therefore teases out “four poetic formulas” which might best summarize Kantian critical philosophy 
as a whole, each having to do with the concepts of space and time. These “four poetic formulas” 
create in turn a fruitful lens to inspect Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema in reference to the cinema of 
Werner Herzog. 
For the first “poetic formula,” Deleuze invokes Shakespeare’s Hamlet, who claims that “time 
is out of joint” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy vii). For Deleuze, a major shift in human thought 
concerning space and time occurs with Kant’s critical philosophy because it “unhinges time” by 
inverting the relationship of time and movement (ibid.). According to Deleuze: 
As long as time remains on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or 
number. This was the view of ancient philosophy. But time out of joint signifies the reversal of the movement- 
time relationship. It is now movement which is subordinate to time. Everything changes, including 
movement...Time is no longer related to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to the time 
which conditions it: this is the first great Kantian reversal in the Critique of Pure Reason. (ibid.) 
 
 
 
Diana Kormos Buchwald et al., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. Translation from English Translation 
Supplement. pp. 324-25. 
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Kant’s critical philosophy overrides the thinking of the ancients in that it requires new definitions of 
both space and time by no longer allowing time to be thought of simply as a matter of succession. 
Complicated by the findings of general relativity, time is indeed “out of joint” but more specifically, 
the continuous flow of past-present-future that philosophy and common sense had maintained has 
been replaced by a relative situation in which each realm is interactive with the other. While the 
processing of time does indeed seem to be linear to the human brain, its empirical functioning is far 
more complicated.11 Once time cannot be thought of as only in terms of succession, according to 
Deleuze, “space cannot be defined by coexistence” either, but too must be seen in relative terms; an 
event must always calibrated between at least two spaces and not taking place in one, permeating 
neutral space at a specific time (Kant’s Critical Philosophy viii). 
The second “poetic formula” drawn from Kant’s critical philosophy is Rimbaud’s phrase “I is 
another,” and again is derived from The Critique of Pure Reason (ibid.). Deleuze describes this as “the 
most difficult aspect” of Kant’s views on space and time to grasp because it is so incredibly different 
than our everyday experience of self (ibid.). Moreover, today we can easily see that it relates to the 
position on general relativity broached above. In Kant’s critique, “the Ego itself is in time, and thus 
constantly changing: it is a passive, or rather receptive, Ego which experiences changes in time” 
(ibid.). Yet, Deleuze claims, “on the other hand, the I is an act which constantly carries out a 
 
 
11 There are myriad accounts of this and many have worked their way into both scientific literature and pop culture. In 
terms of the cinema, one might site Christopher Nolan’s 2014 Interstellar. Mathematically speaking, and, should the 
body be capable of surviving it and the technology required be invented, practically speaking too, this film’s story is 
viable: a father could indeed, by getting close to the event horizon of a black hole, return to earth to find himself to be 
far younger than his daughter. Numerous Hollywood indulgences are of course taken within the film, but this sort of 
“time travel” through relativity is indeed possible and occurs routinely between objects in space, even in almost 
imperceptible ways with the things here on earth. Time passes, for example, slower at sea level than it does at the top of a 
mountain by being more approximate to Earth’s gravitational center. 
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synthesis of time, and of that which happens in time, by dividing up the present, the past and the 
future at every instant” (ibid.). Deleuze means that, by following Kant’s logic through to its natural 
conclusion, we come to realize that there is no “true” ego underlying our identities, but rather the 
passage of time and the effects of the external events around us that carve us out, slowly chipping 
away at our form and ceaselessly altering that form. With the tools established in Kant’s critical 
philosophy, and echoing the Nietzschean notion that the self is not individual, but rather always at 
bare minimum and at any moment “dividual,” Deleuze shows that the splitting of time in its very 
formation divides us from ourselves and never ceases to divide us. All those various pasts that are 
open to critical interpretation and still exist within the present reveal the identity as a process rather 
than an essence. 
That the “I is another” is so difficult to grasp because it is for Deleuze a direct reversal of 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum: in the Kantian determination, an ‘I think’ is “determinable only in time, 
under the form of time, thus as the existence of a phenomenal, receptive and changing ego...I cannot 
therefore constitute myself as a unique and active subject, but as a passive ego which represents to 
itself only the activity of its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an Other which affects it” (Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy viii-ix). Within the Cartesian determination, a strictly speaking moral 
consciousness, capable of righteous action is possible, yet, against Kant’s own intentions, the critical 
philosophy sunders the individual subjects’ self-conception and leaves them with the ethical 
conundrum of right action, caught up and formed in time. In Deleuze’s reading of Kant there is 
always something external that preconditions action, and true self-determination becomes impossible 
to conceive of. 
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Deleuze will later refer to this as the subjectivity that is in time in his works on cinema. It is 
the equivalent of saying that at this point, with Kant’s determinations, “time moves into the subject, 
in order to distinguish the Ego from the I in it. It is the form under which the I affects the ego, that 
is, that way in which the mind affects itself” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy ix). That is, it is only here, 
once the individual identity is split and the processes of subjectification become apparent to the 
subject, can one come to appreciate the effects of time and the way that, just as much as we are 
capable of forming ourselves through conscious choice, we too are formed of our time. It is not a 
simple matter of thinking of time as something in us, but rather that “our interiority constantly 
divides us from ourselves, splits us in two” and causes “a giddiness, an oscillation” (ibid.). And, for 
Deleuze, this giddy splitting never ceases to occur. There is no indivisible notion of self precisely 
because time has no end in terms of the Ego/I; a subject that is in time has the unflagging ability to 
be sundered and sundered again by the bifurcations of time itself. It becomes more and more 
difficult to think of oneself after Kant as an independent and free subject, but rather as a split ego/I 
that continually has to establish and reestablish itself as it falls and breaks, over and over again, from 
the continuum of time being pulled out from underfoot. Identity formation becomes, for Deleuze, 
beset on all sides by affectual shocks that paralyze it temporarily and force the identity to recognize a 
crisis in the moral grounds of its actions. 
The third “poetic formula” concerns something arising this time from Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason and, according to Deleuze, “might appear in formulas akin to those of Kafka” 
(Kant’s Critical Philosophy ix-x). It takes the form of a pure imperative, “you must!” In this work, 
Kant inverts the traditional relationship of the law and the Good, which is for Deleuze “as important 
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as the reversal of the movement-time relationship” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy x). Where former 
philosophies maintained that the law flowed out from the Good, Kant’s critical system and its new 
determinations of space and time force the good to instead flow out of the Law. According to 
Deleuze, the Law becomes a “pure form” in Kant that “has no object: neither sensible nor 
intelligible. It does not tell us what we must do, but to what (subjective) rule we must conform, 
whatever our action” (ibid.). In the aftermath of critical thought, in order to access the Good, one is 
not simply able to follow the law, for the law no longer specifies a righteous course of action. 
Instead, conformity to a Law which goes unstated is required for good or even safe action - anything 
else can quite literally be seen as illegal activity. Alluding to Kafka’s parable Vor dem Gesetz in Das 
Urteil, as well as his short story In der Strafkolonie, Deleuze is fundamentally trying to assert that the 
empty form of Law that simply says “you must!” rather than give specific demands replaces the 
possibility of moral certainty of action with an ethical and practical determination. Much like the 
case for Kafka’s characters, guilt becomes for the new subject – that again arises from Kant’s new 
determinations of space and time – a necessity. In such a conception, Deleuze argues that we can 
“know [the law] only through its imprint on our heart and in our flesh; we are guilty, necessarily 
guilty. Guilt is like the moral thread which duplicates the thread of time” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
xi). This sort of foundational, fundamental and a priori guilt would occur for anyone who does not 
directly mirror the course of common Law with their actions: thought itself in the critical sense 
would become a crime one is guilty of and not a simple or righteous action one is capable of. 
The fourth and final “poetic formula” that Deleuze chooses to embody Kant’s philosophy 
comes once again from Rimbaud and this time takes a physical tone: “a disorder of all the senses,” 
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or, as Deleuze translates into Kantian terms, “an unregulated exercise of all the faculties” (ibid.). 
That is, the primary and dominating sense of vision one finds in pre-critical philosophies begins to 
give way to other senses. Citing the Critique of Judgement, Deleuze describes the late Kant as one 
who proposes an “aesthetic of the Beautiful and the Sublime, in which the sensible is valid in itself 
and unfolds in a pathos beyond all logic, which will grasp time in its surging forth, in the very origin 
of its thread and its giddiness” (KCP, xii). That is, Kant, helping sow the seeds of Romanticism by 
suggesting the idea that critical thought could somehow supplicate to or ask exception of Nature, 
and the fatally flawed notion that an inspiration of Genius might come to appreciate the logic of 
Nature or channel its. This sets up for Deleuze this amounts to the “final Kantian reversal,” by 
granting an organic, human knowledge a “discordant accord” with beautiful or sublime Nature 
(Kant’s Critical Philosophy xii-xiii). This sort of discordant accord was, according to Deleuze, to 
“define future philosophy” and creates “a new music as discord, and as a discordant accord, the 
source of time” (Kant’s Critical Philosophy xiii). And, while this incredibly dangerous sort of 
Romanticism still operates in large swathes of our culture and our technology,12 it is not a 
methodology to be praised, but rather critiqued and – with the help of science and art – one day 
possibly to be overcome. 
These four “poetic formulas” are therefore not merely creative ways for Deleuze to elucidate 
the philosophical problematics of Kantian thought, they are the core of the contemporary 
problematics of creative human thought itself, including artistic and scientific thought. Deleuze 
 
 
12 See Arthur Kroker’s The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism (1984) or more recently Mark Cokelbergh’s 
excellent monograph New Romantic Cyborgs (2017) for ample evidence of just how Romantic our notions and uses of 
technology truly are and have increasingly become since the time of Kant. 
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himself admits that these formulas are “clearly arbitrary in relation to Kant,” that is they don’t bear 
on anything directly in Kant and Kant himself certainly would not argue for them, but are 
summations of Deleuze’s own analysis (ibid.). However, Deleuze goes on to say that the content of 
the poetic formulas is “not at all arbitrary in relation to what Kant has left us for the present and the 
future” (ibid.). The “poetic formulas” of critical philosophy are the starting positions for the 
explorations of modern cinema and not its end, not a happy or praiseworthy situation but the 
bedrock of global dilemmas and personal agonies. The poetic formulas Deleuze derives from 
critiquing Kant presage an entire new approach to cinema and thought itself founded fundamentally 
on post-Kantian conceptualizations of space and time, on the dizzying world of four-dimensional 
spacetime, and require us to rethink those very terms in order that we might develop a philosophy, 
politics, and ethics appropriate to the desperate conditions they force on the human subject. 
Moreover, they are the starting point for “modern” cinema for Deleuze and what differentiates it from 
“classical” cinema: a direct look into time out of joint in the cinema and its effects on the modern, post- 
Kantian subject, with all the difficulties that entails for the individual. Deleuze does not extoll the 
analyses of Kant, but treats them as the gravest of human problems, treats Kant as an enemy, and 
one whose legacy has left the world playing with philosophical fire, even if it took Deleuze most of 
his career to truly appreciate these dangers.13 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Failing to understand the full dangers of this sort of machine-based Romanticism can still blatantly be seen in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. This work, if read in isolation, has extremely troubling political ends that went against its 
authors human aims. Tempered in A Thousand Plateaus and more directly acknowledged in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze 
and Guattari slowly came around to face the inhuman horrors that romanticizing an indifferent nature brings about and 
provided at least a partial platform on which superjective, humanistic thinking might one day take place. 
29  
While these poetic formulas were penned more than fifty years ago, the sentiment remains 
the same; they are the foundational problems that we are still attempting to untangle today in an 
array of artistic, humanistic, and scientific disciplines. The difference is, however, that much of the 
fourth dimension that Kant began to open up within his critical philosophy and causes time to 
become “out of joint” has now been effectively theorized and empirically validated. At the risk of 
stating the obvious, science had moved on from Kant by the time of Deleuze’s formulations and 
reflections on the philosophy of cinema; huge technological and scientific advances were made that 
allowed Deleuze to comprehend aspects of the universe that in Kant’s time must have appeared 
speculative in the extreme or totally indecipherable, not the least of which the discoveries of general 
relativity and quantum mechanics. As stated above, after Einstein, among others, we simply cannot 
look at nature the same way, and cannot fairly ignore the relativistic nature of time, nor can we 
completely forget the quantum nature of space. As a result, Deleuze was better able to comprehend 
the impact of Kantian critique by drawing on these advances and incorporating some of their 
findings into his view. In fact, it is not unfair to say that Einstein’s formulations of special and 
general relativity bear as much or even more weight on Deleuze’s methodologies concerning the 
space and time of cinema than Kant’s theories do, even if, as a philosopher, Deleuze grounded his 
work by critiquing the latter. The point is much of what could once be thought of as theoretical 
opinion has, over time, become empirical fact. Thus, in order to properly address the space and time 
of cinema, one must not only follow Deleuze’s use, but also incorporate contemporary scientific 
understanding of these terms. And, indeed, this is one of the most fruitful platforms from which to 
critique or update Deleuze’s system in turn. 
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While it is nearly impossible to know precisely what conceptions of space and time Deleuze 
had in mind when writing Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, it is blatantly clear that scientific notions of 
space and time were a vital part of the picture. In Cinema 1, for example, Deleuze cites the “physio- 
biological domain” as corresponding to his use of “milieu,” which is embodied, actualized space, and 
the “mathematical domain” to correspond to the “notion of space” in its more abstract sense when 
formulating his ideas of the cinema of the Large and the Small14 (Cinema 1 186). Moreover, as cited 
above in his comparisons between Resnais and the thermodynamic physicist Ilya Prigogine and the 
mathematician Rene Thom’s link to Jean-Luc Godard, Deleuze not only acknowledged but was 
rather fond of charting parallels between philosophy, including his own cinematic concepts, and 
scientific findings. Deleuze sees Bergson’s thought, for example, as “closely linked to Riemannian 
spaces15 in mathematics and physics” (Negotiations 30). Elsewhere, Bergson’s studies on time and 
duration were for Deleuze “the metaphysical counterpart of modern science,” through which 
Bergson sought to “give the theory of relativity the metaphysics it lacked” (Two Regimes of Madness 
341). Bergson’s magnum opus, Matter and Memory, which is the very same work upon which 
Deleuze’s theories of cinema are grounded, “draws the conditions for a new metaphysics of memory 
 
 
14 It is also not merely coincidence that Deleuze cites Herzog as the director to explain the figures of Large and Small 
cinema. See Cinema 1, pp. 184-186. 
15 Deleuze is acutely aware of what Riemannian space can mean for both philosophy and cinema. This “differential 
geometry” that can mathematically explain “manifolds” serves as a key inspiration for Deleuze work on Leibniz, The 
Fold. It also serves as a cornerstone of “The Smooth and the Striated” in A Thousand Plateaus. Finally, in Negotiations 
Deleuze states of Riemannian space, “I see after the war a new kind of space based on neighborhoods appears, the 
connections between one little portion and another being made in an infinite number of possible ways and not 
predetermined. A sort of disconnected space. If I say the cinematic space is Riemannian, it seems facile, and yet in a way 
it’s quite true. I’m not saying that cinema is doing what Riemann did. But if one takes a space defined simply as 
neighborhoods joined up in an infinite number of possible ways, with visual and aural neighborhoods joined in a tactile 
way, then it’s Bresson’s space. Bresson isn’t Riemann, of course, but what he does in cinema is the same as what 
happened in mathematics, and echoes it” (124). 
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from a scientific conception of the brain” (ibid.). According to Deleuze, to continue such a line of 
research today means “developing a metaphysical image of thought that corresponds to the new 
lines, openings, leaps and dynamics discovered by molecular biologists of the brain: new connections 
and reconnections in thought” (ibid.). It is therefore clear that when Deleuze described the spaces 
and times of cinema, he inevitably had scientific parallels in mind; one must have at least a general 
awareness of scientific definitions of space and time in order to fully appreciate the conceptual 
apparatus provided by Deleuze in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. 
Though it might seem a commonplace contention, another difficulty that comes with the 
“spin” of Deleuze’s cinematographic concepts is that the way one understands the terms space and 
time differs greatly across scientific disciplines and has changed a great deal throughout history. 
Theorizations of space and time not only “progress” toward more scientifically rigorous definitions, 
at times they even “regress” to something more closely akin to previous formulations. Aristotle’s 
“aether,” for example, was used frequently in scientific literature from Ancient Greece up until the 
late 1800s to describe the substance that permeated all space beyond Earth, before it was by and 
large abandoned after the findings of the Michelson-Morley Experiment in 1887.16 Aether’s 
synonym, quintessence, however, is now being utilized in scientific discourses surrounding dark 
 
 
16 This experiment, undertaken in Cleveland, Ohio, was centered around comparing the speed of light in perpendicular 
directions. Light was projected and its speed measured through “luminiferous aether” hoping to detect the relative 
motion of matter. The result of the experiment, however, was negative and there was no significant difference in the 
speed of light through the presumed aether and the speed of light emitted at right angles. This was the first empirical 
evidence going against the then popular theorizations about aether and paved the way for the research that led to 
Einstein’s formulations of special relativity, which invalidated the concept of a stationary aether altogether. This is also 
why the Michelson-Morley is often considered to be “the most famous failed experiment in history.” Einstein himself 
commented, “If the Michelson-Morley experiment had not brought us into serious embarrassment [about being 
incorrect concerning aether], no one would have regarded the relativity theory as a (halfway) redemption” (Albrecht 
Fölsing (1998). Albert Einstein: A Biography, 219). 
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matter and dark energy, the as of yet still hypothetical substance that accounts for roughly 85% of 
the universe’s mass and the immanent energy of empty space, which likely accounts for two-thirds of 
all cosmic energy.17 The point is that when one discusses space and time as I do in this study, it is 
vital to understand that these terms have histories and uses that extend far beyond their everyday 
conceptions. Moreover, they have varied uses that can often confound the reader or lead them astray; 
they have changing definitions that can often be mutually exclusive if one looks at them from a 
scientific perspective compared to their general public use or even their philosophical definitions. In 
each dimension, space and time are not the same thing. As such, no full account can be given. Certain 
problems with the concepts of space and time are inevitably going to emerge due to these 
dissonances, but it is nonetheless important to provide a few points of further context for how space 
and time will be utilized in our central concern with the philosophy of cinema and in analyzing the 
films of Werner Herzog. 
Scientifically speaking, space and time as separate entities are in light of special and general 
relativity little more than a semantically helpful illusion, a more convenient way to talk about and 
envision spacetime, because its full reality exceeds our sensory capabilities. Given that humans 
experience the world chiefly in terms of three dimensions, it is only fitting that we also talk about it 
in similar terms. Nonetheless, empirical reality is rather more complicated and in the wake of Planck 
(quantum mechanics) and Einstein (the photoelectric effect and relativity), there is undeniable 
 
 
17 Quintessence is, for example, used as the title for the cosmologist Lawrence Krauss’ revised monograph on the physics 
of dark matter. Krauss’ work is a particularly important example, as we will see, in connection to Werner Herzog. Not 
only is Herzog acutely aware of Krauss’ work, he has recently utilized Krauss as an actor in his narrative film Salt and 
Fire, as well as an important interviewee in the documentary Lo and Behold, both of which are analyzed in detail in later 
chapters. Krauss’ roles clearly demonstrate a direct link between particle physics and cinematic efforts for Herzog. 
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scientific proof of at the very least a fourth dimension to spacetime and very likely more. Thus, when 
one speaks of space or time as separate, one is prescinding the complicated nature of their empirical 
reality for the sake of easily communicable language. In other words, speaking about spacetime is 
particularly difficult because it forces one to set aside this extremely practical bias and consider 
empirical or “real” much that lies beyond the veil of human senses. In A Brief History of Time, for 
example, Stephen Hawking provides a glossary of terms, concisely defined as they are utilized in 
contemporary physics, identifying spacetime as “the four-dimensional space whose points are events” 
with events in turn being “a point in space-time, identified by its time and space” (200, 203). Such 
events are precisely the “events” that Deleuze has in mind with his philosophy of cinema: ‘events’ 
and ‘becoming’ occur beyond the pale of three dimensions, but they do not occur beyond the reach 
of thought - they can and are thought and experienced, but they are always done so through the creative 
endeavors of philosophy, art, and science. 
In fact, for Deleuze, coming to terms with and expanding such spatiotemporal perspectives is 
the entire point of developing a rigorous philosophy of cinema. When Deleuze speaks of the “direct 
time-image” that grounds his work in cinema, he is more precisely speaking of a spacetime event, 
what he terms a “temporal structure” that “goes beyond” the traditional “succession of time - past- 
present-future” (Cinema 2 xii). That is to say, Deleuze – and I along with him – was firmly 
convinced that empirically “there are yet more temporal structures” and that the “whole aim” of 
analyzing film from the perspective of a realist ontology is to “release those [structures] that the 
cinematographic image has been able to grasp and reveal, and which can echo the teachings of 
science” (ibid.). Reading a cinema like Herzog’s as a grammar of images is to research the “temporal 
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structures” that extend beyond the frequently assumed dimensionality and linear progression of past- 
present-future. 
The best way to come to terms with this contention conceptually and empirically is to 
explore the actuality/virtuality distinction that Deleuze invokes throughout his philosophy dating 
back to Difference and Repetition. As noted above, the concept of the virtual plays a vital role in 
Deleuze’s thinking and in particularly his philosophy of cinema. And, in fact, the virtual as 
something empirically “real” lies behind the whole of Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze claimed that 
“the virtual is not opposed to the real but the actual” and never tired of reiterating that fact 
(Difference and Repetition 208). Moreover, Deleuze felt that “the virtual must be defined as strictly 
part of [any] real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it 
plunged as though into an objective dimension” (Difference and Repetition 209). The virtual is 
inherently part of everything we consider “real” and perhaps is best seen as a sort of differential, 
probability space out of which actual events emerge. For Deleuze the “reality of the virtual is 
structure” – and he means this in a completely empirically verifiable, scientific sense (ibid.). The 
virtual is a material structure of the universe, not a metaphysical, ghostly realm, but rather a physical 
realm that operates at a microscopic magnitude we have yet to fully understand. 
While many ideas that likely influenced Deleuze’s thinking concerning virtuality were in the 
air during his lifetime, since his death, many of these formulations have come to seem both obvious 
and undeniable from a scientific point of view. For example, before Deleuze’s death “virtual 
particles” were already theorized and empirically verified to a degree by experimental physics, but 
were still rather vaguely understood. These particles, which are one of the foundational concepts of 
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quantum mechanics, are defined as “a particle that can never be directly detected, but whose 
existence does have measurable effects” (Hawking 204). Such particles seem to pop in and out of 
existence, emerging from what seemed at one point to be nothingness, but is now conceptualized 
under the umbrella of the quantum field. In a recent Scientific American article, Gordon Kane, the 
director of the Michigan Center for Theoretical Physics at the University of Michigan, attempted to 
relate to the intellectual public that: 
Virtual particles are indeed real particles. Quantum theory predicts that every particle spends some time as a 
combination of other particles in all possible ways. These predictions are very well understood and tested. 
Quantum mechanics allows, and indeed requires, temporary violations of conservation of energy, so one 
particle can become a pair of heavier particles (the so-called virtual particles), which quickly rejoin into the 
original particle as if they had never been there. If that were all that occurred, we would still be confident that it 
was a real effect because it is an intrinsic part of quantum mechanics, which is extremely well tested, and is a 
complete and tightly woven theory – if any part of it were wrong the whole structure would collapse.18 
Thus, it should be no real stretch of the imagination to take Deleuze’s concept of the virtual 
seriously or even to treat it as empirical fact. Thousands of scientists are doing so on a daily basis 
across the entire globe and, as of yet, no proof exists that can invalidate quantum functioning. 
The virtual is therefore not to be thought of simply as a philosophical construct, but is rather 
a key component of material structure, the “temporal structures” found in cinema and the universe 
itself. Take, for a second example, the very recent discovery of the Higgs boson and the Higgs field 
in 2013.19 This field is theorized to permeate spacetime and proved that at the quantum level, 
 
18 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-virtual-particles-rea/ 
19 According to the Italian particle physicist Carlo Rovelli, the discovery of the Higgs particle and Higgs field “was 
actually observed and found to have precisely the properties predicted by the Standard Model” (Reality 129). This proved 
definitively that “the world is not made up of fields and particles but of a single type of entity: the quantum field. There 
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virtuality is as iron-clad a theory as gravity itself. And if the philosophy of cinema is to continue on 
from Deleuze’s formulations, it must do so by refining its terms or even adding them in light of the 
discoveries of modern science. Recent experiments in CERN particle accelerators, the 2019 imaging 
of black holes for the first time, research into quantum gravity: all of these advances point not to the 
question of whether or not the virtual is real, for that has already been proven, but instead are 
beginning to discover precisely how the virtual works and how actualized space and time arise from 
virtual events. Experiments are underway that seek to better comprehend the virtual field, to 
understand its purview and more accurately explain its functioning. 
Cinema must keep up with and stage, or “monstrate” these scientific results as best it can in 
order to maintain its relevance as anything akin to an art, as an important tool for human thought. 
Yet, this is no easy process. Just like the mathematics of the quantum realm, that can only treat their 
subjects indirectly and conceptualize them only through actual effects, the cinema is incapable of 
simply showing this process in its entirety. It is never a matter of a single, still frame within a film 
that could capture the virtual itself. Instead, in order to make this as of yet unrepresentable realm 
comprehensible, cinema must explicitly or implicitly acknowledge its existence, as well as chart 
process of formation for its underlying concepts, the times and spaces that comprise the images of 
cinema themselves. Furthermore, to aid in this task, the cinema now demands the creation of new, 
nonlinear narrative strategies and methodological approaches to montage and cinematic music that 
 
 
 
 
 
are no longer particles that move in space with the passage of time, but quantum fields whose elementary events happen 
in spacetime. The world is strange but simple” (ibid.). There is, quite literally and empirically, a virtual plane from which 
“actual” matter emerges, much like Deleuze argued long before his theorizations could be scientifically verified. 
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are but nascent in their development. It is not the task of cinema to “show” the virtual, so much as 
make it – and the dangers that come with it – known. 
With this in mind, it is vital to reiterate that this dissertation is not a classical critique of a 
Deleuzian philosophy of cinema. Instead, I have taken up the task of thinking with Deleuze about 
Herzogian cinema. I am not seeking to validate the virtual itself, as its empirical reality is beyond 
doubt, but rather to examine in what guises it appears and to investigate how it functions in 
Herzogian cinema. Much like Isabelle Stenger does in her magisterial study of Whitehead, I map 
Herzog’s films along Deleuzian lines to see where that might lead at both the analytical and 
conceptual level. In other words, I am using Deleuzian theory as a tool to think through Herzogian 
cinema in a manner that might shed new light on his films – some of which have seen little to no 
critical attention – and in the end show how those very same films might in turn provide a platform 
for new investigations into the philosophy of cinema. I do not critique Deleuzian methodology 
wholesale, though I do seek to build upon it in my conclusions. The fact is, if one doesn’t mind the 
apt pun, that a Deleuzian approach to cinema is light-years ahead of any other currently available; 
this is because Deleuze, unlike most traditional philosophers, built his theories on a wide range of 
artistic, philosophical, and scientific works rather than conceptual works alone. While Deleuze himself 
was the first to admit that his philosophy of cinema was in some ways incomplete – as all 
philosophies inevitably are – the system he developed, rooted deeply in Peircian semiotics, is so 
robust to changes at the grammatical level that it might be fairly described as bordering on scientific. 
And just like within science, one does not and cannot dismiss valid functions; there is thankfully no 
question of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Instead, I can only hope that, through 
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creative thought and experiment, new concepts, affects, percepts and functions can be discovered 
and that the old can be rethought and refined. It is a matter of coming to better terms with 
Deleuzian philosophy and its contemporary social implications rather than overriding it. And one 
simple but vital way that Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema can be further developed is by bringing his 
conceptual schematics up to date with the contemporary findings of cutting-edge scientific research, 
creating parallels and resonances with contemporary scientific fields and recent films. 
Finally, I would like to include a summary note for this work. In Dark Deleuze, Andrew 
Culp mentions, “Deleuze once told a friend that a ‘worthwhile book’ performs at least three 
functions: polemics, recovery, and creativity...the author must reveal that (1) other scholarship 
commits an error; (2) an essential insight has been missed; and (3) a new concept can be created” 
(1). This dissertation sets similar goals for itself. By applying a thoroughly Deleuzian reading to 
several of Herzog’s films and especially recent films that have generated little to no commentary thus 
far, I demonstrate that Herzog scholarship has (1) committed and continues to commit the error of 
reading him ironically, as a neo-Romantic, as politically suspect (2) Herzog’s pragmatism and 
diagrammatics have been overlooked, as well as his Stoicism, his humor. These contentions serve as a 
foundation for new interpretations that view Herzog’s efforts toward forging a new grammar of 
images as inextricably bound to an empirically informed philosophy of cinema. And (3) new 
concepts can be created through analyzing Herzog’s landscapes, his reveries, his micropolitics. If 
Herzog’s oeuvre begs the philosophical questions “what is the cinema?” and “what are its ethics?” as I 
argue, a new taxonomy of cinematic syntax – and potentially even morphology – suggests itself 
alongside further theorizations of its spatiotemporal grammar. 
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Beginning with Chapter I, I attempt to explicate Herzog’s “non-ironic” efforts to formulate a 
new grammar of images and how this relates to Deleuze’s own mission to engender a new image of 
thought. A Stoic and a pragmatist, Herzog draws on humor and an indifferent Nature to ground his 
cinematic projects. In Chapter II, I utilize Deleuze’s concept of the time-image to provide a 
polemical reading of Herzog’s Herz aus Glas set against those found in secondary literature up until 
now. Defending Deleuze’s contention that, “in this film Herzog has set out the greatest crystal- 
images [a type of time-image] in the history of the cinema,” I argue that Herzog’s cinema is 
grounded in the logic of time-images and that this film serves as an apology for his role as a 
filmmaker (Cinema 2 75). Moreover, this position confirms Herzog’s denial of those works that seek 
to paint him a Romantic filmmaker and demonstrates instead how his entire cinema focuses on the 
post-Kantian problematics that the virtual field brings in tow. In Chapter III, I present an analysis of 
one of Herzog’s most prevalent landscapes: the volcano. Arguing that volcanic landscapes in 
Herzog’s oeuvre further cement his position as a four-tiered, pragmatic filmmaker, I demonstrate 
that for Herzog volcanoes are intimately tied to the problematic of landscape/face and ultimately 
serve as a powerful percept: the ur-landscape of thought itself. Finally, in Chapter IV I analyze 
Herzog’s recent documentary Lo and Behold in detail, focusing on the film’s emergent relationship 
with informatics. By examining Herzog’s take on the Internet, I present an account of how Herzog 
can also be seen as “the most metaphysical of cinema directors” but also that his metaphysics works 
in tandem with contemporary physics to present a humanistic challenge to informatics and critique 
its fundamentally binary logic (Cinema 1 185). 
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It is no coincidence that these three chapters in some way parallel the “Daughters of Chaos” 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy?: philosophy, art, and science (208). Now, as ever, 
philosophical concepts, artistic percepts and affects, and even scientific functions must find a new 
way of interacting and furthering each other’s creativity for such a thing to be achieved. For 
example, the Deleuzian concept of the time-image and the percept within Herzog’s work I call 
“volcanic 
(sur)face” offer starting points for future spatiotemporal critiques of film, which must face the 
cinema’s “internal struggle with informatics” and science in general if new aspects of cinematic 
grammar, syntax, and morphology are to be revealed (Cinema 2 270). In my conclusions, I provide 
a brief summary argument and gesture toward the possibility for a unifying concept for cinematic 
spacetimes that might yield profound ethical and aesthetic ramifications, and micropolitical 
consequences. 
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Chapter I: Werner Herzog and his New Grammar of Images 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the secondary literature on Werner Herzog is the 
majority of his critics’ utter reluctance to believe anything he says. In fact, the very terms of his 
comments are not merely ignored, they are all too frequently turned against his explicit intentions. 
Alan Singer, for example, describes Herzog’s cinema as achieving an “ironic sublime,” that pits 
representation against itself (204). The director, for his part, insists not only that his intentions are 
not to create irony, but that he is utterly incapable of irony as such, that he lacks a “sensory organ for 
irony” (Guide for the Perplexed 40). Comparing himself to the French, who he claims are masters of 
irony, Herzog styles himself a “brooding, squatting Bavarian bullfrog” that is “incapable of 
discussing art with people” (Guide for the Perplexed 41). 
To back up his claims, Herzog relates several stories in A Guide for the Perplexed (2014), an in- 
depth series of interviews with Paul Cronin that runs to nearly 500 pages. He recalls when 
Harmonie Korine prank phone called him, claimed to be a painter, and attempted to sell him some 
of his work – which Herzog refused, stating “I don’t have any art on my walls, only maps. 
Sometimes a family photo, but never a painting” (Guide for the Perplexed 40). Herzog was unable to 
identify his friend because he took every word literally and the ruse wasn’t dispelled until Korine 
began to laugh and told Herzog who it really was and that he was joking. Embarrassingly, Herzog 
claims that Korine “didn’t change his voice” and that it was simply his lack of irony that prevented 
him from recognizing his friend’s voice, taking each word, as it were, at face value (ibid.). Similarly, 
Florian Fricke – a musician Herzog has collaborated with on numerous occasions throughout his 
career – once called him pretending to be from the German Ministry of the Interior and saying there 
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had been a mix up, that Herzog had been falsely awarded the Bundesfilmpreis for his first major film 
Signs of Life. After “ten minutes” of Herzog reprimanding the minister for such a gross error (“You as 
Minister of the Interior are responsible for many things, including internal security and the safety of 
our borders. In what kind of state is your house?”), it was once again Fricke’s laugh that made 
Herzog realize he was being fooled (Guide for the Perplexed 40-41). Yet, once he knew what was 
going on, Herzog realized Fricke “hadn’t even used a different voice when he was playing the 
minister’s personal assistant, but I still took them as two different people. That’s how bad my 
communication defect is. When it comes to irony, there are things common to almost everyone that 
are lost on me” (Guide for the Perplexed 41). 
This lack of irony is a key component to understanding and interpreting Herzog’s films. Some 
scholars, like Eric Ames, attest to Herzog’s statements concerning his ironic “defect”: “Werner Herzog 
Eats His Shoe demonstrates his claim to take everything literally, without irony” (Ferocious Reality 
14). But far more often critics repeatedly place irony at the heart of Herzog’s work. Timothy 
Corrigan argues one must view Herzog as an ironic director, but one whose sense of irony does not 
fall into “traditional or modernist” categories, but rather “may very well subvert any binary 
distinctions” (14). This, Corrigan claims, “would align Herzog with other contemporary directors 
like Terrence Malick, Chantal Akerman, or Nagisa Oshima” (ibid.). Roger F. Cook writes of 
Herzog’s “ironic ecstasy” and “self-irony” in Woodcarver Steiner (281-298). Laurie Johnson writes on 
“interiority and irony” in The White Diamond (518-521). The list could go on. But it is key to note 
that the insistence of a central ironic element to Herzog’s work by the large majority of his critics is 
not only widespread, it evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the philosophical traditions his 
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films share an affinity with (many of which are, perhaps ironically, French). Shortly put, it 
misapprehends Herzog’s beginning as his ends. Contrary to such positions, I argue that Herzog’s 
lack of irony is drawn from his pragmatic empiricism. Rather than reveling in ironic ecstasy, which 
would be lapsing back into the Kantian Romanticism of The Critique of Judgment, Herzog instead 
takes this problematic as his starting point. Herzog’s films should be read as an attempt to come to 
terms with and move beyond the “poetic formulas” of Kant, not to simply chart a lineage of their 
development. Failing to recognize this causes us to underestimate the vital importance of the critique 
of language and the central aim of working on the grammar of images within Herzog’s films, the 
threads of which run from start to finish through his oeuvre and ground the conceptual framework 
of his cinema. 
Within empirical reality there are functional dimensions which bypass our senses and our 
understanding without scientific intervention. Empirical truth is to our common sense far stranger 
than fiction for the simple reason that words and information do not boil down to the same thing, 
despite sharing many structures. Information is never ironic, for it is not a demonstration but a 
monstration. It is only through playing with words and the concepts that underpin them that irony 
might arise. And Werner Herzog does his best to tightly cling to the information at hand, rely on 
direct representation rather than the joys of irony or metaphor. While Herzog has a proven track 
record of being hyperbolic, he is rarely so without a precise and calculated weighing of words. In 
fact, his responses are so distilled, so obviously measured, that his responses can at times seem 
scripted. Frequently portrayed as enigmatic or deliberately misleading, Herzog is most certainly 
elusive when asked for concrete meaning, for an ideology that extends beyond the scope of his films 
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and their functioning. Yet, about the films and about himself, Herzog has been remarkably candid, 
effusive even. To a degree that far surpasses almost any other living director, he has been willing to 
speak at length about his personal life, his films and the process of their creation, as volumes such as 
A Guide for the Perplexed and countless other lengthy interviews attest. Throughout his entire career, 
however, he has never wavered once on the issue of irony, insisting that he and his films have a great 
sense of humor to them, but no ironic elements whatsoever. 
While it is hard to imagine a human being completely free of irony, one can most certainly 
ascertain that Herzog indulges in far less than his fair share of the stuff and strains against irony 
when it arises. How, then, are we to ally such differences of opinion between creator and critic? One 
cannot and should not dismiss scholarship such as Singer’s, Corrigan’s, Cook’s and Johnson’s out of 
hand, which, it must be said, is rigorous and at times compelling. Yet, the vast majority of secondary 
literature on Herzog’s films leave their readers with the unsatisfying notion that the analysis is 
incomplete, that an exegesis of his films is unattainable. Elements and even entire scenes often do 
not fit within the analytic paradigm presented, most noticeably when psychoanalytical. This stems 
from a failure to take Herzog at his non-ironic word. For lacking irony is not simply a “defect” of 
character as Herzog intimates, but rather an entirely different philosophical and analytical position 
concerning film itself. While one can draw interesting conclusions from ironic readings of Herzog’s 
work, approaching his films with a non-ironic philosophy and analytic, through pragmatism and a 
realist ontology, however, brings a cohesion to them that almost all other interpretations lack. When 
viewed in this light, Herzog’s films often show themselves to be what he claims: efforts toward a 
“new grammar of images.” Herzog’s films are investigations into the nature of the cinematographic 
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image in addition to being compelling stories. They are experiments rather than solely 
representational artworks. 
The term a new grammar of images, which will prove vital to the analysis undertaken here, 
comes not coincidentally from the same short film Eric Ames claims demonstrates Herzog’s lack of 
irony, Werner Herzog Eats His Shoe. The film has a rather humorous, even silly origin. In it, Herzog 
likens being a filmmaker to being a “clown.” Following suit and splicing in scenes from The Gold 
Rush, where Charlie Chaplin, too, eats his shoe, Les Blank, the short film’s director, links Herzog’s 
clownishness not merely to Chaplin himself and his famous “Little Tramp” character, but also 
Chaplin’s inspirations for making the film. Chaplin claimed that The Gold Rush, and especially the 
scenes involving his shoes, were sparked by reading an account of the Donner Party, who resorted to 
cannibalism and consuming the leather of their shoes in order to survive after becoming snowbound 
in the Sierra Nevada. That is, eating one’s shoe is an act born of desperation, but also an amazingly 
humanized one, considering the alternative. Werner Herzog Eats His Shoe rests on subtly similar, self- 
referential humor. Hoping to spur on his friend and fellow director Errol Morris – who often 
lamented his inability to maintain enough financing to make his first feature film, Gates of Heaven – 
Herzog prompted Morris to make his film, no matter the obstacles involved, to do absolutely 
anything necessary, and announced “I’ll eat the shoes I’m wearing the day I see your film for the first 
time” (Guide for the Perplexed 179). Herzog, it seems, wanted to make his friend Morris aware that, 
even in the direst of straits, one could find a means to go on. 
While few, including Morris, took the statement seriously, after Gates of Heaven was released, 
Herzog contacted Les Blank to film him eating what he had been wearing on the day, “ankle-high 
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Clarks desert boots, with a sole that melted away like cheese on a pizza” (Guide for the Perplexed 
180). But rather than merely use the absurdist humor as some sort of publicity stunt, Herzog used 
eating his shoe as a platform to make a clear declaration of his own ambitions as a filmmaker. In the 
film’s final scenes, Herzog forcefully issues something akin to a personal manifesto, a declaration of 
why he is a filmmaker in the first place: 
Our civilization doesn’t have adequate images, and I think a civilization is doomed or is going to die out like 
dinosaurs if it does not develop an adequate language or adequate images. I see it as a very, very dramatic 
situation. For example, we have found out that there are serious problems facing our civilization, like energy 
problems, or environmental problems, or nuclear power and all this, or over-population of the world. But 
generally, it is not understood yet that a problem of the same magnitude is that we do not have adequate images, 
and that’s what I’m working on – a new grammar of images. (Werner Herzog Eats His Shoe) 
Herzog has returned to the concept of a new grammar of images on many occasions 
throughout his career. In fellow New German Cinema director Wim Wenders’ 1985 Tokyo-Ga, 
Herzog claims that unlike Wenders, he is primarily concerned with images and not just signs, 
marking a distinction between the two, that he is not after symbolism as much as our direct 
experience of cinematic imagery. Herzog claims that “there are few images left, and that one would 
have to work like an archeologist with a shovel to find something new in this ‘insulted landscape’ 
(Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 10). That is, for Herzog, a cultural semiology is not enough. 
Understanding signs and their symbolic economy is not sufficient on its own. Rather, what one 
needs is a creative semiotics: one must experiment with and expand upon the grammar of images rather 
than merely toy with their accepted syntax. A syntax of signs is a closed analytic and not the same as a 
syntax of images, which, in film, would be nothing other than montage. Likewise, a grammar of 
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signs can only relate to a given cultural paradigm; it is an extrinsic property. A grammar of images 
relates, however, to empirical reality itself; it is intrinsic and intensive. In the Herzogian mindset, the 
landscape of images is “insulted” not because there is nothing new, but rather because solely focusing 
on a closed system of signs all too often leads to a tiresome repetition of syntactical arrangement, the 
re-presentation of what one is already looking at, so to speak. Signs become tired, worn out; they 
become clichés over time and lose their functionality. But by looking into images, by looking into 
the fundamental properties of film, one opens up the opportunity for entire new arrangements, for 
new aspects of film logic to be ascertained. Through these images one learns more of nature itself and 
simultaneously discovers the preconditions for cultural semiologies, for human devised systems of 
signs. 
Echoing Herzog’s statement’s in Werner Herzog Eats His Shoe, it is my fundamental 
contention that Herzog’s films should be read as investigations into the grammar of images and not 
simply as relating to the syntax of signs. Following Deleuze, I argue that Herzog’s notion of a 
grammar of images cannot simply be uncovered; it is instead formed in an interstice, in the 
movements across the synaptic gaps that link philosophy, science, and cinema together. No one of 
these fields is capable of addressing the grammar of images completely on its own, but requires 
influences and disruptions from the other fields to further complement and critique its own 
conception of cinematic images and their human grammar. Furthermore, I firmly believe that 
Herzog views cinematic images as empirical rather than ironic, linguistic properties; Herzog 
maintains a strict policy of filming only “real,” naturally occurring physical events, eschewing most 
special effects, and outright rejecting computer animation. In his most famous example, Herzog 
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went to unbelievable lengths in Fitzcarraldo to design and implement a pulley system capable of 
pulling a massive boat over a mountain rather than relying on special effects.20 The heart of this 
“natural” grammar of images lies not in some idiosyncratic compulsion to deny irony and obscure 
meaning on Herzog’s part, but rather a way to show the various frictions between language and 
medium of film itself, between the syntax of words and empirical structure of reality that film 
captures. That is, working on a new grammar of images is also a philosophical and even scientific 
problem rather than a purely cinematographic one in that it looks deeply into how we view empirical 
structure. The results of such experiments, should they be successful, would extend well beyond the 
laboratories in which they were made. 
Surprisingly, very little has been written about Herzog or the grammar of images from an 
empirical perspective. Similarly, and despite the staggering number of parallels in Herzog and 
Deleuze’s work, Deleuzian readings on Herzog’s work are few and far between. On the surface, the 
correlations are so numerous as to almost be clownish in turn, with each thinker creating an uncanny 
caricature of the other’s thoughts through their separate but intertwined fields: Herzog’s self- 
proclaimed “efforts to get away from the ‘Daddy’s cinema’ that predated New German Cinema” and 
the writing of Anti-Oedipus (Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 16). “Becoming-animal” and the story of 
Timothy Treadwell in Grizzly Man. The shared influence of Kafka, Kleist, Büchner, and Nietzsche 
and the creative force of madness, but also the mutual condemnation of fetishizing madness and a 
penchant for sobriety. Herzog’s “physical” and “athletic” filmmaking alongside Deleuze’s embodied, 
 
 
 
20 See the director’s own commentary concerning this in Les Blank’s 1982 The Burden of Dreams, as well as Herzog’s his 
collected notebooks from the film set, The Conquest of the Useless, published in 2009. 
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anatomical philosophy of cinema. And perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the absence of 
irony or what each considers metaphorical obfuscation, remarkably housed in the same terms of 
“lacking” an organ (body without organs). Yet, as seen in the Introduction, this is not to stake a claim 
that they are somehow doing the same thing, but rather that they ask a similar question of cinema in 
their own manner, arriving at similar conclusions diagrammatically: what are cinema’s fundamental 
properties? 
To question the importance and functioning of cinema, to develop its conceptual practice, is 
also to mount an investigation as to what cinema actually is. As Stanley Cavell writes in The World 
Viewed, “’What is the importance of art?’ is grammatically related to, or is a way of answering, the 
question ‘What is art?’” (italics mine. 4). This seems especially true of cinema because it claims a 
unique place among the arts through its very medium. Erwin Panofsky declares that “The medium 
of the movies is physical reality itself” (16). Similarly, theorists such as Siegfried Kracauer considered 
the task of film “the redemption of physical reality” in his Theory of Film. But what is truly striking 
about considering the task of a filmmaker like Werner Herzog as working on a new grammar of 
images is not some saving grace or redemption of a fallen physical reality. Instead, what becomes 
paramount is that the cinematic quest for a new grammar of images, while fundamentally different 
in its creation of percepts and affects taken from reality, not only begs but forces the Deleuzian 
question of a new image of thought. To create or discover new aspects of grammar within 
cinematographic images, is to alter the preconditions of thinking itself. That is, cinema is inherently 
tied to thinking in the Deleuzian sense. And thought is not an aberration of, but rather a 
probabilistic outcome of empirical reality. 
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According to Deleuze, cinema, like thought, has grounds directly in its images that lie a 
priori to any language of signification. Any new grammar of images must be undertaken from a 
starting point that has the critique of language in its focus. Yet, this cannot be sufficiently 
formulated until language’s origins are established or assumed. Like the aforementioned quote from 
Stanley Cavell, to ask the question of what importance a new grammar of images might have is to 
simultaneously ask what grammar is, what images are, and more specifically a cinematographic 
grammar of images. Indeed, language itself, however defined, cannot be conceived of as separated 
from the issue of grammar; traditional notions of language imply meaning and relational and/or 
transcendent sense. For our purposes, however, grammar should be conceived of not merely as a set 
of rules particular to a language to determine proper usage such as the case of English Grammar. 
Instead, following Deleuze, we conceive of grammar as a machinic system that utilizes correlate 
presuppositions to create meaning and allow for action. Language is an aspect of human semiotics 
functioning on the level of symbolic logic, but biologically derived. Grammar, on the other hand, is 
an extension of the sensible before it becomes a linguistic structure; as such grammar allows for both 
meaning and differentiation. Any grammar of images taps directly into sensory correlates, which serve 
as its “raw materials,” and functions as the foundation of their symbolic but also sensory economy. A 
human grammar of images is a specific grammar that forces the occurrence of thought and lies at the 
base of economic-political-mythic organization rather than being their product. 
It is no coincidence that Deleuze used the work of Charles Sanders Peirce as a foundation for 
his taxonomy of cinematographic images in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. Deleuze considered Peirce’s 
work to be “undoubtedly [the] most complete and most varied” classification of signs and images 
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available and likened its rigor to “Linnaeus’s classifications in natural history, or even more 
Mendeleev’s table in chemistry” (Cinema 1 xiv). Peirce’s taxonomy of signs is one of scientific 
precision for Deleuze, theoretical in the sense that electromagnetism might be conceived of as a 
theory - ceaselessly operating and elegantly surmised through Maxwell’s equations.21 In fact, while 
Deleuze himself was somewhat reluctant to cite Peirce directly and did so only sparingly, one can 
hardly begrudge him for doing so. In many ways, Peirce likely hit too close to home, and a great 
number of the core ideas within their work are nearly identical. As a wildly prolific and extremely 
precise writer, an encompassing overview of Peirce’s semiotics cannot be fully expounded here. 
However, a few key Peircean elements should be mentioned as they apply directly to Deleuzian film 
theory and Herzog’s new grammar of images. 
First of all, it must be underscored that Peirce equated the science of semiotics with logic 
itself, with thinking in all its forms and at all levels. “Logic, in its general sense, is…only another 
name for semiotic, the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs” (Logic as Semiotic 98). But more 
than that, Peirce demonstrates the triadic forms he develops through semiotics challenge Platonic 
dualism not by overriding it, but expanding it with a third term and also showing how the movement 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Maxwell’s Equations are four relatively simple equations that fundamentally set up the force of electromagnetism. 
According to Lawrence Krauss, these equations “ultimately changed everything, including our notions of space and time” 
(Greatest Story 36). Electricity and magnetism were traditionally viewed as separate forces, but Maxwell demonstrated 
beyond doubt that they were in fact “different manifestations for one and the same force,” revolutionizing research and 
the human technologies that utilize this force (Greatest Story 38). Furthermore, Maxwell concluded in 1862 as a result of 
his equations that light was an electromagnetic wave and paved the way for the unifications in physical theory that arose 
in the 20th century, most notably Einstein’s Relativity. Though the equations are are to this day inexact, they function at 
our level but are the classical limit of quantum electrodynamics. In short, these equations amount to one of the most 
monumental scientific discoveries ever made. 
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between each term is necessary for the functioning of thought and the genesis of meaning. Peirce 
begins with a simple definition of what a sign is and propounds its basic function: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It 
addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed 
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. 
It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the 
ground of the representamen…In consequence of every representamen being thus connected with three things, 
the ground, the object, and the interpretant, the science of semiotic has three branches. The first is called by 
Duns Scotus grammatica speculativa. We may term it pure grammar. It has for its task to ascertain what must be 
true of the representamen used by every scientific intelligence in order that they may embody any meaning. The 
second is logic proper…the formal science of the conditions of truth of representations. The third…I call pure 
rhetoric. Its task is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, 
and especially one thought brings forth another. (italics in original. “Logic as Semiotic” 99) 
It is this first level, the level of ground and pure grammar that most centrally concerns us. 
 
Grammar, just as Peirce says, has at heart the task of providing the preconditions for the embodiment 
of meaning. A new grammar of images can be no different; it is a grammar in precisely the same way 
that Peirce conceived of Firstness as pure grammar. Of Firstness, Peirce wrote, “We must not 
consider whether it exists or is only imaginary, because existence depends on its [Firstness’] subject 
having a place in the general system of the universe” (Philosophical Writings 87). That is, even if it 
cannot be directly accessed in the same manner as indexical or symbolic signs, as Secondness and 
Thirdness, the pure qualities of Firstness are a priori conditions for indexes and symbols to function. 
This leads Peirce to declare quality itself “the monadic element of the world” without which there 
would be no sense (ibid.). 
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Contrary to the representations of signs, Deleuze believed that images can then be seen 
within Peirce’s system as – at first seemingly paradoxically – direct representations, “which partake of 
simple qualities, or First Firstness” (Logic as Semiotic 105). That is, images are empirically verifiable 
events, a meeting of the ground and something capable of sensing a quality, of drawing on pure 
grammar to give this interaction meaning. This is the meeting of empirical events with 
consciousness, or at the very least, the nerve impulse, the foundational realm of sense. Peirce sets 
images against signs, against indexical diagrams, which “represent relations, mainly dyadic,” and 
symbolic metaphors, a special type of signs which “represent the representative character of a 
representamen by representing a parallelism in something else” (ibid.). In other words, while signs 
correlate to Secondness (indexical meaning) and symbols correlate to Thirdness (the symbolic 
meaning in human language), images are not strictly speaking representations at all, but 
presentations and are grounded in pure grammar, in First Firstness; images are monstrations rather 
than demonstrations. For Deleuze, this is equivalent of saying that in Peirce’s thinking it is not 
simply the case that everything can be conceived of through linguistics – to do so would again 
simply be a regression into Platonic dualism. This would be a world bounded fully by linguistic 
representation and the logic of his semiotic would not function as it would then lack the necessary 
qualities of Firstness: it would make grammar not only ineffable, but incomprehensible.22 
 
 
22 While there are certain complications to this structural view of the semiotic from within Peirce’s own work – one 
could, for example, fairly state that for Peirce Firstness simply prescinds from Secondness and Thirdness – Deleuze is 
essentially arguing that Firstness and its logical, semiotic processes can be considered independently of Secondness and 
Thirdness by pressing the empirical foundation of Firstness, of quality, beyond the point that Peirce himself thought 
possible. According to Deleuze, Firstness would have its own logic – different than indexical or symbolic logic – that 
operates in tandem with them at human scale or at least parallel to it. Yet, Deleuze was also adamant that this sort of 
logic, empirically speaking, continues to function in the absence of Secondness or Thirdness. This would not be an 
organic logics of human and animal life, but rather a “logic” tied to inorganic growth, change, or organization. Perhaps 
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Though it is easy for humans to simply lump everything under the umbrella of language 
given that thinking itself is so tightly ensnared in it, a triadic semiotic demonstrates that there are 
difficulties involved in accepting this notion. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Peirce shows that 
the indexical and symbolic systems of human language are not functional on their own, that 
something exists a priori to representational language and even structures it. He relates it with a 
wonderful example: 
Possibly, there may be Representamens that are not Signs. If a sunflower, in turning toward the sun, becomes 
by that act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely 
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would 
become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation. (italics in 
original. Logic as Semiotic 100) 
In a move that seems impossible, Peirce takes an empirically verifiable example that, upon analysis, 
demonstrates that grammar must serve as the ground of language and not the other way around! 
Grammar is not inherently a part of language, but rather a structural part of the semiotic and 
empirical reality itself that supersedes representational expression of thought through language. That 
is to say, even his system which takes into account pure grammar is likely incomplete and the 
possibility of a different logic than the one he develops might be possible, based on a different form of 
representation than those signs that become human language (at the indexical level of Secondness and 
the symbols of Thirdness). Much like the sunflower that turns toward the sun and can replicate the 
 
the best example of this would be crystalline “life,” which is capable of growth, self-organization and other markers of 
“life.” While this might appear to some as a mystical turn on Deleuze’s part, it should be argued that he also underscored 
that this was always an empirical matter; Deleuze was not trying to make grand claims but rather was attempting to 
conceptualize scientific findings. This question of crystalline “life” continues to this day in scientific research and popular 
literature, such as this contemporary article from Wired magazine: https://www.wired.com/2013/01/living-crystal/ 
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possibility of its action through its repetition, its reproduction, a pre-linguistic realm must of 
necessity function in order for language to even appear. And, at the very least, even if this were not 
the case, an as of yet undetermined logic would need to function at both the pre-linguistic and 
linguistic level, combining them in a common symbolic quality.23 
Peirce does not himself follow this line of thinking fully, though as we will see below, 
Deleuze attempts to. In fact, this is precisely why Deleuze viewed Peircian semiotics rather than 
semiology as appropriate to any investigation into cinema’s concepts: because cinema’s concepts are 
specific types of images. Deleuze bases his taxonomy of cinema on Peirce in the first place because 
there is “a profound mirroring of images and signs” (Negotiations 65). According to Deleuze, the 
Peircian semiotic “considers language only in relation to this specific content, images and signs” 
while other approaches to cinema fall back into a logic that “is of linguistic inspiration” and has a 
habit to “cut language off from the images and signs that make up its raw material” (Cinema 2 262). 
In other words, film theories that build their foundation on linguistics and interpretation remove all 
Firstness from consideration: with this action, the semiotic loses its triadic functioning and lapses 
back into the dyadic and Platonic dualism. “A semiotics based on linguistics worries me,” Deleuze 
writes, “because it does away with both the image and the notion of the sign. It reduces image to an 
utterance, which seems very bizarre, and then of course finds in it the linguistic components of 
utterances – syntagms, paradigms, the signifier. It’s a sleight of hand that makes us forget about 
movement” (Negotiations 65). When Firstness is ignored movement is halted and the pre-linguistic 
 
 
 
23 Or, as yet another possibility, a drastic change in scale – or even human biology – might necessitate expanding the 
semiotic to include Fourthness. This is, however, at present nothing more than likely conjecture. 
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field of grammar is as a result ignored as well. But one cannot fairly set movement aside precisely 
because modern science has shown that while pure grammar may be ineffable in linguistic terms, it 
can indeed be sensed and even measured: the preconditions out of which representations, including 
language, rise, can be indirectly observed and calculated. 
Deleuze writes in the conclusion to Cinema 2 that cinema demands inspection of its 
foundational concepts, its movement-images and time-images, if it is to complement and challenge 
philosophy: 
Cinema is not a universal or primitive language system, nor a language. It brings to light an intelligible content 
which is like a presupposition, a condition, a necessary correlate through which language constructs its own 
‘objects’ (signifying units and operations). But this correlate, though inseparable, is specific: it consists of 
movements and thought-processes (pre-linguistic images), and of points of view on these movements and 
processes (pre-signifying signs). It constitutes a whole ‘psychomechanics,’ the spiritual automaton, the utterable of 
a language system which has its own logic. The language system takes utterances of language, with signifying units 
and operations from it, but the utterable itself, its images and signs, are of another nature. This would be what 
Hjelmslev calls non-linguistically formed ‘content,’ whilst the language system works through form and substance. 
Or rather, it is the first signifiable, anterior to all significance, which Gustave Guillaume made the condition of 
linguistics. (Cinema 2 262) 
This position stands in radical opposition to traditional film theory and its aims. As Flaxman notes, 
such an approach to film “has little in common with the familiar categories of film studies” (Brain is 
the Screen 23). Deleuze’s theory is not simply another linguistic analytic, or even an analytic for that 
matter; it is an effort to expand the semiotic of cinema. It flies in the face of interpretive theories 
such as Christian Metz’s “grande syntagmatique” that approach cinema “by analogy (cinema is like a 
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langue, the shot is like an utterance)” (italics in original. ibid.). Deleuze’s repudiation, or, as 
Flaxman puts it, “evisceration” of Metz or any other film theory that relies on an analogically based 
semiology stems from his fundamental disavowal of the distancing inherent within the process of 
linguistic signification (Brain is the Screen 23). The Deleuzian philosophy of cinema is not geared 
toward creating a new representational schema, but rather to chart the new logic that cinema demands – 
one that forces thought at the level of direct representation, or monstration, at the level of sense. 
At this level, the issue of irony once again becomes key. If, as I argue, the new grammar of 
images functions within Herzog as an investigation into the psychomechanics of cinema by forging 
pre-signfying signs and pre-linguistic images, then the cinema of Werner Herzog can be defended as 
a philosophical endeavor and, what’s more, as humorous rather than ironic filmmaking. In The Logic 
of Sense, Deleuze assigns a vital function to humor by juxtaposing it to irony. Rallying against Plato, 
who sometimes “wonders” if pure events and pure becoming “might not have a very peculiar relation 
to language,” Deleuze declares Platonic thought incapable of coming to terms with the “verbs of 
pure becoming,” where “all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God” (Logic of Sense 2- 
3). Much like the aforementioned example of Peirce’s sunflower, Deleuze argues that the natural 
world itself furnishes empirical examples that demonstrate language to be grounded in sense (or even 
nonsense) rather than the other way around. As Deleuze notes, “the logic of sense is inspired in its 
entirety by empiricism. Only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the 
visible without falling into Ideas,” that is, into Platonic dualism and dyadic interpretation that does 
away with grounds, with Firstness (Logic of Sense 20). It is only with empiricism – an empiricism 
based on scientific findings rather than personal experience – that one can account for creative 
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genesis and not lapse back into the “remembrance” of transcendent Ideas. If, however, one wishes to 
remain within the realm of the empirical and to eschew the philosophical dualisms of Plato, what 
practical tools might work? The burden becomes discovering how, if at all, one might develop a logic 
that exists anterior to signification within language itself. 
To accomplish this task, Deleuze turns to Stoic philosophy. Contrary to Platonic thought, the 
Stoics draw a firm line between the irony of identity and the humor of paradox. The same can and 
must be done for an empirically inspired film semiotic. Stoicism distances itself from Platonism and 
irony by taking stock of examples, of monstrations rather than merely demonstrations, by direct 
experiences rather than linguistic representations of those experiences. Following a triadic process of 
signification akin to Peircian semiotics, Stoicism does not ignore Firstness, nor does it ignore 
movement. Moreover, Stoicism contends that monstrations, or direct representations, are humorous 
without being ironic. Within the logic of sense, “humor is the art of the surface, which is opposed to 
the old irony, the art of depth and heights” (9). Deleuze describes this as a battle, where “Sophists 
and Cynics…made humor a philosophical weapon against Socratic irony,” but one that was truly 
settled with the advent of Stoicism (ibid.). It is only with the Stoics, Deleuze claims, that “humor 
found its dialects, its dialectical principle or its natural place and its pure philosophical concept” 
(ibid.) What the Stoics accomplish with their dialectics of humor is to open new avenues for thought 
by doing away with the transcendent distancing demanded by irony, by altering “the task of 
language both to establish limits and to go beyond them” (ibid.). Stoicism allows for the advent of 
the event, of the verb, the Peircian copula; it does not employ the philosophical “sleight of hand” that 
excludes movement espoused through Platonic Forms, eternally existent Ideas. Simply put, Stoicism 
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is a philosophical vein that can be utilized to revive and conceptualize signs and images as surface 
events. Stoicism, through humor, can account for spacetime events in the scientific sense. Therefore, 
when I argue that one should read Herzog as a Stoic and a humorist rather than an ironic film 
director, I am merely claiming that Herzog is viewing the world in terms of ubiquitous and 
unceasing movement, envisioning a world where nothing can be said to be truly static. And, it must 
be stressed, empirically, this is very much the case. Nothing truly “is” but rather “is” something only 
insofar as it interacts with other things, it “is” only in its “doing.”24 
Empiricism can therefore be thought of as a network of monstrations rather than 
demonstrations, as pure events of becoming rather than being. A classic philosophical example of 
this comes from Diogenes the Cynic and shows the marked movement toward humor and away 
from irony. When Plato defines man as “a biped and featherless animal,” Diogenes presents to him a 
“plucked fowl” (Logic of Sense 139). When asked ‘what is philosophy?’ Diogenes presented “the most 
oral of animals” and the one that best sums up the “problem of language”: a fish, dangling from a 
string (ibid.). These direct representations or monstrations are humorous, but not ironic; they are 
literal and empirical but not intended to be metaphorical. While any good Platonist might scoff at 
such a seemingly cheap ploys – much like Plato did himself – they prove vital in that they open the 
 
 
 
 
24 In a parallel move to Peirce and Deleuze, and housed in remarkably similar terms, the contemporary Italian physicist 
Carlo Rovelli writes, “Nature, for its part, is what it is...If our [linguistic] grammar and our intuition do not readily adapt 
to what we discover, well, too bad: we must seek to adapt them. [Linguistic] grammar developed from our limited 
experience, before we became aware of its imprecision...we must not allow ourselves to be confused by an inadequate 
grammar” (Oder of Time 98-99). This sentiment leads him to conclude that, “the spatiality of the world consists of the 
web of their interactions [elementary particles, photons and quanta of gravity - or rather ‘quanta of space’]...they interact 
incessantly with each other, and indeed exist only in terms of these incessant interactions. And this interaction is the 
happening of the world” (Order of Time 108). 
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possibility for humor to emerge. An extended, important passage from Deleuze’s Logic of Sense 
 
elucidates this: 
 
Plato laughed at those who were satisfied with giving examples, pointing or designating, rather than attaining 
the Essences: I am not asking you (he used to say) who is just, but what is justice. It is therefore easy to ask 
Plato to follow down the path which he claimed to have made us climb. Each time we are asked about a 
signification, we respond with a designation and a pure ‘monstration.’ And, in order to persuade the spectator 
that it is not a question of a simple ‘example,’ and that Plato’s problem was poorly posed, we are going to 
imitate what is designated, we are going to eat what is mimicked, we will shatter what is shown. The important 
thing is to do it quickly: to find quickly something to designate, to eat, or to break, which would replace the 
signification (the Idea) that you have been invited to look for. All the faster and better since there is no 
resemblance (nor should there be one) between what one points out and what one has been asked. There is a 
difficult relation, which rejects the false Platonic duality of the essence and the example. This exercise, which 
consists in substituting designations, monstrations, and consumptions, and pure destructions for significations, 
requires an odd inspiration – that one knows how to ‘descend.’ What is required is humor, as opposed to the 
Socratic irony or to the technique of the ascent. (Logic of Sense 139-140) 
The issue that lies at the heart of empirical monstrations is, therefore and perhaps oddly, 
humor itself. Yet even once this “descent” into humor is achieved, the descent to the level of signs 
and images, a further problem arises in terms of signification, for sense itself. While the Cynical 
position utilizes humor, it is still an absurdist humor. Descent as opposed to ascent leads from true 
significations to pure denotations, which “replace and negate” those significations; they lead not to 
false assertions but to absurd presentations, much like Diogenes’ fish (Logic of Sense 140). Echoing 
Deleuze, I believe that “the condition of truth is not opposed to the false, but to the absurd: that 
which is without signification or that which may be neither true nor false” (Logic of Sense 15). 
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Precisely because of this, language cannot be grounded in the absurd any more than it could be fairly 
grounded in the idealist sense. This is the foundational problem of the Cynical position – it leads to 
pure denotation, to absurdity, to the non-sense of the depths juxtaposed with the signification of 
Platonic heights. Yet from depths of the Cynical position, there is a way one might break through to 
a level ‘deeper’ still: the paradoxical ‘depths’ of the surface. 
According to Deleuze, it is surface that is the deepest layer of all. Following Valéry’s maxim 
that “there’s nothing deeper than the skin,” Deleuze describes philosophy itself as “a general 
dermatology or art of surfaces” and explains that his efforts in Logic of Sense are geared toward trying 
“to describe such surfaces” (Negotiations 87). “By the same movement with which language falls 
from the heights and then plunges below,” Deleuze writes, “we must be led back to the surface 
where there is no longer anything to denote or even to signify, but where pure sense is produced. It 
is produced in its essential relation to a third element, this time it is the nonsense of the surface” 
(Logic of Sense 15). This sort of surface “nonsense” is completely different than absurd “non-sense” 
derived from the Cynical position. While the latter leads to the absurd and is therefore set against 
truth, the former is simply grounded on the deeper level of Firstness – it allows for truth as a human 
contention but links monstration, links empiricism, directly to Firstness. What one discovers with 
the nonsense of the surface are “pure events considered from the perspective of their eternal 
truth…from the point of view of the substance which sub-tends them, independent of their 
spatiotemporal actualization in a state of affairs” (ibid.). One discovers not only their actuality, but 
shockingly an ‘underneath’ to the actuality of events. Differently presented, this essentially means 
that one “finds pure singularities…independent of the individuals and persons which embody them 
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or actualize them” (ibid.). One finds pre-signfying signs and pre-linguistic images, the preconditions 
of language itself, but even more than this, one finds a field anterior to direct sense itself that can 
nonetheless be indirectly intuited, observed, and even calculated. One finds the chaos from which 
everything we can sense, everything we can say, arises: the virtual field. 
A Zeroness has been introduced to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Thirdness 
functions through symbolic logic; Secondness functions through indexical logic; Firstness functions 
through a logic of sense; sense arises from Zeroness, from the probabilistic virtual events of the 
(sur)face. Humor’s role, its ‘true paradoxes’ within the logic of sense, makes a conceptualization of 
Zeroness possible and is what makes Stoicism so important for any analysis of Herzog’s work. 
Stoicism delves into singularities and events, directly into sense itself and even below it, through the 
lens of humor rather than irony. The ironic position is not ironclad and enduring, but rather an 
anthropocentric and symbolic creation that enables the psychologically comforting position of moral 
truth to be asserted in the face of empirical evidence. Plato, in the end, proves to be stuck in his own 
Cave. 
 
The “adventure” of the “Stoic sage,” or, as I am arguing, Herzogian characters, is therefore 
 
precisely to be seen as the “two-fold dismissal of height and depth to the advantage of the surface,” 
for, let there be no doubt, Herzog is, if not strictly speaking a Stoic himself, deeply influenced by 
Stoic philosophy (ibid.). As particularly humorous evidence of this, we have such accounts as Herzog 
being shot while giving an interview, lifting up his shirt to reveal blood, but, realizing that it only 
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created a minor flesh wound, claiming that the bullet “is not significant.”25 Moreover, though 
Herzog continually denies his own capability for irony, he also frequently underscores his sense of 
humor and its importance within his cinema. When asked in an interview whether or not he had a 
sense of humor despite lacking an understanding of irony, Herzog simply replied “Of course!” 
(Guide for the Perplexed 42). According to Herzog, “There’s a big difference between irony and 
humor. I can understand humor and laugh at jokes, even if I’ve never been very good at telling them 
myself…Often overlooked is the humor in my films…My audiences laugh all the time, and an 
audience that laughs is always in the right; that’s a law of nature…Seeing audiences laugh at my films 
has always been important to me” (italics mine. ibid.). Humor is not idle fun, but rather a way to get 
to the surface of things. 
This topological preference, this focus on surface and humor, as opposed to heights and 
irony is no small matter for Herzog. It extends even into his personal linguistic usage, as well as his 
approach to language when aiming toward a new grammar of images within his filmmaking. 
Comparing himself again to French filmmakers, he notes: “The French love to play with their 
words, so to master their language is to be a master of irony. Technically I can speak French; I have 
the vocabulary and know the grammar, but will only do so when forced to. Only twice in my life has 
this happened” (Guide for the Perplexed 41). While the likely wild stories of these two occurrences 
remain unimportant, it is important to note that even coming as close to irony as Herzog feels 
speaking the French language entails is something only to be done under duress, “only when there is 
 
 
 
25 This video can be seen at: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/videos/comments/9o14cw/director_werner_herzog_casually_gets_shot_during/ 
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a real necessity, otherwise I withdraw and become a denizen of the crag” (ibid.). It is not simply a 
matter of obstinance or arrogance that lends Herzog this position, but rather a fundamental lack of 
interest in what the lofty heights of irony offer: an idealized truth. Nor does he seem interested in 
exploring the depths of the human, the unceasingly negative movements of Platonic dialectics. 
Instead, keeping his focus and his films aimed at the surface, Herzog explores “the inner landscapes” 
and “ecstatic truth” of humans. He does so by experimenting with the grammar of images. 
Now that my foundational claims concerning the grammar of images are in place, let us turn 
to the functioning of these claims within cinema specifically. A realist-ontological stance toward 
cinema means approaching cinema at the levels of Zeroness and Firstness. Images are the concepts of 
cinema, not to be taken in the simple sense of a picture, but as the integral units of existence, what 
Schwab says amounts within cinema to “an ontology of images” or an “image-world” (109). An 
“image” is therefore never intended to represent an individual frame abstracted from a film, but rather the 
spacetimes captured and monstrated within the film, drawn from empirical reality. Images are “blocs of 
space-time;” they are the constituent parts of the universe itself, which, following from Deleuze’s 
reading of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, allows one to fairly conceive of “the universe as cinema in 
itself, a metacinema” (Cinema 1 59). This is to say, there are images within film, but they are not 
solely within film. They are material, empirically verifiable events. The body, the brain, all the way 
up to the cosmic level of the earth and stars, and back down to microscopic planes – these are all 
“images” within a pragmatic, empirically driven philosophy of cinema. 
In terms of cinema specifically, there are two fundamental concepts, two types of images out 
of which Deleuze develops his taxonomy: the movement-image and the time-image. Let me begin by 
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explaining the movement-image. This type of image is “identical” with matter itself and the “material 
universe” is nothing other than the whole of movement-images, or, more precisely, the “machine 
assemblage of movement-images” (ibid.). When Deleuze speaks of movement-images, he is therefore 
speaking of all that which is empirically identifiable by direct sense. When I speak of movement- 
images in Herzog, I mean the same thing, and, furthermore want to underscore that “IMAGE = 
MOVEMENT,” that is, movement-images are matter in motion, in its actions and reactions 
(Cinema 1 58). All movement-images are by their very nature active and actual, but they are so 
relationally, just like physical objects. There are no truly still objects in the universe and neither are 
there truly still images. 
Questions immediately arise, however, from such a conception of the movement-image; they 
arise in a movement parallel to that of Firstness and grammar as I broached above. As Deleuze asks, 
“what happens and what can happen in this acentred universe where everything reacts on everything 
else?...an interval appears - a gap between the action and the reaction” (emphasis in original. Cinema 
1 61). That is, we must conceive of a special image that is the site for the encounter, the “when and 
where” for any actualized encounter to “occur.” In other words, there are always coordinates of space 
and time, of spacetime, for any event. But, for human concerns like the philosophy of cinema, these 
events occur on and through a special type of image. This interval, this gap, is for Deleuze the 
human brain itself, the privileged image that grounds sense and the perception of all other images in 
humans: “the brain is nothing more than this - an interval, a gap between action and reaction” 
(Cinema 1 62). 
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Deleuze makes it clear that the brain is not an actual “center” of images but rather simply 
“constitutes one special image among the others. It constitutes a center of indetermination in the 
acentred universe of images” (Cinema 1 62-63). The human brain is a spectacular development, a 
special case, but it is not to be seen as the center of the universe and the material universe would go 
on functioning just fine in its absence. But it is the center of human perception. This is because in a 
universe where the movement-image and matter are identical, “the thing and the perception of the 
thing are one and the same thing, one and the same image, but related to one or other of two 
systems of reference” (Cinema 1 63). The brain is simply the special image for us, the special interval, 
from which we “perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs” 
(ibid.). The brain houses our subjectivity through its interactions, which are inherently “subtractive” 
(ibid.). The brain is not something that merely allows us to know or experience, it is an interval that 
allows us to actively shut out certain stimuli and in the same process focus in on anything we want. 
Therefore, the first “avatar” of the movement-image is the subjective perception of objective things: 
the perception-image, any movement-image that is “related to a center of indetermination [the 
brain]” (ibid.). The brain, banal as it might sound, and as difficult as it is for our identities to grasp, 
is that which allows us to perceive. 
The perception-image leads directly to the second “avatar” of the movement-image: the 
action-image. This is because the subjective position of the brain in accordance with movement- 
images also implies an operation and “we should not think that the whole operation consists only of 
a subtraction” (ibid.). Instead, when related to a special image like the human brain, “the universe is 
incurved and organized to surround it...perception is only one side of the gap, and action is the other 
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side. What is called action, strictly speaking, is the delayed reaction of the center of indetermination 
[the brain]” (ibid.). Action is the subjective reaction of the brain to an objective thing. In fact, the 
action-image is this subjective passing or incurving of the universe; it is the “second material aspect 
of subjectivity” (Cinema 1 65). This “imperceptible” change from perception to action is the 
“incurving of the universe” and this “simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our 
possible action on things” (ibid.). The relation between perception-image and action-image is what 
opens up the realm of possibility and our awareness of virtuality. Importantly, Deleuze quotes from 
Bergson’s Matter and Memory here: “Perception is the master of space in the exact measure that 
action is the master of time” (ibid.). In this second material aspect, the privileged image of the brain 
is able to interact with both actual movement-images [matter/space] and imagine future movement- 
images [probabilistic events/time]. Action is able to occur from a remarkable formulation of 
imagination, through a subjective displacement of the self in time, wherein the brain can envision 
probabilities of the future. 
The third and final fundamental type of movement-image, the affection-image, is 
presupposed in the interaction of the first two. For the interval [brain] is not just a “specialization of 
the two limit-faces, perceptive and active. There is an in-between” (ibid.). And this “in-between” is 
the affective capacity of the brain itself, the human ability to make – first and foremost for and 
within themselves – objective and subjective distinctions, and to navigate the intricate webs of 
subjective and objective realities that make up our mental lives. Affection is “a coincidence of subject 
and object, or the way in which the subject perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself 
‘from the inside’ (third material aspect of subjectivity)” (ibid.). Affection is the human ability to look 
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at the world outside of itself and then to perceive aspects of its own subjective perceptions, to make 
internal changes of form from external stimulus. Adding this third movement-image type achieves 
the possibility of forming a grammar of images, of creating a logic or sense of sense based around a 
privileged image that incurves the universe around the human brain. 
The triadic functioning of these three material states of subjectivity not only serves as the 
ground of that subjectivity, it is that very subjectivity in its embodied form. Here, our subjective 
position is able to perceive and act upon itself, to be affected, but here, through interference from the 
logic of sense, one also encounters the problematics summarized in the “poetic formulas” drawn 
from Kantian critique. With the three material states of subjectivity in mind, the Ego truly is no 
longer the I for the I is another; here time is now conceived of as truly out of joint. Deleuze writes, 
“in affection...movement ceases to be that of translation in order to become movement of expression, 
that is to say quality...each one of us, the special image or the contingent center, is nothing but an 
assemblage of three images, a consolidate of perception-images, action-images and affection-images” 
(Cinema 1 66). These material states – all of which appear in and are capable of being monstrated to 
the human body, to the brain, in the cinema – cause a new “passionate” relationship of the human 
brain to the images it views, to the specific, taxonomically arranged space-times that it presents to 
itself on the cinema screen. Here, the brain and our subjectivity with it, undergoes a crisis of 
perception, action, and affection, and we are able to recognize that we are our brains as well as begin 
to come to terms with how the images we choose to view affect and are affected by those same 
images. The brain, though a-centered, reveals the autocatalytic logic of its own material functioning 
and the role our subjective experiences play in guiding the flows of that logic. 
69  
A correlation can now be drawn between the movement-image and Peircian semiotics. Like 
Peirce’s signs, movement-images are not images solely because of our understanding of them through 
language, but are instead formed at the level of actuality and sense. Movement-images are not 
dependent on a subject/object relation (for two unthinking objects still move in relation to one 
another), but they are dependent on some interaction of some sort. In our case, this interaction 
occurs through and to the brain. Movement-images must not necessarily be “seen” but are that 
through which “prior to any consideration, prior to any analysis, reality presents itself” (Jean-Clet 
Martin 63). As the foundational “blocs of space-time” that comprise the actual, movement-images do 
not require our attention or awareness in order to exist, but they must, however, interact with matter 
in some manner. One can, for example, easily conceive of a ray of light that exists and is actual, but 
speeding away from the Earth in a direction that would make it impossible to detect for us, but that 
this same beam of energy could illuminate some other unknown planet. This light could still be 
conceived of as a movement-image – if it could somehow be captured by some alien cinema. What is 
far more remarkable than this seemingly sci-fi example, however, is that there are other images that 
exist beyond, or perhaps more precisely, at a different scale than movement-images: images can be 
probabilistic, too, and there are virtual images in addition to actual movement-images (matter). 
These images are at the core of a Deleuzian understanding of thought itself and are linked to the 
operation of time. 
Taking up time as a concern for the cinema introduces what Deleuze briefly mentions and 
calls a “special perception-image...which no longer simply expresses movement, but the relation 
between movement and the interval of movement” (Cinema 2 31). We should recall that this 
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interval of movement is the brain itself; this special image is the relationship between brain/thought 
and the material universe. According to Deleuze, it acts as a “degree zero...there will be a ‘zeroness’ 
before Peirce’s firstness” (Cinema 2 31-32). But while Deleuze is often distressingly obscure about 
what this means, the underlying implication is rather simple. Zeroness qualifies as another semiotic 
level that parallels the empirical human knowledge of the genesis of time (and, though Deleuze 
ignored the parallel but rather different implications, space). The human brain – most especially 
through mathematics and other sciences – is capable of thinking processes that exceed its natural 
sensory limitations, to see microscopic realms and make macroscopic physical predictions. And this 
ability extends to the concepts of time and space, including their genesis. 
While pure qualities exist at the level of Firstness, Zeroness implies an ability on the part of 
the human brain to conceptualize the very formation of those qualities, the realm out of which 
quality emerges. Zeroness is also the bridge that grounds human senses in their relationship to 
cinema’s other fundamental concept: the time-image. The movement-image in its three “avatars” 
ground subjective sense – perception, action, affection. But as Deleuze attests of his initial 
breakdown of the movement-image into three subtypes, “there is every reason to believe that many 
other kinds of images can exist...the plane of movement-images is a bloc of space-time, a temporal 
perspective, but, in this respect, it is a perspective on a real Time which is not at all the same as the 
plane or the movement. We are therefore justified in thinking that there are time-images which are 
themselves capable of having all kinds of varieties” (Cinema 1 68). I would like to argue that this sort 
of “real Time” is nothing other than the quantum realm out of which the physical universe 
(movement-images) empirically emerges. With this in mind, I would venture that Deleuze believed 
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time-images, which tie the empirical realities of Zeroness to the rest of the semiotic, reveal an 
entirely new challenge for the brain in that they task the brain with a plethora of questions that can 
as of yet only be indirectly observed. 
Adding Zeroness to Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics is Deleuze’s greatest contribution to the 
field, as well as to the philosophy of cinema, and is the one Deleuze spends the most time thinking 
through. But, being of a fundamentally different nature, time-images also necessitate understanding 
the term “sign” in “a completely different way from Peirce” and traditional pragmatics (Cinema 2 
32). A sign – such as those pure optical and sound situations that arise in modern cinema, opsigns 
and sonsigns – is for Deleuze “a particular image that refers to a type of image, whether from the 
point of view of its bipolar composition, or from the point of view of its genesis” (ibid.). He goes on 
to say that, “signs themselves are the features of expression that compose and combine these images 
[the various types of movement-images], and constantly re-create them, borne or carted along by 
matter in movement” (Cinema 2 33). Signs in Deleuze’s taxonomy are therefore the elements of our 
perception, affection, and action when derived from the movement-image, but are our referential 
system between thought and materiality when derived from the time-image. They are the ground 
out of which subjectivity emerges, is built and altered, which in turn provides us the ability to alter 
objective materiality. With the time-image, an entire new “second dimension of pure, non-linguistic 
semiotics” emerges (Cinema 2 34). 
Time-images are formed from direct presentations of time; they create a crisis within the 
movement-image and more specifically the action-image, overloading the cinematic hero or heroine 
with optical and sound situations that cause their active capabilities to falter. Time-images are, again, 
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not “pictures” of time, but sequences and situations which arise within the cinema that reveal the 
nonlinear, quantum nature of time and monstrate the pattern of its formation. And, for Deleuze, the 
cinema is only able to create them because, once again drawing on Charles Sanders Peirce for his 
foundations, Deleuze felt that the cinema – incorporating science, art, and philosophy within its 
methodology – was truly capable of being used as a tool for thought, that one could think with the 
cinema. 
Deleuze links his concepts of “affection” and “action,” to Peirce’s Firstness and Secondness 
respectively. But he goes on to say that “Peirce added a third kind of image: the ‘mental’ or 
Thirdness” (Cinema 1 197). This Thirdness is, as I have shown, based on a relation, a symbolic act 
of law rather than affective quality or indexical action. Deleuze writes of such mental images: 
This may seem to be already included in action, but this is not so. An action, that is to say a duel or a pair of 
forces, obeys laws which make it possible, but it is never its law which makes it act...Therefore Thirdness gives 
birth not to actions but to ‘acts’ which necessarily contain the symbolic element of a law (giving, exchanging); 
not to perceptions, but to interpretations which refer to the element of sense; not to affections, but to 
intellectual feelings of relations, such as the feelings which accompany the use of the logical conjunctions 
‘because,’ ‘although,’ ‘so that,’ ‘therefore,’ ‘now,’ etc. (ibid.) 
These ‘mental’ images of Thirdness function differently than the other forms of movement-image 
discussed up to this point in that they take “as objects of thought, objects which have their own 
existence outside of thought, just as the objects of perception have their own existence outside of 
perception” (Cinema 1 198). ‘Mental’ images will have “a new, direct, relationship with thought,” 
achieved at the end of Thirdness, of symbolic logic, by looping back to pre-signifying signs and pre- 
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linguistic images, by returning to reflections on the origins of the cinema’s fundamental units (ibid.). 
This new, “direct” relationship precipitated a “new thinking image” in cinema. Instead of 
maintaining a full focus on movement, space, and therefore actualized matter – the sensory-motor 
system itself – this opening up of thought to the ‘outside,’ to the chaotic world of Zeroness, the 
cinema allowed for direct presentations of time and its formations and changes the relationship 
between time and human thought. This marks the emergence of the time-image, which precipitates 
a crisis within the movement-image and its variations once they are disconnected from the sensory- 
motor schema. 
Overridden by the force of mental images with a direct relationship to thought, modern 
cinematic heroes and heroines are placed into scenarios that open up direct presentations of time, 
pure optical and sound situations that act within them, but that they struggle to act upon in a 
classical manner. This crisis, which still continues in the cinema today and appears ever more 
frequently, is in fact the origin of modern cinema for Deleuze and what defines it. With the advent 
of the time-image, the entire relationship of cinema to thought is altered, no longer focused solely on 
actualized matter in the movement-image, but forcefully opening up subjectivity and exposing the 
power of virtuality as both epigenetic and dangerous.26 Additionally, it presents “a new breed of signs” 
the pure optical and sound situations that modern cinematic protagonists encounter and struggle 
 
 
26 While Deleuze does not say this himself, I am arguing that this monumental change is also rather comparable to the 
discovery of quantum mechanics in physics. While a full explanation of the parallels between the two cannot be taken up 
here, one must acknowledge the similarity or even partial indebtedness of Deleuze’s thinking to scientific works such as 
Prigogine and Stengers’ Order out of Chaos, which was published just one year before Cinema 2. Deleuze mentions his 
appreciation for this work in Negotiations, pp. 29. Elements of Deleuze’s time-based analyses also incorporate the 
findings of general relativity, but as of yet, it is the quantum nature of Zeroness that is most painfully lacking from 
current secondary literature on Deleuze as well as within the philosophy of cinema. 
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against (Cinema 2 6). These signs, which exceed the sensory capabilities of the cinematic characters 
which encounter them, always present indirect, phantasmagorical dangers. Rather than remaining in 
the spatial materiality of the movement-image, wherein the camera often acts as an objective 
observer presenting the scene, these new signs therefore present superjective, sensory situations that 
are often paralyzing, terrifying, and painful and that exceed individual capabilities. Characters are no 
longer action heroes, but agonized seers, who simply aren’t up to the task of solving the horrors that 
face them on their own. 
Time-images are also inherently self-reflective: the characters themselves are aware of their 
visions and their inability to act on them in the traditional manner. Deleuze felt that “these new 
signs refer to varied images – sometimes everyday banality, sometimes exceptional or limit- 
circumstances – but, above all, subjective images, memories of childhood, sound and visual dreams 
or fantasies, where the character does not act without seeing himself acting, complicit viewer of the 
role he himself is playing” (ibid.). That is, by revealing direct images of time as it is experienced in the 
modern world, as ‘time out of joint’ through the discrepancies between general relativity and quantum 
mechanics, time-images and the opsigns and sonsigns they engender present situations in which 
characters cannot act without an awareness of their actions, cannot but be subjectively affected and 
affecting, and can no longer act with moral certitude. In cinema that engages with time-images, 
characters are left with the ethical burden of personal, ethical responsibility rather than a moral 
certitude they can symbolically represent. They find themselves in a world where space itself is no 
longer purely actualized, but must incorporate virtual, subjective changes and even superjective 
changes that Zeroness brings about. In this sort of realm, action can take place in an “any-space- 
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whatever,” which is “in opposition to action which most often unfolded in the qualified space-time 
of the old realism” (Cinema 1 208). Time-images operate in a fundamentally new realism, a new 
view on spacetime, that does away with traditional boundaries and scales, forging instead 
microscopic and cosmically immense views compared to everyday human existence. Time-images 
reveal quantum and relativistic aspects of spacetime to their viewers through monstrations of time that 
form actual events within the brain. 
The concepts of cinema cannot and do not stop at the actualized movement-image precisely 
because the virtual is real and empirically verifiable. By staging operations of time within the cinema, 
cinema opens new ties to the virtual field, it forms a new concept that is different than the 
movement-image in that it has a more expansive purview of empirical processes. Virtuality in cinema 
is not a matter of saying whether or not movement-images and time-images are “real” for both are 
real, but rather a matter of conceptualizing the scale between the two, of accepting a new scale 
within the semiotics of cinema: adding Zeroness to the pre-established levels of Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness (or just Secondness and Thirdness in analogical, linguistic film theories). 
The movement-image is therefore not a “wrong” but rather an incomplete manner to view 
the capabilities of cinema in much the same way that Euclidean geometry is an incomplete way to 
mathematically analyze space, because this space functions differently at different levels. A good way 
to understand this is to draw a visual comparison. Take, for example, geometric figures. A figure 
with one dimension can be visualized as a point. If one adds another dimension to this figure, 
something new emerges, and this figure works differently than the first. For example, think of the 
properties of a two-dimensional figure like a triangle. Mathematically, this 2-D triangle has a certain 
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height, a certain length, and its angles add up to 180 degrees. It has certain properties and laws that 
define its form. If you, however, then add a third dimension to this figure, you will have a 
tetrahedron rather than a triangle, a conic figure with yet different properties now that it is 3-D. The 
figure now has volume and assuming its sides are set at right angles it has four triangular faces and 
one square one. While the 2-D mathematics still apply to the individual faces, different equations are 
required to address the new properties that arise from adding the third dimension. From 3-D, one 
can move to 4-D by introducing time as yet another dimension; the figure would become a 
tetrahedron with duration, a tetrahedron as a spacetime event. One could then further complicate 
that figure by challenging our experience of a successive past-present-future through adding into 
consideration nonmetric space and nonlinear time. 
This is exactly what time-images are for the cinema and its theorization: a new geometric 
dimension. Time-images challenge but do not override movement-images, whose equations still 
work, but only as part of the picture and cannot account for the new properties of the figure that the 
added dimension(s) that the time-image brings. For example, non-Euclidean geometry was required 
to address and access the curved surfaces of spacetime. Once these sorts of surfaces had been 
empirically determined, an entirely new mathematical field was opened up that sought to formulate 
and describe the geometric aspects of these surfaces. Similarly, time-images open up the possibility 
for a different type of cinema to be conceived, with fundamentally different properties and different 
laws: a different morphological structure within shots, a different syntactical approach to montage, a 
different way of conceiving the spacetimes that form cinematographic grammar. To work on a new 
grammar of images is therefore today precisely the task of exploring and charting the different 
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properties and different laws that arise out of time-images and the human brain’s new connections to 
the virtual field. 
Without overstating its importance, the time-image can be seen as a truly Copernican 
revolution for cinema and even for modern thought as a whole. It must be stressed that it does not 
invalidate or replace the movement-image, but instead reduces its contemporary importance and 
changes the function of cinema in important ways: 
The movement-image has not disappeared, but now exists only as the first dimension of an image that never 
stops growing in dimensions…[with the time-image] The cinema is going to become an analytic of the 
image...but in every case it subordinates description of a space to the functions of thought. This is not the 
simple distinction between the subjective and objective, the real and the imaginary, it is on the contrary their 
indiscernibility which will endow the camera with a rich array of functions...a camera-consciousness which 
would no longer be defined by the movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is 
able to enter into. And it [the cinema] becomes questioning, responding, objecting, provoking, theorematizing, 
hypothesizing, experimenting in accordance with the open list of logical conjunctions (‘or’, ‘therefore’, ‘if’, 
‘because’, ‘actually’, ‘although…’). (Cinema 2 22-23) 
The time-image is a new way of thinking about and conceptualizing the world, providing the 
cinema with a new logical function that causes it to spread out and out, unto infinity, by providing 
logical conjunctions rather than artistic statements. Following in the wake of the two major 
empirical discoveries concerning spacetime that occurred in the twentieth century – general relativity 
and quantum mechanics – contemporary cinema tasks itself with teasing out, connecting up, 
responding to, and experimenting with the ethical dilemmas that occur in human culture once a 
three-tiered semiotic becomes, as it were, four-tiered, and includes Zeroness. And this is where the 
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cinema of Werner Herzog fits in. While it might at first seem a stretch, Herzog’s non-ironical, 
humorous cinema has direct ties to the philosophical and artistic resonances of these two scientific 
theories, as I demonstrate in the following chapters. Herzog’s cinema is one that, continually circling 
back to the question of the genesis of spacetime, presents ethical, human challenges to our scientific 
and cultural aims. Let us now turn to Herzog’s films and take a journey within him in space and 
time. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Cracking the Crystal: Temporal Economy and Politics in Werner Herzog’s Herz aus Glas 
 
Poetic Formula: “Time is out of joint” 
 
It is the economy of time that serves as the foundation for my approach to the cinema of 
Werner Herzog. Prevalent from his earliest films, time-images are, as it were, the engines through 
which Herzog’s entire cinema operates. Each of Herzog’s films – though their central topics vary 
widely – inspects the crystalline economy of image and thought. Slowly expanding and refining our 
understanding of film and its images through ceaseless, meticulously “stylized” repetitions, Herzog’s 
oeuvre is dedicated to the grammar of images by closely inspecting their spatiotemporal operation 
and how they affect or even give rise to our cultural lives and even our personal subjectivities. And of 
all his films it is Herz aus Glas which forms the “greatest crystal-images27 in the history of the 
cinema” and meditates most directly on a “fallen” conception of time that is “out of joint.” 
 
 
 
 
27 As the foundational form of the time-image, crystal-images change the cinema by becoming an extension to the ever- 
expanding realm of human thought; crystal-images stage the production of thought itself and its role in human life. They 
arise from the Kantian problematic of time being out of joint, where action itself enters a state of crisis when confronted 
by opsigns and sonsigns, pure optical and sound situations that overwhelm a film’s characters. With the appearance of 
crystal-images, the underpinnings and virtualities of time are overtly explored through logical conjunctions that present 
challenges to film characters’ subjectivity. Essentially, these new elements allow for the virtuality and the actuality of time 
and space to be conceived of in a different manner. Once this change occurs, once time is out of joint and can no longer 
be conceived solely through the linear pattern of a flow from past to present to future, a new economy of thought is 
engendered. That is, pure optical and sound situations – what Deleuze calls the opsigns and sonsigns of modern cinema 
– ground a new economy for thought; they introduce a new form of exchange between thought and movement. Spacetime, 
when viewed relativistically and through its quantum nature, likewise requires a rethinking of logic itself, with action and 
ethics in tow. While I restrict my comments more generally to time-images here, Deleuze’s comments are more centrally 
concerned with crystal-images, which he theorizes in Cinema 2, pp. 68-97. While a more directed reading concerning 
crystal-images in Herz aus Glas is lacking in secondary literature on the film, I am restricting myself to the broader 
concept of time-images for both brevity and to aid those readers who are not already familiar with Deleuze’s works on 
cinema. 
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That time is of the essence and in a state of crisis is apparent from Herz aus Glas’s opening 
scenes. As Hias relates in his foundational prophecy, “erst kommt die Zeit im Stürzen und dann die 
Erde…die Wolken kommen in einem Rasen, dann kocht die Erde, dass ist das Zeichen.“ The 
viewer experiences this “sign” through two important sequences. In stunning time-lapse that 
Herzog claims took eleven days to capture and is one of his favorite shots from the film, clouds flow 
ceaselessly over a mountain and down through a valley. Time itself is transmuted into something 
fluid, something “like a river,” but also importantly something that one can “see” (Herz aus Glas, 
director commentary). Through striking footage of flowing clouds, Herzog seeks to make time 
directly visible. But the viewer also experiences the fall, the “Stürzen,” of this time through a long 
shot of an enormous and crushing waterfall that disorients directionality and causes the viewer to 
feel almost as if they were floating as they watch the cataract. It is therefore not merely time, but its 
spatial orientation that are presented, its direction; rather than the commonplace, linear conception 
of time flowing or marching “forward” from past to present and from present to future, the great 
waterfall unhinges space and direction itself. Staring into the water, one cannot tell if they are 
falling, rising, or somehow achieving both simultaneously. This fundamental breaking of linear 
time quite literally defies gravity and displaces the Earth beneath the viewer’s feet. From this 
“vision” of nonlinear time Hais’ prophecy continues and he goes on to state that “Aus dem Stürzen 
und Fliegen hebt sich ein neues Land…eine neue Erde.” How this change occurs, the movement 
from an old world to a new one with be a central theme running through the remainder of the film 
and is taken up time and again throughout Herzog’s oeuvre. It poses the question of how – if at all 
– one can escape from the 
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economy of the crystal-image. It asks, if there can indeed ever be something “new” under the sun, 
how the new events form and how time itself comes into being. 
Immediately after Hias’ initial visions, the viewer is confronted with how this crisis of time is 
processed in the everyday world through images and how time is related to language. Walking 
through what appears to be the Bavarian Alps, Hias encounters a group of villagers. Not 
coincidentally, Hias’ first contact with the villagers is centered on semiotics and declares figurative 
language a priori to real, rational definitions, but also underscores just how important the latter are. 
In what seems to be a direct allusion to Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages (1781), the 
villagers inform Hias that they’ve heard the news that a terrible giant is at large in the region. 
Desperately fearful, they relate how the giant will come to destroy their homes and livelihoods, or 
even kill them outright. But more than that, their entire way of living and thinking is threatened by 
such a menace. The giant will not merely kill them, it will deprive them of the very organ that makes 
them who they are. As a young man bemoans, “[Der Riese] lutscht uns das Hirn aus!“ But Hias tries 
to calm them, saying that there are no such things as giants and that the tale’s originator, who claims 
to have seen the giant firsthand, was simply mistaken. Had he been less fearful and more observant, 
Hias claims the man would have noticed that the sun was low in the sky; what had actually seen was 
the elongated “Schatten eines Zwergs.” The young man’s mind is getting away from him and the 
empirical reality of the situation does not at all align with his fears. 
The relationship between language and image also proves crucial in setting up the film’s 
central concern – the loss of the secret formula for ruby glass after the death of Mühlbeck, its master 
craftsman. In an early scene, two forlorn glass workers converse with one another about the missing 
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formula: “Schreiben hät‘ er doch können…das hät‘ er leicht aufschreiben können“ to which the 
other replies “hast du schon mal ein Wort geschrieben?” The first man obviously has not (one 
assumes he is illiterate as nearly all factory workers would have been) and can only shrug “aber reden 
hät’ er doch können.” The loss of the secret formula for the ruby glass is all the more painful as it 
seems to the first man as if Mühlbeck could have simply written it down, turned it into 
communicable information, a true Word. But the second man puts this into question or at the very 
least attempts to absolve Mühlbeck, implying that such a task might have exceeded his abilities. 
Asking the first if he has ever written a Word – and, again, it is assumed he is illiterate and incapable 
of doing so – lamenting the loss of the formula seems to be fruitless as it might have been inevitable 
in any case. Still, the first man seems to at least hope that the secret could have been passed on orally, 
simply told to someone else. Yet in the context of the film, this obviously was not the case – the 
formula is indeed missing, possibly lost forever. And it is quite uncertain who, if anyone, might be to 
blame. 
In the following scene, Herzog definitively states that this loss of language is not merely 
about written words or speech, but images. According to Herzog, images that a given people can 
orient themselves around are vital for the survival of a culture or civilization; without working 
continually to develop them they are “doomed” and will “die out like dinosaurs” (Werner Herzog 
Eats his Shoe). Herzog goes so far as to compare inadequate images a problem on just as catastrophic 
a scale as “energy problems, or environmental problems, or nuclear power…or over-population of 
the world” (Ibid.) And it is just such a light one should consider the position of Herz aus Glas’ 
characters: with the loss of their ability to create ruby glass is not some simple difficulty, it is a 
83  
disaster of apocalyptic proportions. The economy of the village seems to reside in their ability to 
produce the red crystal and it supports their infrastructure and even personal relationships; the 
villagers’ daily lives and their economic security are based upon producing ruby glass, which they 
now find themselves incapable of doing, having lost the formula with Mühlbeck’s death. Without it, 
they lack an image upon which they can project their future. The master states this clearly in his 
initial assessment of the ruby glass and why he seeks with increasing desperation and obsession to 
find a way to rediscover its secret, for without it, he asks himself, “Was schützt mich jetzt von den 
Unbilden des freien Weltes?” (emphasis mine). These “Unbilden” – poorly translated in the English 
captions to “evils” – should be taken literally as a lack of images, not in the sense of pictures, but as 
the pre-linguistic elements of Firstness. Both their daily lives and their economy are based upon 
producing ruby glass, which they now find themselves incapable of doing, having lost the formula 
with Mühlbeck’s death. 
The great and grave error of the Master throughout the film is not that he has falsely 
identified the problem – Mühlbeck really is dead and the formula for ruby glass gone – but rather 
that he clings to the idea of a fallen world and loss. Speaking of the ruby glass, he is right to think of 
it as having a “leicht zerbrechliche Seele” and that it seems to fulfill its social function fully only 
when it is “rein von Flecken,” but already begins his descent into religious fanaticism and 
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destruction by declaring cracks in glass as “sins.”29 For the ruby glass is a symbol of linear time itself, 
the formula for cause and effect in a world that runs from past to present to future. The Master’s 
fanaticism lies in the fact that he sees no potential for a broken sense of time or even the possibility 
for new understandings of time, but rather indulges in a prelapsarian, romantic fantasy of a former 
perfection that must be regained at any cost; he does not want a broken symbol of time, but rather 
wants to possess the formula of time and sell it as his own. Moreover, he completely misses or denies 
the ability of the crack to serve as a site of self-reflection even though this awareness has already 
arisen within some of the village people. For example, Toni, the man that survives the bar fight early 
in the film, understands that “Das mit dem Rubinenglass, das ist der Krankheit vom Herrn.” As the 
Master’s own “Dienstmensch” declares when examining the ruby glass “Es leben Menschen darin. 
Wie können Menschen in Glashäuser leben?“ Gesturing to one side she continues, “Hier, die Kirche. 
In der Kirche leben Tiere, Tiere aller Arten…aber kein Mensch ist in der Kirche zu sehen.” The 
viewer gets the sense that the Master lives in just such a Church, devoid of humans but full of 
animals. That it is a horse that emerges from the glass rather than a human figure in a later scene 
only reinforces the point. There is an inhumanness and fervent religiosity in the Master’s desperate 
search for a perfect Word to revive the lost formula; his subjects do indeed live in glass houses – but 
houses of his own devising, whose formula he owns – and as the increasingly ominous prophecies of 
Hias show punished as sinners for any flaws with damnation and death. If the Master cannot literally 
“own” the operation of time and its economy, he is willing to burn the entire village down. 
 
 
29 Though it cannot be expanded upon here, this scene is also crucial in developing Deleuze’s conceptualization of pure 
optical or pure acoustic images linked to the crystal-image. The full quote in this passage concludes with the intriguing 
phrase “Nach dem Sündenfall gibt es keinen Ton mehr” to which his steward Adelbert provides an emphatic “Amen.” 
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Understanding the master’s mad search for the secret of ruby glass as a quest for pure, linear 
time and limited semiotic that do not require critical self-reflection and could eradicate the “sin” of 
“cracks” also provides a certain logic to scenes in Herz aus Glas that otherwise remain bizarre or even 
senseless. For example, when the master has Mülbeck’s davenport brought in and tears it open with a 
“Brieföffner.” Certain that he is going to find the secret formula, the torn open couch only reveals to 
the Master a tangled mass of animal hair. Yet, this does not stop him. Sifting through the hair he 
says, “Wir werden diese Nachricht lesen. Kann er das entziffern?” After a while, he is given pause at 
the apparent lack of the secret message, but still reads the animal hair as a sign, indeed as a message: 
“Wenn einem ein Brief erreicht, ohne Papier, sodass die Buchstaben herumlegen, dann ist das ehe 
zum nachdenken.” His mad chase after the secret of the ruby glass subjectively experienced as a loss of 
language, or, more specifically, a letter, a message – he has lost his ability to have and create meaning 
and this must be given to him from an external source. He does not want a direct image of time, but 
rather an indirect one that will wholly legitimate his power, wealth, and social position. This is the 
core of his madness. His drive to receive and understand such a message is all-encompassing, 
overwhelming, and arouses such profound longing and fear within him that he will recreate it at any 
cost; he will completely abandon his own logic and reason in order to provide himself the illusion of 
the message having arrived, even if for just a moment. By this point, the Master is so far gone that 
the “message” doesn’t even require that the letters be arranged into anything legible. The message 
doesn’t have to have any sense at all – everything has become a symbol for his delusion of regaining 
the ability to make ruby glass, to have a perfect soul free from cracks, free from sin, to restore the 
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easily calculable progression of time from past to present to future, and to regain control of the 
economy of time, symbolized by the glass itself. 
This reading also reveals the conception of time to be a specifically political problem or 
rather the problematic out of which politics flow. And certainly, whether loved or loathed, Herz aus 
Glas provokes what can only be called a visceral response in terms of its political content. In one 
scathing review that has become famous in Herzog scholarship, Eric Rentschler outright attacks 
Herzog on political grounds and claims he has turned both his characters and his viewers into 
unthinking “cogs” in the machine of his “feverish instrumentalism” (178). Rentschler’s venomous 
account of the film finds “striking resemblances” between Herz aus Glas and Leni Riefensthal’s The 
Blue Light, a film that “resorts to a romantic anti-capitalism decidedly characteristic of Nazi 
ideology” (170-171). It also critiques the film’s expressionistic character from the Kracauerian 
perspective, declaring that Herzog has cast himself as a seemingly “benevolent Caligari” (160) and 
insisting that “The Cabinet of Werner Herzog demands a captive audience” (162). Rentschler goes 
so far as to compare the mechanics of what he sees as Herzog’s thinking to none other than Hitler’s 
minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, with the small caveat that they “do not fully coincide” 
(174-175). Rentschler believes those that so keenly followed Herzog in his hypnotic project often 
take a tone that “smacks of the most devout Führer-worship” (162). Nor is Rentschler alone in his 
condemnations; in the same volume, Corrigan also labeled Herzog a “unsocialized and narcissistic 
son” (18). 
Herzog, for his part, doesn’t fail to provide a response in bombastic style. Speaking of critics 
that reduce his films to political statements or hope to discern his personal credo through his films, 
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Herzog states, “Grasp this with a pair of pliers, but the credo is the films themselves and my ability 
to make them” (Guide for the Perplexed 77). That is, in his opinion he is not trying to make grand 
claims, as he is so often inclined to underscore, but to try and expose new images already within the 
world and ourselves as humans, always aimed at understanding their grammar. He is staging 
repetitions of temporal structures because it is those structures that most fundamentally condition 
us. Those that continually press him and his films for manifesto-like statements are missing the point 
and have “tunnel vision” (ibid.).30 It is, according to Herzog, “as if they were looking through a 
straw they picked up at McDonald’s. They keep searching. No wonder they get desperate” (ibid.). 
The political poignancy that such critics force upon the film stem from viewing it solely within the 
realm of the movement-image. The political critiques of Rentschler and others in the end make the 
fundamental error of approaching Herzog’s films at the wrong scale, by viewing them, as it were, 
through a warped lens of time and fail to take into account the complexities of Herzogian identity 
structures. 
More favorable reviews tend to eschew political grievances and instead highlight the film’s 
linking of body and materiality (Heringman 2012), or its ability to “reassimilate myth to its 
historical exigencies” when one reads Herzog’s efforts in Herz aus Glas as efforts toward an “ironic 
sublime” (Singer 1986). Some, such as Forbes claim that Herz aus Glas simply isn’t “a narrative 
film,” and that “story told, the film remains disconcertingly ‘about’ something else” (256). But these, 
 
30 Here Herzog shows off a particularly Nietzschean bent that appears at times in his work. Deleuze writes that the 
striking difference between Herzog’s metaphysical style and that of the German Expressionists to whom he is often 
compared is “a problem of Good and Evil to which Herzog is indifferent” (Cinema 1 185). This is, of course, a matter of 
concern from the position of practical politics, just as it has always been. However, it can be argued that Herzog’s films 
warrant a reading from a “micropolitical” stance through their staging of ethical problematics rather than providing a 
wholly positive example that fits into a given political paradigm. 
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too, are half-truths for they leave, as Rentschler rightly claims, the film “as a whole unaccounted for” 
(166). From my own perspective, it seems prudent to highlight Wahl’s comments, which have an 
unwittingly pragmatic coloring to them and provide a platform from which to supply my own 
reading of the film as working toward a new grammar of images through its temporal economy: 
‘Hypnotic’ films like Heart of Glass tend not only to lull the concentration of the viewer, but demand, for 
precisely that reason – in contrast, for example, with action films – the highest degree of concentration, and 
they make great demands on the conscious mind. Eric Rentschler does not take account for this. (246) 
The images in Herz aus Glas are indeed hypnotic, but blatantly so, and for that very reason prompt 
the viewer toward self-reflection with a power that few other films have ever attained. As Prager 
notes, “this film is one of Herzog’s most demanding feature films to watch” (Aesthetic Ecstasy and 
Truth 97). Furthermore, Prager adds, “it could very well be asserted that film’s irrationality - its 
unanswered questions, its relentless circularity and its implicit critique of the Enlightenment - aids in 
stimulating rational responses” (Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 95). It is precisely the lack of clear action 
and everyday narrative that Herz aus Glas forces the viewer to conceive of the film as more than just 
another story. Though the narrative seems to advance through the Nostradamus-like prophecies of 
Hias and the obvious obsession and madness of the unnamed “Herr,” it is the townspeople, the 
society of the village at large, that are of greatest importance. Often overlooked, this simple 
contention is crucial. It is not a question of good or evil actions or individuals, but how, as if in a 
trance induced stupor, they can do the things they do – and in the end, really do nothing at all – in 
the face of prophecies that keep coming true and a delirious leader that slips ever more blatantly into 
madness. The film demands its characters to be read as a collective system rather than as individuals 
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the viewer should celebrate or decry. It presents a tangled intersubjectivity, no less wrought with 
difficulty and strife than subjective models in the classical vein, but one that functions entirely 
differently in terms of action and thought and puts the question of individual freedom into question, 
or at the very least asks for its reimagining. 
As critics like Rentschler are right to note, connections to National Socialism are apparent; 
Herzog himself admits this with his intentions when making the film. Calling Herz aus Glas a “tale 
of collective madness, of people aware of an approaching catastrophe yet who do nothing,” Herzog 
goes on to state that “after all, the idea of people walking into a foreseeable disaster is an 
unfortunately familiar situation in German history” (Guide for the Perplexed 133). But as I 
demonstrated above, it is a crisis of time itself and images in themselves that sets the whole thing in 
motion. Nonetheless, Herzog also offers up new potentialities for future action and thought, even if 
they do not have a “pure” political nature. And he does so by not only creating time-images within 
Herz aus Glas, but by also blatantly showing how politically dangerous the logic of the two central 
characters can be when isolated, with the Master indeed harboring the danger of a Fürher-like 
psychopathy and Hias the danger of sitting and seeing, but doing nothing. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important and most easily identifiable political commentary in 
Herz aus Glas emerges through core relationship of Hias and the Master. Eric Rentschler becomes 
important once again for both identifying critical relationships within the film and simultaneously 
drawing wildly negative conclusions by viewing Hias and the Master as individuals, rather than as a 
bound and crystalline economy. Citing the visionary Hias’ relationship with the Master – who 
Rentschler constantly and tellingly refers to as “the industrialist,” despite the term being utterly 
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lacking in the film, in Herzog’s commentary on the film, or even in the screenplay – Rentschler 
believes, “Hias…correspond[s] to Herzog’s preferred self-image. The seer, nevertheless, becomes 
indistinguishable from his double, the industrialist” (175).31 Rentschler defends this position by 
citing a scene in which the two men’s shadows blend together upon first meeting, but utterly lacks 
any further commentary on the fact that it is the “shadows” that touch and blend, rather than the 
men or their actions themselves, assuming, as it were, that the “shadows” were the real or true 
essence of each man and that their words and actions – which are often at complete odds in their 
presentation – were meaningless. It is my contention that Hias and the Master are indeed bound 
together by their “shadows,” and are indeed doubles, but that neither can or should be read as a 
solely positive or negative example, rather as the actual and virtual sides of a single figure, two-sides 
of the same coin. Their core relationship is a political problem presented to the attentive viewer, not 
a political position to be glorified or taken up. 
Hias, for example, surely cannot be thought of as a wholly positive character, if only for his 
lack of effectuality. As a prophet, he does not see certainties of the future, but rather the probabilities 
of a virtual field, achieved by his reverie on time that grounds all subsequent visions. Moreover, he is 
aware of this fact, as well as his own impotence to act on the behalf of another and does not even 
have any conviction that his visions might come true, merely that he does indeed see them. As he 
mentions to one of the townsfolk concerning a prophecy, “Glaubst du es oder glaubst du es nicht – 
 
31 Rentschler also interestingly links this to the future development of Fitzcarraldo, where “there is no distinction 
between the visionary and the entrepreneur” (176). The operation of time-images, and more specifically crystal-images, 
does indeed appear to be the same as that of capital (uneven exchange). Yet, puzzlingly, Rentschler seems to eternally 
imply that Herzog seems to be glorifying this movement of capital rather than inspect or express its functioning for an 
ethical purpose. He seems, as it were, to be viewing it with respect to a form of representation that capital defies with its 
functioning, epitomized by the internal movements of time-images. 
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das ist deine Sache. Ich sag nur was ich sehe. Ob’s sein wird, weiss ich nicht.“ While Hias can often 
see the potential for catastrophe, he also frequently gestures toward the possibility of some sort of 
agency, at the very least in the guise of “belief.” Moreover, he actually provides many of the 
townsfolk with suggestions to avoid the disasters he has foreseen. The Dienstmensch is, for example, 
warned to get away from the Master by Hias well before her murder. Read in this way, his 
prophecies, and in particular the larger historical prophecies he intones near the film’s conclusion 
demonstrate not future events, but the channels of potentiality that extend out from what he sees in 
the present. Hias does not look into the future, but rather far off into what Herzog frequently refers 
to as “distance,” he sees into the “virtual” dimension of time itself, which is not the future, but rather 
the empirical historicities of the past that form the preconditions for probabilistic emergence. He 
does not see ‘the future’ so much as the myriad ‘futures’ that exist in the present: all of those virtual 
pasts that also exist in the present. He literally sees probability spaces and offers advice to those who 
care to listen. 
My contention that Hias’ visions are not of the future itself, but rather complex probabilistic 
potentialities derived from glimpsing time is evident throughout Herz aus Glas. Take, as an example, 
Hias’ long prophecy that seems to vaguely predict European history in one fell swoop, before 
extending into modern times and possibly beyond. Some of these events can be now seen to have 
come to pass or even have multiple interpretations, but others have not: 
Dann fängt der Kleine einen Krieg an und der Große überm Wasser macht es aus. Dann kriegst du um 200 
Gulden keinen Laib Brot mehr. Dann kommt ein gestrenger Herr, der zieht das Hemd über dem Kopf und die 
Haut dazu. Nach dem Krieg meinst du das es ist eine Ruhe, es ist aber keine…Die Bauern werden sich 
92  
gewandten wie die Stadtleute und die Stadtleute wie die Affen. Die Weibern ziehen sich Hosen und Stiefeln an. 
Die Bauern werden mit gewischten Stiefeln mitten in der Miststadt stehen. Die Bauern werden Kuchen essen 
und politisieren…In jedem Haus ist ein Krieg. Kein Mensch wird auch den anderen mögen. Die reichen und 
feinen Leuten werden umgebracht. Wer feine Hände hat, wird totgeschlagen. Die Bauern werden ihren 
Häusern mit einem hohen Zaun einzäunen und auf die Fenstern an die Stadtleute schießen. Die Stadtleute 
werden betteln, “Lass mich akern!” aber sie werden umgebracht. Kein Mensch wird mehr den anderen mögen. 
Wenn zwei auf einer Bank kommen und der eine sagt “rück ein wenig“ und der anderen tut’s nicht, so ist das 
sein Tod. Das ist die Zeit von Bänkeabräumen.” (Herz aus Glas) 
This long, virtual history is what Hias sees not as the absolute future, but as what will occur from the 
trajectory of the present if nothing is done by the people, if they learn nothing from their own past. For, 
as the film cleverly demonstrates, the virtual is something accessible, even if it is not actual, and 
because of this it can be identified and fought. 
That the virtual is both real, but also actionable is forcefully evident in Herzog’s use of “the 
bear” throughout the film. Surprisingly, an analysis of the bear does not appear in secondary 
literature on Herz aus Glas even though it proves vital to connecting the film’s content to Hias’ final 
vision at its conclusion. In fact, bears are an incredibly important and under-researched aspect of 
many of Herzog’s films. In the wildly successful Grizzly Man, wild bears are of course front and 
center, however, Herz aus Glas and another one of Herzog’s films that deals quite expressly with 
semiotic issues, Jeder für sich und Gott gegen alle, use the figure of the bear in a very particular 
manner. Herzog seems to draw his inspiration for this utilization from Heinrich von Kleist. Herzog 
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has never shied away from acknowledging his admiration of Kleist32 and his use of bears in these two 
films reflects and expands upon the problem that the trained bear at the end of Kleist’s Über das 
Marionettentheater illustrates. At the culmination of the short tale, Kleist’s protagonist – who is 
initially interested in understanding how certain marionettes he encounters are able to dance 
gracefully, while being artificial – is told a story by the marionette operator about a man that is 
invited to fencing practice by an acquaintance, the Herr v. G. The latter being a superior 
swordsman, this man is utterly astounded when Herr v. G. informs him that he is a very good but 
imperfect swordsman, having studied with one that is indeed perfect. Shockingly, this is not another 
person, but a bear that has been taught to fence. Kleist writes: 
Der Bär stand, als ich erstaunt vor ihn trat, auf den Hinterfüßen, mit dem Rücken an einem Pfahl gelehnt, an 
welchem er angeschlossen war, die rechte Tatze schlagfertig erhoben, und sah mir ins Auge: das war seine 
Fechterpositur (807). 
But as he begins to fence with the bear as Herr v. G. suggests, he is astonished to find that the bear is 
easily able to parry every one of his strikes, and with minimal effort at that: “der Bär machte eine 
ganz kurze Bewegung mit der Tatze und parierte den Stoß” (ibid.). This is incredible enough in and 
of itself, but what is utterly astonishing is that the bear only responds to true attacks. It passively 
identifies and ignores all feints, but never fails to parry any actual, intended attack: “auf Finten (was 
ihm kein Fechter der Welt nachmacht) ging er gar nicht einmal ein: Aug in Auge, als ob er meine 
Seele darin lesen könnte, stand er, die Tatze schlagfertig erhoben, und wenn meine Stöße nicht 
 
32 In an interview with Geoffrey O’Brien, Herzog declares that Kleist – along with writers like Büchner and Hölderlin – 
provide their readers with “the innermost landscapes of human beings, and that is why they will outlive everything else” 
(Interviews 127-128). He is also listed along with Hölderlin, Kuhlmann, Montaigne, Thucydides, and Virgil as one of 
the “small number of authors important to him” that he keeps books of in his home (Guide for the Perplexed xv). 
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ernsthaft gemeint waren, so rührte er sich nicht” (ibid.). The bear, chained with its back to the wall, 
is the perfect fencer because it can clearly differentiate between actual and virtual threats; it can sense 
the moment that the virtual intent becomes actual. And this is the key: the bear has to have a 
thoughtful awareness of the emergence of the actual from the virtual to differentiate between mental 
“feints” that do not result in actual attacks and those that do. It cannot be argued that the bear 
simply has no comprehension of the virtual and exists solely in an actual realm when its sensory- 
motor schema, because it both reacts perfectly to the stimuli it receives, but also immediately 
identifies mental subterfuge. It can, unlike the seer or visionary, always identify those “futures” will 
become actual and dismiss those that will not or perhaps simply does not have to contend with them 
in the first place. The bear has a perfect, yet ossified view on time, which presents “actions” as 
predetermined events, with the future being entirely “visible” within the present. But, more 
troubling, this sort of perfection comes at a grave cost. Recalling my discussion of the Master and his 
search for the perfection of the ruby glass, the bear can be shown to occupy just that state of grace 
that the story’s narrator is trying to understand, where time can be completely “owned” through the 
present. Yet, as Kleist points out, this is not necessarily to be envied. With his final sentences, there 
comes an apocalyptic warning: 
Mithin, sagte ich ein wenig zerstreut, müßten wir wieder von dem Baum der Erkenntnis essen, um in den 
Stand der Unschuld zurückzufallen? 
Allerdings, antwortete er [der Marionettenmeister]; das ist das letzte Kapitel von der Geschichte der Welt. 
(ibid.) 
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In other words, to achieve such a perfect recognition of time as something pure paradoxically 
becomes a suicidal mission. It leads to the destruction of the world by eradicating the indiscernible 
and with it the possible emergence of the new. It has formed a pure historicity that unifies time into 
a singular entity or conception. 
This conception of the bear – completely overlooked in secondary literature on Herz aus Glas 
 
– proves critical to a full analysis of the film. Hias mentions the bear when he meets the Master for 
the very first time, warning the Master of its dangers and asking for the help of a hunter in order to 
slay it. Yet, the master does not seem to heed Hias’ request, instead pressing on in his search for the 
missing formula of the ruby glass. “Du sollst die Beigabe fürs Rubienglas sehen” to which Hias 
replies, “Ich weiss aber nicht die Beigabe.” The master continues, reducing it to a matter of money 
“für zehn Gulden weiss er es” and when Hias still does not respond, the Master continues, “Dann 
weiss er es für tausend.” Hias’ final reply is categorical and clear, “Ich bin nur wegen dem Jäger da.” 
That is, Hias wants the master to do what he cannot – to mobilize his wealth and power to deal with 
the threat of the bear, to act where he, as a simple cowherd tied to his visions of the virtual, 
seemingly cannot. 
The Master ignores this request and the film continues to take its course, barreling headlong 
toward the tragedy and catastrophe that Hias foresees. Yet, still, Hias has hopes that there is a way to 
thwart the impending doom that the town and its people face, even if he cannot quite place a finger 
on precisely how that might be achieved. Eventually, chaos breaks out and the Master murders the 
Dienstmench and sets fire to the Glashütte, landing himself and Hias with him in prison for seeing 
the tragedy but failing to prevent it. Crucially, it is at this juncture that the bear becomes important 
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again. Indeed, without it the hopeful ending of the film would seem an aberration. Trapped together 
in prison, Hias paces crying “ich muß in den Wald!” The Master takes this as Hias wishing to escape 
society, a romantic move to return to Nature and asks “und Menschen, wirst du keine sehen? Du 
gefällst mir. Du hast ein Herz aus Glas.” 
It is with the Master’s approval that Hias’ heart and purity of vision finally break, where the 
seer becomes more than merely the master’s virtual double by recognizing himself as the mirrored 
counterpart of a madman. Through this recognition, a “crack” occurs and Hias’ position toward his 
visions and the virtual itself radically shifts. The scene ends and what the viewer suddenly encounters 
is time, the literal passing of a season, which the visionary alluded to in his conversation with the 
shopkeeper just before his capture. The next time the viewer sees Hias, he has been freed from prison 
even though it is not shown precisely how this occurs. Hias marches through the woods, still 
partially decked with snow, with winter passing and spring emerging. But instead of seeking 
isolation and the solace of Nature as the Master assumed, Hias marches straight toward a small cave 
and, crawling halfway in to get the creature out, provokes a fight with the bear he has been 
mentioning throughout the film. But the bear is invisible, is virtual, not opposed to the real but 
rather the actual. Hias pulls his knife from his sheath and, wrestling and fighting for his life, finally 
slays the bear. Moreover, the bear, though invisible, is not only presented as a real adversary, it is life 
sustaining and even, in its own way, necessary; Hias actually eats it, “So, und jetzt der Bär braten.” 
This is a grave warning that life for Hias, for the whole community, will not go on until the bear – 
the human desire for an understanding of time that is flawlessly linear and calculable, totally 
actualized – is destroyed, cooked, consumed. 
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Immediately after he slays and eats the bear, an action that requires an awareness of the virtual 
but also practical, political effort, we see Hias’ final vision. He imagines a man on an inhospitable 
landscape, a “Felseninsel” far off the shore. Standing alone, he casts his gaze out across the water 
wondering if in fact the world is flat – for word has not reached such an isolated location that the sea 
does not end in an Abyss as the islanders believe. Hais calls this man, “der erste, dass zweifelt.” The 
perseverance of his doubts eventually takes root in the community and, after several years, he is 
joined by three others. Seeking proof for the reality of the horizon they face, they decide to set out 
across the sea and finally, “brechen sie auf, in einem viel zu kleinen Boot.” Yet, the film concludes 
with a dramatically hopeful and uplifting statement. As the men row out to sea with birds whirling 
above their boat, words appear on the screen: “Es mochte ihnen ein Zeichen von Hoffnung 
erscheinen, dass ihnen die Vögel aufs offene Meer hinaus folgten.” 
How then is the viewer to take this shift in perspective and action? Throughout the film, 
Hias’ prophecies have predicted only catastrophic events: deaths, fires, even wars. But, once freed 
from the prison he shared with the Master, after slaying and consuming the bear, he suddenly 
foresees a hopeful, if difficult path. For as we, the film’s viewers, know, the Earth is not flat. Should 
the islanders survive their difficult voyage, they will indeed find new land. So, what exactly has 
changed for Hias in his confrontation with the Master? In his confrontation with the bear? It is my 
contention that Hias not merely discovered the crystalline nature of his relationship with the Master, 
that he is, as a “pure” visionary, both his opposite and complementary double, but he also comes to 
understand the importance of the “crack,” of interval and is able to take upon himself the slaying of 
the virtual bear, releasing new hope, an image of the “new world” he foresaw in the film’s opening 
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sequence, but could not comprehend. No other explanation seems satisfactory to understand the 
film in its entirety. 
Another way to think of this is to relate it back to a temporal summation between Hias and 
the Master. The Master, as an emblem of the present, seeks to control its economy by regaining the 
formula for the ruby glass in order to allow the economic and even subjective lives of the villagers to 
flow out from himself and his possession of the formula: he is in all of the politically suspect ways a 
Führer figure, the font of political and economic power within the village. Hias, looking not into the 
future, but rather into the virtuality of the past that exists in the present, “sees” the probability spaces 
of future events not as they will inevitably unfold, but rather as a superposition of states that are 
likely to occur within a particular, progressive historical line. No matter what the Master might do, 
no matter what Hias might see but then fail to act upon, in the end the true political choice becomes 
a matter for the villagers, for the people as a collective unit, to decide their fate. Following the 
infernal circuitry of the time-image, the double bind of political action becomes apparent. One must 
act, but also never fail to look into the virtual field of those pasts that exist in the present in order to 
chart the probable outcomes of future events.33 
To follow a Master blindly, hypnotically, and to avoid looking into the virtual is a political 
negligence that continually funnels political power into tighter and tighter circuits, leading 
ultimately to a single human figure, an individual face, out of which all economies flow. Such 
 
33 Herzog and his characters’ positions on temporal economy are not completely new. One could make mention of, for 
example, apocalyptic time from the Revelations of St. John or Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History, 
particularly in their commentary on the artist Paul Klee’s “Angelus Novus.” What is novel in Herzog’s cinema is the 
direct monstration of such a spatiotemporal perspective and the central character Hias’ struggle to come to terms with 
viewing the world in this manner. 
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stupefied passivity of the masses has a well-documented history and foreseeable, bloody ends. Yet, to 
dwell solely within the dreamy realm of visions does nothing to mitigate such futures. A recognition 
of the seer as the double of the tyrant is of necessity demanded for the formation of any politics that 
might remain ethical. Ethics arrives not in the formation of the time-image, but rather from escaping 
its economy. Ethics is not a moralistic certainty, but a tight-rope balancing act that juggles both 
vision and industry. 
Through its unending and circuitous time-images Herz aus Glas does not provide political 
ideals to be aimed for, but instead diagrams the mechanics of politics itself, down to its temporal 
economy. Viewed as participating in the selfsame physical structures of the world, time-images 
monstrate the uneven exchange of material and social flows, they trace economic and political 
realities, putting to question not simply their realities, but how one assesses and alters them through 
thought and action that extends beyond the individual. If the film has a politics, it is simply that of 
identifying and slaying the bear; if there are any political means within the film, they are in the end a 
call to reexamine our understanding of temporal structures as a means of reexamining ourselves, of 
writing our own history. Time-images are not ideals but rather physical problems we face, temporal 
structures we must think. Time-images are the infernal circuits of time we must continually escape 
to hold any ethical sway over our future. In the end, Herz aus Glas paints the micropolitical 
quandary of a time that is “out of joint.” 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Volcanic (Sur)face: Landscape and Subjectivity 
 
Poetic Formula: “I is another” 
 
In my analysis up to this point, I have painted a novel portrait of Herzog as a pragmatist 
dedicated to his project of working on a new grammar of images. In the introduction I identified 
Herzog as a non-ironic director with a humorous but Stoic disposition. In Chapter II, Herzog’s Herz 
aus Glas was demonstrated to adhere to and explore the logic of the time-image. The economic 
functioning of time-images, which provided a glimpse of time in the pure state, endlessly dividing 
itself, forking. This “perpetual exchange” proved to raze the ground of not merely the factory that 
plays such a central role in the film and the livelihood of its characters, but also of their subjectivity, 
which, with time out of joint, flowed forth from a point of indiscernibility between the “real and the 
imaginary,” between action and vision (Cinema 2 273). This was caused by the character Hias' 
“visions,” his new awareness of time out of joint and the “pure recollections” that arise from “seeing” 
the past that exists within the present and coming to terms with virtuality. In the movement-image, 
subjectivity “appears as soon as there is a gap between a received and an executed movement.” 
(Cinema 2 47). With the time-image, subjectivity takes on “a new sense, which is no longer motor or 
material, but temporal...that which ‘is added’ to matter, not what distends it” (ibid.). With time- 
images, a post-Kantian subjectivity emerges that maintains the functions of its previous form, but 
also adds a superjective dimension that no longer allows for subjectivity to be conceived merely as an 
individual identity, but rather also a product of the processes of subjectification; the subjects linear 
everyday gets shot through with a nonlinear and dynamic temporality. And with this new temporal 
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perspective, the subject finds itself, much like the doubting men at the end of Herz aus Glas, setting 
out toward a new and uncertain future. 
For Herzog, this contention has profound effects on the way his cinematic subjects must be 
conceptualized. Post-Kantian subjectivity is not a firm or solid state, but rather our mode of 
operation as humans, both conscious and unconscious, in time and with the inhuman.34 In a time 
that is out of joint, one approaches the subject not as an unchanging entity, but as an ever-changing 
process: and this applies in the cinema just as much as it does in everyday life. Cinematic subjectivity 
is therefore not to be confused with individuality or identity in Herzog’s oeuvre. Instead, the 
subjectivity of Herzogian characters must be viewed not as singular but rather split and by nature 
social throughout the entirety of Herzog’s work.35 And, indeed, it is this particular mode of 
subjective operation, of processual subjectification rather than an essence of the subject, that is of 
deepest interest to both contemporary philosophy and film: not a singular subject or given 
individual, but rather that split and multiple subject whose “I is another.” 
 
 
34 We should be reminded here that Bergson – who Deleuze bases the foundation of his research into cinema on 
alongside Charles Sanders Peirce – believed that “the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped at its 
foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way around. That we are in time looks like a 
commonplace, yet it is the highest paradox. Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which 
we are, in which we move, live and change” (Cinema 2 82). 
35 As Guattari notes in his The Three Ecologies, “The subject is not a straightforward matter” (24). In the last chapter, 
along with Deleuze, we located the subject in time, and specifically a time out of joint, rather than conceive of it as a 
clearly bounded and boundaried identity. Guattari recommends abandoning the analysis of ‘the subject’ in favor of what 
he calls the “components of subjectification,” the actively functioning aspects of the world that lead to the production of 
subjects (ibid.). “This would lead us, necessarily, to re-examine the relation between concepts of the individual and 
subjectivity, and, above all, to make a clear distinction between the two. Vectors of subjectification do not necessarily 
pass through the individual, which in reality appears to be something like a ‘terminal’ for processes that involve human 
groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines, etc. Therefore, interiority establishes itself at the crossroads 
of multiple components, each relatively autonomous in relation to the other, and, if need be, in open conflict” (Three 
Ecologies 25). To me this seems particularly evident of cinematic characters that, in their very being as fictional 
assemblages, are more patently social in nature: no film without a viewer, no subject without a socius. The cinema 
provides a wonderful platform to inspect the visceral processes of subjectification with minimal political risk. 
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An I which is another comes, as I have argued, as a result of a particular conceptualization of 
nonlinear time. In Herzog’s cinema the present and the past which exists in the present are grounded 
in the time-image, but creation and the future itself are not. They are instead grounded in escaping 
from the crystalline logic of the time-image, from slaying the bear and making way for new ground. 
And, as I have shown within Herz aus Glas, this site of creation is also an ethical and political 
dilemma. At some point, it becomes insufficient to merely provide the prophecies that “vision” 
brings with it; one must also confront the virtual directly, must identify the threat of the bear and 
rout it out, in order that a different future might be conceived. 
The future and creation are therefore not a synthesis of dialectical processes within time- 
images. The future and creative acts can instead better be thought of as discovering a way out, of 
cracking and escaping from the crystal itself. With its internal movements a time-image forms 
nothing more than an “infernal circuit” that would have to collapse back onto a supreme Concept, 
on an ultimate subject from which the world issues forth, in order to warrant a future. Yet for 
Herzog the future must be spoken rather than simply warranted; it must be created through an 
encounter with something outside of its own circuits, a Herzogian ecstatic truth.36 It is from external 
movements that time-images allow us to trace backward through our development in a manner not 
dissimilar to what a scientific analysis of the Big Bang might provide. By utilizing the empirical 
information, we can ascertain from the present, we improve our knowledge of the past and better 
 
 
36 Herzog defines his concept of “ecstatic truth” most directly in his Minnesota Declaration, where he states that, “there 
are deeper strata of truth in cinema, and there is such thing as a poetic, ecstatic truth. It is mysterious and elusive, and 
can only be reached through fabrication and imagination and stylization.” This is set against “the truth of accountants.” 
The point is that ecstatic truths – much like Deleuzian percepts and affects – are “direct,” unmediated experiences, even 
though they still participate in a historical milieu. Ecstatic truths can otherwise be defined as actual spacetime events. 
103  
understand the path of our own development. Only once we come to terms with our origins might 
we come to terms with the probabilistic realities of our future. Only in this manner can we ascertain 
how a given event37 was formed and how future events might come to occur, how we might shape 
and guide the temporal flows that form those same future events. 
The complex and multiple nature of subjectivity, derived as it is from a conception of time 
that is out of joint and the logic of time-images, is one of the areas in which Herzog’s films resonate 
most forcefully today. If the advent of the time-images demands, as I have argued, a rethinking of 
time itself with human subjectivity enthralled and in tow, it also precipitates a reexamination of land 
itself, of actual firmament, in both its creation and function and how physical space informs the 
processes of subjectification. Picking up where Herz aus Glas leaves off, the logical conclusions drawn 
from time-images demand an exploration of the “neue Erde” that Hias foresees at the film’s outset, 
the new lands that the doubting men set out to discover the film’s conclusion. Such new worlds are 
physical locations – they are actual space – yet they are also the foundational possibility of new 
subjectivities and new modes of subjectification; they are, in a manner of speaking, the probability 
spaces of the future too. To undertake this reexamination, I will turn to Herzog’s use of landscape, 
including his well-documented penchant for filming what he calls “inner landscapes,” but I would 
like to suggest upfront that it is Herzog’s use of volcanic landscapes in particular that should be read 
as an investigation into these modes of subjectification. 
 
 
 
37 While it cannot be taken up directly here, Deleuze’s conception of an encounter with the outside, the concept of the 
event, is defined in his ‘Twenty-third Series of the Aion’ in Logic of Sense. It is no coincidence that this is taken up in the 
same small chapter that demonstrates both his theory of time, including his concept of the Aion and his theory of 
language, including his understanding of its foundations (Logic of Sense 167-172). 
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While there has been next to nothing written on Herzog’s use of volcanoes in secondary 
literature, there is a considerable amount of critical commentary on Herzog’s landscapes and their 
central importance in his films is widely acknowledged. For Matthew Gandy, landscape in Herzog 
“plays a pivotal role” and “emerges as a dramatic provocation for Herzog and his cinematic 
protagonists: an existential motif for mortality that contrasts the ephemerality of human life with the 
indifference and infinitude of nature” (528). Yet this approach suffers by introducing them as 
representative of an externalized and objective “nature,” and quickly ensnares Herzog’s work within 
the framework of “neo-romanticism;” it falls immediately into the same old trap of being unable to 
approach Herzog and his films non-ironically, unable to take him at his word. Gandy continues: 
Although I make use of Herzog’s own testimony...I do not consider that his words can provide more than a 
useful starting point for analysis since it is a characteristic feature of romanticist aesthetics to emphasize the role 
of the individual human subject rather than their cultural or political context. Indeed, the presence of the 
‘extreme subject,’ which is a feature closely associated both with Herzog’s own persona and those of his main 
cinematic protagonists, raises its own set of questions for any critical understanding of the enduring resonance 
of human encounters with landscape within contemporary cinema (529). 
The fundamental fault with this approach is that it is making the common mistake that we broached 
above: it is confusing subjectivity with identity. Gandy’s viewpoint inverts the problematic of 
Herzog’s nonlinear cinema by applying linear rules, for in any cinema that engages with time-images, 
cultural and political contexts arise out of subjectification rather than focus on a singular subject arising 
out of cultural and political contexts. Such subjectivities are in and of time in addition to being located 
within space, actually and objectively. Contrary to what Gandy and others might believe, Herzogian 
subjectivity functions not through neo-romantic individualism, but as a social multiplicity in a post- 
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Kantian world where an I is always another. For Herzog there is no romantic, but only an indifferent 
Nature. As a result, subjectivity never has at its core a question of an individual genius capable of 
conquering or harmonizing with nature. Instead, despite our uncanny ability to view ourselves as 
discrete individuals, the subjectivity of Herzogian characters inevitably reveals a non-romantic, 
pragmatic and social relationship between the individual and their physical environment, where the 
latter shapes the former and inevitably snuffs it out. 
This contention upends a great number of positions taken within critical commentary on 
Herzog’s work, especially concerning Herzog’s positions on aesthetics and politics. In his thorough, 
book-length study on the cinema of Werner Herzog, Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth, Brad Prager claims, 
“Politics is something Herzog sets aside as a simulacra, something that can only distract from or 
diminish aesthetic ecstasies” (11). Prager then adds that for Herzog, “Part of his self-understanding 
as an artist who transcends the sphere of the political – his separation of aesthetics from politics – 
comes from the idea that he has special access to a social unconscious. In this regard, his famous 
fascination with landscapes becomes a central concern” (italics mine. ibid.). This is, perhaps oddly, both 
accurate and backward. Linking Herzog’s interest in landscapes to politics, aesthetics, and a social 
unconscious is both fair and important, but this contention, too, seems to have an inverted 
understanding of subjectivity and its role in Herzog’s films. It is not that politics are absent from 
Herzog’s work, but rather that they arise from the depths of his aesthetics. Herzog’s films 
demonstrate a micropolitics of function rather than a macropolitics of declaration; they seek the 
grammar of images rather than to impose a closed system of syntax. As such, Herzog’s politics within 
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his films are only indirectly legible, derived by tracing backward through the physical systems that 
form particular cultural and political positions. 
Strikingly, this political contention is also the bedrock on which Herzog’s use of landscape 
operates – including his concept of inner landscapes – though this fact is often overlooked. Critics 
like Prager are well aware that “Herzog has insisted that landscapes are always already within us” and, 
quoting the director directly, Prager notes that Herzog has explained: “For me a true landscape is not 
just a representation of a desert or a forest. It shows an inner state of mind, literally inner landscapes, 
and it is the human soul that is visible through the landscapes presented in my films” (ibid.). Yet by 
failing to acknowledge Herzog’s pragmatic and post-Kantian view on subjectivity, even 
commendable work such as Prager’s is inevitably led to ally Herzog’s work with the movements that 
the director so strongly rejects, and in particular romanticism, providing various caveats along the 
way. For example, Herzog is not for Prager a “Romantic in the traditional sense,” but rather a 
Romantic in the vein of “[Caspar David] Friedrich,38 Archim von Arnim, Heinrich von Kleist and 
others” (Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 12). And this pseudo- or neo-romanticism leads straight back to 
the difficulties we have already encountered concerning Herzog and irony. “In addition to the 
 
 
 
38 Herzog is rather frequently associated with Romanticism despite frequently denying the claim, and vehemently at that: 
“You can’t get a more contrary position towards the Romantic point of view than mine” (Guide for the Perplexed 141). 
He does, however, claim to have ties to the Romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich, particularly through their similar 
understanding of landscape. “While almost everything about romanticism is foreign to me, Caspar David Friedrich is 
someone I do have great affinity for. In his paintings Der Mönch am Meer and Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer a man 
stands alone, looking out over the landscape. Compared to the grandeur of the environment surrounding him, he is 
small and insignificant. Friedrich didn’t paint landscapes per se, he revealed inner landscapes to us, ones that exist only in 
our dreams. It’s something I have always tried to do with my films” (Guide for the Perplexed 142). Tellingly, this quote 
also attests to Herzog’s understanding of social subjectivity as more important and powerful than an “insignificant” 
individual identity. This, in the end, seems to be what so forcefully separates him from the Romantic tradition. It is not a 
matter of the individual as becoming one with Nature, but rather the individual being an insignificant part of an 
indifferent Nature. 
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question of how Herzog depicts landscapes,” Prager explains, “another key link with the history of 
German ideas comes by way of Herzog’s irony” (Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 14). This is not 
necessarily to be viewed in the exact same manner as Platonic irony for Prager, but in the Romantic 
way of thinking as “gestures that reflect on the medium itself” (ibid.). This sort of “formal irony” 
and reflection on the medium of film is indeed evident in Herzog’s work; Prager is right to affirm 
that this “is not the same as the irony of a joke that presents itself as seriousness, but rather a 
question of how a particular medium is employed; it is a means of acknowledging the author’s 
presence set against the illusion that the work exists independently of its author” (ibid.). But 
conceiving of Herzog’s landscapes through irony seems to be more of a convenient (as well as 
confounding) way to keep his work closer to his predecessors rather than fair or fruitful. It, once 
again, seems to be asking a cinema grounded in time-images to play, as it were, by the rules of 
movement-images; it ignores the dimensional problematics of nonlinear time which are so prevalent 
in Herzog’s work. Adopting Romanticism and irony as metrics fails to acknowledge Herzog’s 
pragmatic, social approach to subjectivity and should therefore be abandoned in efforts to come to 
terms with his cinema. Even if the conclusions drawn from Romantic critiques offer some food for 
practical thought, they do little to come to terms with the mechanics and the underlying 
micropolitics of Herzog’s work. 
For a fresh perspective, I want to highlight Herzog’s own comments on his use of landscape 
before extending them to volcanic landscapes specifically. Despite the reservations of critics like 
Gandy, this position allows us to better understand the director’s intentions and provides a platform 
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to both understand and critique Herzog’s micropolitical examinations, all of which stem from his 
social view of subjectivity, both internally and externally. 
An initial, fundamental contention is that, for Herzog, landscapes are not merely 
backgrounds. “I never present literal landscapes in my films. What I show are instead landscapes of 
the mind, locales of the soul” (Guide for the Perplexed 97). Herzog is never just showing his viewers a 
landscape; he is instead revealing the resonances that landscapes have with the human, how 
landscapes relate to and help form human culture in all its varied forms. Landscapes are linked to 
thought and awe instead of being simple or natural stages for Herzog’s characters; they always reveal 
something about Herzog’s characters themselves and the human condition, demonstrate the limits of 
each rather than merely serve as a backdrop for their actions. Furthermore, Herzogian landscapes are 
not stagnant things or neutral places, but something akin to living entities that can be manipulated 
according to the director’s cinematic vision. Speaking of the Peruvian jungles that serve as the setting 
for Aguirre, Herzog relates: 
It was as if the landscapes had no choice; they had to fit my imagination and submit themselves to my idea of 
what they should look like. Although sometimes I struggle to find actual environments that match those in my 
head, I’m good at reshaping physical landscapes and making them operative for a film...Often I try to introduce 
a certain atmosphere into a landscape, using sound and vision to give it a definite character. The fact is that I 
can direct landscapes, just as I do actors and animals. (ibid.) 
Herzog believes that he is able to direct landscapes, because they have their own “rhythm and 
sensuousness” that he can use to stylized effect (Guide for the Perplexed 64). Herzog has stated that “a 
landscape always adapts to a given situation” and in his work as a director he coaxes them along to 
these sorts of adaptations or modulations (Werner Herzog: Interviews 19). To achieve these 
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adaptations and modulations, his well-documented “stylizations,” Herzog is willing to go to great 
lengths, manipulating not only the landscape itself to fit his vision, but also utilizing visual and 
sound effects to reveal more forcefully these “locales of the soul.” Herzog always finds something 
physical, preexisting in his present, and then adds sensory dimensions to his footage, altering its 
content in the process. Speaking of the now famous scene that features countless windmills in his 
first major feature Signs of Life, Herzog states: 
Take, for example, the windmills in Signs of Life. They are in a valley in Crete. No one has counted, but there 
are about ten thousand windmills on a plateau in Crete. That’s a reality. When you see them in the film, you 
think it’s a trick. I’m thrilled by this because it makes reality become strange, you can no longer trust it. And 
there is something in that which is similar to insanity...I want to add something else. I always try to introduce a 
different aspect, a different character into a landscape. For the windmills in Signs of Life sound is important. 
Here’s what I did: I took a recording of nearly a thousand people clapping at the end of a concert and distorted 
it electronically until it sounded like wood banging. Then I added another sound over it - what you hear in the 
countryside when you put your ear on a telegraph pole and the wind passes through the wires. You hear a 
humming that children call “angel song.” Then I mixed the banging wood with the “angel song” and used the 
resulting sound as if it were noise from the windmills. This changes the windmills. I am not saying that it 
changes them physically, but it changes the image and our perspective. And this new and very direct perspective 
on things is what I am trying to show and render visible. It’s a way of perceiving that might become a part of 
your consciousness and intuition. Regarding landscapes in general, what I am looking for is a decent place for 
human beings, a place that measures up to humanity. (ibid.) 
This passage points to two key elements for analyzing Herzog’s landscapes. First, it must be 
underscored that what Herzog is after, this “new and very direct perspective on things,” is in fact a 
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percept39. Rather than presenting or revealing some particular quality of an exotic location, a 
landscape in Herzog is always a reciprocal and inter-affectual relation between firmament and 
psyche, between physical space and human thought. For Herzog, the human psyche itself is 
“spatial,” it is a landscape, a topography we actively map rather than simply represent (Aesthetic 
Ecstasy and Truth 103). The human psyche is topological rather than typological or teleological in 
Herzog’s view. This is why Herzog is so keen to harp on the literal qualities of “inner landscapes,” 
those already given but constantly shifting contours of human psychic existence. He is not interested 
in landscapes as objects, but rather as effective locales for the process of subjectification, the spaces of 
subjectification.40 Second, Herzog works toward his aim of achieving a “new and very direct 
perspective on things” by utilizing optical and sound situations like those described in his example 
from Signs of Life, by forming opsigns and sonsigns that strain the senses to the point of delirium. 
While a common definition of landscape would likely exclude sound from its concept – or 
potentially even the windmills for that matter, given that they have been built by human hands – 
Herzog’s understanding does not. In fact, these intensive sounds and visions are used more like tools 
 
 
39 As Deleuze and Guattari note, one must be careful not to confuse percepts and affects with “perceptions or feelings” 
respectively (What is Philosophy? 24). Instead, works of art - including film - are to be thought of as “a bloc of sensations, 
that is to say a compound of percepts and affects” (What is Philosophy? 164). Percepts in particular are “no longer 
perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them” (ibid.). They are “beings of sensation” in 
their own right that exist in time, that exists “in itself,” without requiring individual perception as an a priori (ibid.). 
This clashes with Prager’s contention that it is an “illusion” that a work of art exists independently of its author; for 
Deleuze and Herzog it could be argued that they do indeed exist independently in time, and that our own identities are 
drawn from a social subjectivity, that we and our work are produced by the process of subjectification rather than being 
truly individual entities. A percept always forms as a landscape that the human is forced to relate to, changing their 
subjectivity in the same process. 
40 Without stretching too far, this could also go some way toward explaining Herzog’s preference for maps compared to 
artwork within his home, as evinced in our introduction. Landscapes, both external and inner, provide the processes of 
subjectification that interest him, including those that lead human beings toward the creation of ‘art’ and somewhat 
diminish or even eliminate the latter as a productive category. It would essentially all be there in the maps and the 
mapping. 
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to sculpt or change the landscape in a manner akin to an excavating company preparing the ground 
before a new building might be constructed: the potential is already there conceptually, but one 
coaxes it out with active stylizations. The percepts created through his stylizations then provide new 
platforms from which one can again map the landscape and so on unto infinity. Herzog’s landscapes 
are therefore not flat backgrounds, but “layered images” that form the essence of his films, images 
that are by his own admission “prepared by cultural modes of perception, conditioned by historical 
precedents, surrounded by discourse, and governed by relations of power” (Ferocious Reality 49). 
They are images with their own particular historicity, a spatialization of thought that continually 
forces new thought through its human mapping. 
These contentions are especially important to underscore because landscapes are the 
inspiration for nearly all of Herzog’s films. They also set up an important juxtaposition for both 
Herzog and a pragmatic philosophy of cinema: the relationship of landscape and face. In Paul 
Cronin’s initial collection of interviews, Herzog on Herzog, the director declares “Though I do not 
like most of his films, it seems that for Ingmar Bergman his starting point is a human face. The 
starting point for many of my films is a landscape, whether it be a real place or an imaginary or 
hallucinatory one from a dream” (83). He continues with a small caveat, “Actually, maybe I should 
say that the landscapes are not so much the impetus for a film, rather they become the film’s soul, 
and sometimes the characters and the story come afterwards, always very naturally” (italics mine. ibid.). 
This view seems to be reiterated from a 1973 interview with Noureddine Ghali, the very same 
interview where he provided his views on the windmills in Signs of Life. There Herzog stated, “many 
of my films have begun with landscapes. Ingmar Bergman, whose films I don’t like for the most part, 
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begins with faces. His starting point is the face. For me, my starting points are landscapes or 
imaginary places and aberrations, hallucinations...When I speak of landscapes, I don’t mean 
landscapes in the provincial sense. It’s something different” (Werner Herzog: Interviews 19). 
Landscapes are mentioned yet again – and still with a comparison to Bergman and the human face – 
in Guide for the Perplexed, where Herzog stated “For Ingmar Bergman, the starting point of a film 
seems to be the human face, usually the face of a woman. For me, it’s a physical landscape, whether a 
real or imaginary or hallucinatory one” (4). 
Like many of Herzog’s interview statements, these comments are given so often they seem 
almost scripted. Personal distaste for Bergman aside, in almost every conversation concerning 
landscapes, Herzog relates them to faces and takes a critical distance from the latter. This is no 
coincidence; the connection between faces and landscapes is well documented, particularly within 
contemporary pragmatics41. But whereas these theories focus chiefly on the affect of the face, Herzog 
 
 
 
41 Deleuze and Guattari have most clearly outlined this relationship in ‘Year Zero: Faciality,’ a chapter in A Thousand 
Plateaus. Here “The face digs the hole that subjectification needs in order to break through; it constitutes the black hole 
of subjectivity as consciousness or passion, the camera, the third eye (italics mine. 168) The face is presented as “a surface;” it 
is the “inhuman in human beings” (170-171). While their concept of the face/faciality cannot be fully explored here, 
what is important to note is that the face is inevitably linked to the landscape for Deleuze and Guattari: “The face has a 
correlate of great importance: the landscape, which is not just a milieu but a deterritorialized world” (172). Citing 
“Christian education” as a particular way in which the face/landscape correlation is used, Deleuze and Guattari go on to 
say that such education “exerts spiritual control over both faciality and landscapity” (ibid.). This is most centrally the 
case within aesthetic education. While there is no shortage of literature focusing on faciality - in particular from affect 
theory - there is far, far less concerned with “landscapity.” This chapter, hopes, in some small way to begin correcting 
that. For our purposes, it is also important to note that the face/landscape relationship is strikingly declared to be the 
heart of film itself: “The close-up in film treats the face primarily as a landscape; that is the definition of film, black hole 
[face] and white wall [landscape], screen [landscape] and camera [face]” (ibid.). This is because in film, “All faces envelop 
an unknown, unexplored landscape; all landscapes are populated by a loved or dreamed-of face, develop a face to come 
or already past” (172-173). This position, however, hinges upon taking post-Kantian subjectivity into account, with 
individuals viewed as “multiplicities” here rather than truly individual entities. As argued throughout this chapter, 
Herzog takes a very similar approach, by dreaming up landscapes for the origin of his films. It is quite likely that 
landscapity has thus far been largely ignored because it seems a logical fallacy from any transcendent view that 
externalizes Nature as object related to an individual subject. 
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places his primary emphasis on percepts drawn from landscapes. If Herzog – even though he clearly 
seems to understand the theory of affect – is chiefly interested in “landscapes and visions” rather 
than, like Bergman, “faces and becomings,” it could very well be simply because he is not attempting 
to engage faces, which are always “a politics,” but rather provide focus on landscapes which he sees as 
the precondition for any potential politics, any face (A Thousand Plateaus 181).42 For in Herzog’s 
films, it can be argued that a given politics or a given face is always comprised of landscapes, that 
they grow out of and are continually formed by landscapes. It is not my intention to wholeheartedly 
support this position politically, for, in the end, it is far more difficult to distance oneself from the 
politics of the face than Herzog seems to believe it is. But this is an important contention to come to 
terms with the mechanics of Herzog’s films and their micropolitical functions, especially in more 
recent works where this becomes more forceful. The undeniable fact is that – at the very least in 
structural terms – the micropolitics of landscape takes precedence over the politics of the face in 
Herzog’s oeuvre and, as I argue, this position is of necessity aligned with post-Kantian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 For Herzog, faces appear to be of less consequence than landscapes because in his films, just like Deleuze and Guattari, 
“what chooses the faces [as well as the individual face] is not a subject...it is faces that choose their subjects” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 180). Deleuze and Guattari return to and expand the relationship between face and landscape in their final 
collaboration, What is Philosophy?, specifically in their discussion of percept, affect, and concept. Percept - which I claim 
is Herzog’s central interest - is first linked with the novel rather than film: “The novel has often risen to the percept - not 
perception of the moor in Hardy but the moor as percept; oceanic percepts in Melville; urban percept, or those of the 
mirror, in Virginia Woolf” (168-169). This likely explains to some degree why Herzog’s screenplays fall somewhere 
between novel, play, and screenplay, rather than following traditional form. In Deleuze and Guattari, percepts and 
landscape are further aligned with a Herzogian position through their emphasis on vision and the role of the visionary. 
“The landscape sees...The percept is the landscape before man, in the absence of man...characters can only exist, and the 
author can only create them, because they do not perceive but have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of 
the compound of sensations...percepts - including the town - are nonhuman landscapes of nature” (169). These empty, 
humanless landscapes of nature are easily identifiable in nearly every one of Herzog’s films, documentaries and features 
alike. 
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conceptualization of subjectivity, which is not individual but rather in the Nietzschean sense at least 
dividual. 
To illustrate this contention, one need only take an in-depth look at Herzogian volcanoes. 
Volcanoes and volcanic landscapes have a long precedent in Herzog’s work. While Herzog’s early 
films do not address them directly, volcanoes are nonetheless present and important. For example, 
Herzog’s 1970 Auch Zwergen haben klein angefangen is set amidst the volcanic background of the 
Canary Islands. More specifically, the action takes place on the easternmost island, Lanzarote, which 
is home to the “Tunnel of Atlantis” – the world’s longest known submarine volcanic lava tube. This 
volcanic tube is connected to the larger surface structure known as the Cueva de los Verdes and was 
formed roughly 20,000 years ago when the Monte Corona volcano erupted on the island. Volcanoes 
are an integral part of Lanzarote’s geography, history, and even modern tourist industry, with Los 
Volcanes Natural Park and Timanfaya National Park – a massive expanse of land on the western side 
of the island comprised entirely of “volcanic soil” – being popular destinations. Major eruptions 
happened on Lanzarote in 1730-36 and again in 1824 and many of the island’s volcanoes are still 
active. While there is no eruption in Auch Zwergen haben klein angefangen, the film’s nervous and 
gloomy atmosphere is certainly heightened by the volcanic landscapes it is set against and, in the 
end, its small protagonists stage a rebellion that could be described as volcanic in its fury and 
impartiality. Furthermore, Herzog was most certainly aware of the geographical features of 
Lanzarote, and as a landscape it must play a role in any analysis of the film. 
To provide another example, one need only look, once again, at Herz aus Glas, where the 
volcanic landscapes of Yellowstone National Park are included as part of Herzog’s stylized vision of 
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Bavaria; the impending doom of a “supervolcano” is right at home with the world ending and world 
generating mythology the film explores through its time-images. Here one sees the brilliant blue 
pools of the Grand Prismatic Spring in Yellowstone’s Midway Geyser Basin, as well as long shots of 
Mammoth Hot Springs and its cascading slopes of calcium carbonate. These volcanic expanses set 
the apocalyptic tone that Hias’ visions reveal and resonate with the fiery ‘soul’ of the ruby glass in 
both the deep red of its final form and the scenes within the factory that show the glowing, molten 
stages of its attempted production. In fact, I believe time-images and the landscape of the volcano are 
intimately bound in Herzog and it is not coincidental that the ruby glass has an inner “fire” akin to 
the lava and magma of volcanoes. If time-images ultimately serve as Herzog’s apology for 
filmmaking as a visionary mode of thought and production, the volcano serves as the landscape par 
excellence that relates to both the apocalyptic and hopeful sides of such vision: volcanoes become the 
“inner landscapes” that resonate most forcefully with the processes of world formation and 
destruction within human thought. 
This can be taken up and defended by quickly examining Herzog’s very next film. 
 
Immediately after completing Herz aus Glas in 1976, Herzog tellingly made his first film overtly 
featuring volcanoes, La Soufrière43. Prager has argued that La Soufrière “conveys the same impression 
of deferred apocalypse found in Heart of Glass, in which the men at the film’s end set sail in a boat: 
they might be off to meet their doom, yet this is not something that we are permitted to view” 
(Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 115-116). The premise of La Soufrière, which bears the subtitle “Warten 
 
 
43 Herzog states in Encounters at the End of the World “way back in 1976, when I first filmed a volcano...” Yet, Herzog is 
mistaken as both Auch Zwergen haben klein angefangen and Herz aus Glas have volcanic landscapes that, as I argue here, 
play important roles. He is correct, however, in that it is only with La Soufrière that volcanoes become a central concern. 
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auf eine unausweichliche Katastrophe,” was not, however, focused on the volcano itself but rather an 
impending eruption on the island of Guadeloupe in August 1976, during which Herzog hoped to 
find and interview a man that he heard had refused to be evacuated. Speaking of the film’s 
production and intent in an interview, Herzog states: “I was not interested in the volcano. I was 
interested in one single man that refused to be evacuated, a different attitude toward death. 75,000 
people being evacuated and he stayed on!” This remaining man plays a pivotal role in the film’s 
progression and, at least to some extent, Herzog is capable of capturing what he sought when he 
finds the man asleep under a tree: a human attitude at peace with death, waiting calmly for its 
embrace rather than fleeing in fear. Yet despite Herzog’s self-affirmed central concern with “a 
different attitude toward death,” the volcano La Soufrière nonetheless functions as an 
overwhelmingly powerful landscape, a ticking countdown that will surely erase all life on the island, 
and is just as important to analyzing the film as any of the man’s comments – which would be 
meaningless without the volcano’s impending eruption. 
The volcano La Soufrière – literally meaning ‘sulfur’, but also reminiscent of the French 
‘souffrir’ or ‘to suffer’ – is a typical Herzogian landscape as previously described: an inner state of 
being, symbolic of our knowledge of natural apocalypse and it serves as an example of the eventuality 
of death and human extinction rather than just a background (Aesthetic Ecstasy and Truth 115). Early 
in the film Herzog claims that the volcano is going to explode “with the force of 5 or 6 atomic 
bombs,” quickly linking it to catastrophe and apocalypse, to worlds and lives gone in the blink of an 
eye. After finding scientific evidence of a likely eruption, Herzog explains that almost every last 
person evacuated the town of Basse-Terre as fast as they could; and it is in such an empty world that 
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the film takes place. Herzog states that upon arrival, “The place was completely deserted, but in their 
haste, they [the townspeople] had forgotten to turn off traffic lights.” Chillingly, Herzog declares 
Basse-Terre a ghost town and recounts how the city, empty of inhabitants, is akin to what the world 
might look like after sudden human extinction: “The telephones were still working and the air 
conditioners and refrigerators in many houses were still on. In one house, we even found a TV set 
still operating.” The abandoned town was “as spooky as a science fiction locale” and, Herzog claims, 
when he and his cinematographer looked at the horizon, they were sure that “the mountain seemed 
about to explode.” With poetically charged voice over, Herzog assures his viewers that even the 
animals were preparing for a cataclysmic eruption and that, in the face of certain death, much of the 
fauna were fleeing to the ocean: “The sea was full of dead snakes. They had crawled down during the 
night by the thousands from the mountain jungles and fled into the sea, where they promptly 
drowned.” But most poignantly, Herzog describes the entire island as cloaked in a palpable tension 
driven by utter silence: “The silence grew ever deeper and the volcano, La Soufrière, shrouded itself 
in clouds. Nobody knew if the eruption would happen in the next few minutes, or the next day, and 
because one could not see a thing, the fear became anonymous.” 
But, of course, as a “unausweichliche Katastrophe,” La Soufrière does not erupt. At the film’s 
culmination, Herzog states, “The volcano did not explode. Days came and went. The signs of a 
catastrophe began to diminish. After some weeks the population began drifting back to their homes, 
and villages and towns. It will always remain a mystery why there was no eruption. Never before in 
the history of volcanology were signals of such magnitude measured, and yet nothing happened.” 
The film that was to unveil a catastrophe and show a new attitude toward death has become 
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“embarrassed” and “has become a report on an inevitable catastrophe that did not take place.” The 
eruption has become a non-event. The “new attitude toward death” that Herzog sought to expose 
and explore in the end proves to be one and the same with the old attitude: waiting on an apocalypse 
that seemingly refuses to come, but still affects us. The film, which perhaps had the underlying 
ambition of revealing a voice from beyond the grave, instead captures and demonstrates a virtual 
event’s consequences. But more than just that, La Soufrière extends beyond capturing an attitude 
toward death by problematizing the volcano itself as landscape. In the end, the volcanic landscape of 
La Soufrière proves to be the real star of the film, despite the director’s intentions. The volcano, as 
landscape and percept, becomes both the literal and symbolic presentation of devastation and 
extinction that exists within all of us as part of the preconditions for human culture, thought, and life 
itself. Without the volcano, no film; without its imagined but staved off eruption no visceral contact 
with extinction and death and therefore no human meaning. The volcano always functions as a 
precondition of the human and also gestures toward the inhuman. The film is not an account of a 
disaster, but rather humankind’s ability to imagine a world that they are not a part of. La Soufrière 
captures a glimpse of a world evacuated, ripe for destruction, ready to be reformed. 
For Herzog, this virtual catastrophe of La Soufrière is at bottom the imagining of death and 
destruction of the human: a vital part of the grammar of images. Yet it is also and inevitably linked to 
the creation of the new, and to the creation of the future – while one does not see it on film, it is 
obvious that life returns to the island and moreover goes on much as it did before. While La 
Soufrière presents these complementary and intertwined attitudes, it does so quickly and 
unreflectively, without fully fleshing them out, saddling Herzog with far more questions than it 
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provided answers. Given the superficial coverage of the volcano itself, it is more likely that the 
experiences of filming and producing La Soufrière piqued Herzog’s interest in volcanoes and volcanic 
landscapes rather than demonstrated something he had carefully planned or thought through: the 
practically non-existent pre-production and skeleton crew for the film underscore this point. Instead, 
La Soufrière appears to have served as the spark that ignited the director’s more specific and 
conscious interest in volcanoes and is likely one of the main reasons Herzog has returned to them 
time and again in more recent work. 
This return, however, was long in the making. While there is ground for some comparison 
with volcanoes in works like Lektionen in Finsternis with its oil fields shooting geysers of flame, actual 
volcanoes are not returned to until 2009’s Encounters at the End of the World. Encounters, set in frigid 
Antarctica, might at first glance seem an odd choice for discussing volcanoes – and the film does 
indeed explore a number of different themes and landscapes, not merely volcanoes – but several 
important scenes are framed around a group of volcanologists. Furthermore, Herzog cites his interest 
in a particular volcano, Mt. Erebus, as one of his inspirations for making the film. Working with 
only his cinematographer Peter Zeitlinger, Herzog wanted Encounters to be in the vein of Virgil’s 
Georgics and described his vision for the project to Zeitlinger in the following terms: “He [Virgil] 
never explains anything, he just names the glory of the land. Let’s do the same.” (Guide for the 
Perplexed 383). One of these Antarctic glories, Herzog explains, was Mt. Erebus, a massive Antarctic 
volcano: “[Mt. Erebus] is more than twelve thousand feet high and of particular importance for 
scientific study because the inner Earth is directly exposed inside its crater. Only two other such 
volcanoes exist on the planet. The glowing magma continuously spits out lava bombs, some of which 
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are the size of Volkswagens. There is a strange curiosity we humans have for the power of volcanoes, 
perhaps because they are capable of wiping out our entire species” (Guide for the Perplexed 384). 
This strange power is once again linked to annihilation much like in La Soufrière, but this time on 
the global/species scale rather than in reference to a single island and its inhabitants. In Encounters, it 
is no longer an individual attitude toward death, but rather a social attitude toward species 
extinction that captures Herzog’s interest and focus. 
Arriving at the top of the volcano, right at the lip of its massive crater, Herzog and Zeitlinger 
encounter the group of volcanologists, some of them lying prostrate and suffering from altitude 
sickness. “First thing,” Herzog states as the viewer sees aerial footage of the smoking crater, “we were 
instructed in the etiquette of dealing with this volcano.” One of the volcanologists and the leader of 
their expedition, William McIntosh, then explains in detail to Herzog the safety protocol for 
avoiding lava bombs. Reminding Herzog and the film’s viewers that one must under no 
circumstances turn their backs on the crater and the magma, McIntosh explains one must instead 
look straight ahead, attempt to judge the lava bomb’s course, and just “step out of the way.” The 
ecological implications of meeting natural and man-made dangers head-on resonate strongly, but 
also subtly here with the threat of volcanoes themselves being chiefly underscored. Directly thereafter 
in the following scene, Herzog turns his attention to another volcanologist. Speaking with Clive 
Oppenheimer – Herzog’s future collaborator on 2016’s Into the Inferno – Herzog presents to his 
viewers an account of an apocalypse that has already occurred, again at global scale. Oppenheimer 
states: 
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If we go back into the geological record, we see that there are huge volcanic eruptions, massive, explosive 
eruptions that produced thousands of cubic miles of pumice, showering large parts of the earth with fine ash. 
And these have been demonstrated to have had a strong impact on climate. And one of the biggest of these 
events 74,000 years ago has been argued even to have affected our human ancestors. And may have played an 
important role in the origins and dispersal of early humans. So, these events will recur and I think the more we 
understand about them, the better we can prepare for the...the...the...eventuality. 
Herzog takes this provocation, an imagining of apocalyptic recurrence due to volcanic activity, and 
runs with it. In the portentous tone of one of his visionary characters, Herzog declares: 
For this and many other reasons, our presence on this planet does not seem to be sustainable. Our technical 
civilization makes us particularly vulnerable. There is talk all over the scientific community about climate 
change. Many of them agree the end of human life on this earth is assured. Human life is part of an endless 
chain of catastrophes, the demise of the dinosaurs being just one of these events. We seem to be next. And 
when we are gone, what will happen thousands of years from now in the future? Will there be alien 
archeologists from another planet trying to find out what we were doing at the South Pole? 
Ratcheting up the scale of annihilation from town to planet, as well as complimenting the 
idea of annihilation with the idea of a time that extends beyond the human, however, does not sate 
Herzog’s interest in volcanoes. Continuing on from the initial contentions one finds in La Soufrière 
and Encounters, Herzog follows two lines of reasoning that conceptualize the volcano, both virtually 
and actually, with two more films, one narrative and one documentary, and both released in 2016: 
Salt and Fire and the aforementioned Into the Inferno. Each of these films utilize and further develop 
the links between landscape, subjectivity, and politics that I have argued for above. 
Into the Inferno begins in typical Herzogian fashion. If the screen can be thought of as an 
entire world, this world is a volcano and nothing but a volcano. Set to a sweeping, operatic 
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soundtrack, the opening shot is a meditation on a volcano’s lines and curves, a hovering study of its 
topography, its contours. As the camera hikes up the mountain face and peers down into the crater, 
revealing glowing red magma that churns and flows, the credits roll.44 Yet it becomes quickly 
apparent that Into the Inferno does not present volcanoes merely as symbols of destruction. Herzog’s 
on-screen interview with Clive Oppenheimer demonstrates this and frames the exploration of 
volcanoes in Into the Inferno: 
Clive: Do you see them only in destructive terms, volcanoes? 
 
Herzog: No, I do not. [pauses] Something different – it’s good that they are there...and, uh...the soil we are 
walking upon is not permanent. There’s no permanence to what we are doing. No permanence to the efforts of 
human beings, no permanence to art, no permanence to science. There is something of a crust that is somehow 
moving and it makes me fond of the volcano to know that our life, human life, animals, can only live and 
survive because volcanoes created the atmosphere they breathe. 
Nor are volcanoes simply objects of scientific interest in the documentary: 
 
Obviously, there was a scientific side to our journey. But what we were really chasing was the magical side; the 
demons, the new gods. This was the itinerary we had set for ourselves, no matter how strange things might 
eventually get. 
And this “magical side,” these “demons” and “new gods,” are for Herzog nothing less than mythic 
and political forms, human forms of faith and belief. “Of all the volcanoes in Indonesia,” Herzog 
 
44 One is immediately shown that, while maintaining sole directing credit, Into the Inferno is “a film by Werner Herzog 
and Clive Oppenheimer,” a collaborative project. It is important to note that Oppenheimer, one of the volcanologists 
that Herzog met at the summit of Mt. Erebus while filming Encounters, receives creative credit. As a scientist, 
Oppenheimer supplies the film with a more precise, functional perspective on volcanoes, as well as professional 
connections within the field of volcanology that allow for focused interviews. Herzog, for his own part, sculpts the film 
into something more than a simple documentary, weaving Clive’s interviews into a tapestry of Herzogian tropes and 
ensuring Into the Inferno fits into Herzog’s larger body of work. But by specifically assigning a creative role to Clive 
Oppenheimer, Herzog creates a connection between the work of film and science that is central to his semiotic. By 
granting equal creative status to scientific inquiry, Herzog is making the bold move of making science and film 
interdependent in a novel way, as argued below. 
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claims, “there is no single one that is not connected to a belief system.” Volcanoes do not resonate 
with particular faiths or beliefs, but instead are bound to the very creation of those faiths and beliefs, 
be they mythic, religious, political, or even economic. Furthermore, for Herzog and his film’s 
subjects, volcanoes are again shown to be active landscapes, not just a destructive potentiality, but 
wellsprings of meaning, communication, and even kinship. The volcanoes of Into the Inferno do not 
simply inspire fear, but are instead presented as living entities that have an affective role for 
individuals, societies, and the species as a whole. To Herzog, they seem to form the pre-conditions of 
human existence tout-court. The volcanic landscape as percept acts. Volcanoes are therefore both 
benefactors and annihilators, givers of life and harbingers of death; in Into the Inferno they serve as an 
ur-landscape, perhaps the first of all, upon which all human endeavors take place and by the grace of 
which they continue to exist, both in terms of biology and culture. 
This contention is the thread that ties the disparate times and places the film explores 
together. Early footage focuses on the village of Endu on the island of Ambrym in the Vanuatu 
Archipelago. Herzog provides a brief history of the village and its people: “A year ago, most of it was 
destroyed by a tropical storm of phenomenal force. But the village also has to endure the periodic 
fallout of volcanic eruptions. Punctuated by catastrophes, time does not seem to have found a grip 
on the community.” With the grip of time absent – more specifically a modern, Western time, a 
time that has put the subject in a position of crisis and has ever-increased its linearity and 
regimentarity to preserve and enhance Western identity structures45 – Herzog demonstrates that 
 
 
 
45 For further explication of this process, see Isabelle Stengers and Didier Gilles essay, ‘Time and Representation,’ in 
Power and Invention, pp.176-211. 
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realms of human meaning and self-conception are still able to take on forms many in the 
contemporary world might find archaic, specifically in reference to the volcano. After brief 
introductions, Clive Oppenheimer sits down to speak with the village chief, Mael Moses. When 
asked what he feels when he looked into the volcano – an object of scientific study for Oppenheimer 
– Moses replies: 
 
I felt very frightened to look at the fire. Secondly, I felt that I was not on the isle of Ambrym, I felt I was 
somewhere else. And the other thing, how powerful that fire is...It is our belief that spirits are in the fire. The 
fire is burning through that spirit…We are more or less related to the volcano…Once, I dreamt about the 
volcano. I saw people in that fire. People, women and men, they’re cooking their food in there. So, it makes me 
believe there is somebody who is the spirit...We believe that anybody who dies here goes to the volcano and 
that the volcano has become the village. We can talk to them and they can talk to us. [When asked if he can 
talk to the volcano] I cannot because I’m not related to the volcano. But one of my brothers is. He was talking 
to the volcano. 
While this passage functions primarily as a novel approach to volcanoes for Herzog’s viewers, 
it also exemplifies the actualized side of crystalline functioning from its very beginnings, especially 
through its self-referentiality. The volcano, through its spirit, its fire, has reciprocal, familial relations 
with the inhabitants of Endu. By being both the origin and terminus of its people, the volcano is 
simultaneously an engendering, sustaining, and consumptive landscape.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 As Moses mentions almost directly thereafter, “Once upon a time our people were cannibals.” The tribal dance and 
song that the children of the village reenact for Herzog’s camera is meant to symbolize this past. The idea of self- 
referential consumption to usher in the new runs throughout the film and, it must be said, much of Herzog’s work. 
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The subsequent scenes of Into the Inferno continually return to the tropes of self- 
referentiality, creation, sustainability, and destruction.47 These tropes are chiefly addressed through 
the lens of national and cultural identity. In a scene near Lake Toba, Indonesia, Herzog presents a 
scene of “dignitaries” that are “charged with the task of reconciling the goddess of the ocean with the 
demon of the volcano.”48 They do so through a ritual in which they reenact “a sexual union between 
an ancient sultan and the queen of the sea” and this ritual sustains their culture. In Ethiopia, Herzog 
looks at fossil evidence of the very first humans, imagining the “volcanic event” that caused the 
speciation of homo sapiens: an eruption so catastrophic that the human population was decimated 
and we nearly became extinct, uniting the entire species into a single lineage that stems from a small 
population that survived in Africa. In Iceland, Herzog presents a series of eruptions that show 
devastation but also life’s ability to change and adapt to post-apocalyptic conditions. Herzog links 
these eruptions to both poetry and national identity: 
These primordial occurrences influenced the sense of mythical poetry of the Icelanders. There is a text that 
defines the spirit of the people. It exists only in a single manuscript. For Iceland, it is as important as the Dead 
Sea Scrolls are for Israel. The Codex was given as a present to the king of Denmark by an Icelandic bishop in 
 
 
47 In one scene, Herzog and Oppenheimer discuss the Kraffts – a French volcanologist couple who ultimately died in an 
eruption in Japan. Astonishing footage of rolling, roiling rivers of lava and fountains of flame from the Kraffts’ archives 
show them unnervingly close to volcanic events. Herzog then shows the pyroclastic flow that kills them as it blooms on 
the mountainside, with temperatures over 800 Fahrenheit. This underscores his position about how close one gets to a 
volcano is a practical matter of prudence. Herzog and Clive’s stance is to remain “sane” in all explorations, be they 
artistic or scientific. One must observe and report, but always at a critical enough distance to prevent being consumed by 
one’s subject. 
48 In the same scene, Herzog makes an important, ancillary comment. When Herzog sees the Sultan’s Mercedes 
“Wrapped in a bubble of plastic” he likens it to the “conceptual artist Christo.” This artist, along with his wife and 
partner Jeanne-Claude, (oddly born on the same day of June 13, 1935) is known for using “wrapping” public sites and 
buildings. This approach is said not to be ideological or teleological, but for its immediate aesthetic impact. For Christo 
(and Jeanne-Claude before she died in 2009), the purpose of this art is simply to “create works of art for joy and beauty 
and to create new ways of seeing familiar landscapes.” One imagines Herzog particularly enjoying Christo and Jeanne- 
Claude’s work as its inspiration is in some ways parallel to his own. 
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the 17th Century. Hence its name: the Royal Codex or Codex Regius. In 1971, Denmark returned it to 
Iceland. Knowing that it constituted the soul of the country, the Codex was put on Denmark’s largest 
battleship and escorted by a whole fleet. No amount of money in the world would be enough to purchase this 
manuscript from Iceland, although it is battered and crumpled and filled with holes. [In the opening passages] 
There is an apocalyptic vision of the end of the pagan gods. This seems to describe a huge volcanic event. 
Similarly, in North Korea, Into the Inferno underscores the link between national, political identity 
and volcanic landscapes, grounded through the myth of Mt. Pektu, “the sacred mountain of the 
revolution.” Oppenheimer states that “the spirit of the mountain is in all of the Korean People.” 
Here, Herzog shifts perspective by presenting the social subjectivity engendered by the volcano in 
both a positive and a negative sense. A social rather than individual sense of subjectivity can have 
affective, unifying effects such as the ceremony of “collective dance” where the people utilize colored 
cards to literally become a work of art, perhaps unsurprisingly forming a landscape of Mt. Pektu. But 
despite the impressive form and presentation of the event, Herzog states: 
In all this display of the masses, I find an underlying emptiness and solitude. Because of the North Korean 
ideology of political and economic self-reliance, and because of internationally imposed sanctions, the country 
is unique. The population at large has very limited contact with the outside world. There are no international 
phone lines or Internet available to the public. No radio or television from the outside world. To our eyes it is 
strange to see people not glued to their cell phones. There is no advertising anywhere, instead just the ever- 
present propaganda. There are no newsstands, only the official Party newspaper on display. In the subway, in 
the streets, you will find pictures of the leaders, always in the vicinity of the volcano. 
Such tight knit, communal identity can activate and promote incredible individual human 
capabilities, evinced by the little girl piano prodigy. Yet – and more often it seems – it can also cause 
great difficulty by stifling personal expression. The unifying ideology of Mt. Pektu also turns news 
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and information into State propaganda and foments a dearth of individuation. In the end, Herzog 
finds that “the propaganda seems to create a quasi-religious experience.” And this propaganda is 
overpowering. When asking questions “meant to illicit a personal response,” party policies are 
provided rather than individual answers. To Herzog and Oppenheimer, “personal opinions seem to 
us as a mirror-image of the omnipotent ideology of the People and their Leadership.” In other 
words, they have taken the social nature of their subjectivity so far that they have come to shun 
individuality itself. 
The final scenes of Into the Inferno return to the Vanuatu Archipelago, this time to Tanna 
Island and the volcano Mount Yasur. Herzog likens a new cult on the island to a capitalist ideology 
that likely hits closer to Western viewers: 
Similar to North Korea, this volcano has created a new god – the name of the deity, John Frum, a mythical 
American GI who descended from the clouds. Each Friday night, the Islanders celebrate his cult...[already] 
different denominations and even a schism in the Church seem to have materialized. [John Frum] promises to 
return with copious cargos of consumer goods. 
When interviewing the chief of the village, Clive Oppenheimer asks, “Is John Frum like a god? [chief 
nods] The one God? [chief nods].” The chief then answers, “John Frum is like a gate. Like Jesus. 
You have to pass through before going to God.” The American capitalist, replete with goods, will 
return, a modern Savior. Furthermore, seeing as it directly follows on from the critical position 
Herzog takes toward the North Korean lack of individualism, Herzog appears to be hinting the 
capitalism presents the same dangers when elevated to a natural law or a religious principle. 
Contemporary, late capitalism reinforces a move away from individual freedoms and toward a social, 
split subjectivity that is only placated through the narrow joys of what goods one can buy. 
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That Herzog chooses to end his film with an exotic new religion based on American 
consumerism and the nearly ubiquitous economic system of late capitalism is a powerful move to 
demonstrate how closely bound we all are to volcanic landscapes, no matter where, no matter when. 
Each of the locales he investigates is, of course, worthy of further exploration in their own right, 
though these cannot be fairly undertaken here. But what is vital to note is that, for Herzog, nobody 
and nothing, regardless of any circumstances, remains unaffected by volcanoes. Regardless of what 
culture one comes from or how one chooses to live their life, volcanoes play a key role for us as a 
species. Herzog states: 
It is hard to take your eyes off the fire that burns deep under our feet. Everywhere, under the continents and sea 
beds, it is a fire that wants to burst forth and it could not care less about what we are doing up here. This 
boiling mass is just monumentally indifferent to scurrying roaches, retarded reptiles, and vapid humans alike. 
In Into the Inferno, Herzog paints volcanic landscapes as an underpinning of human existence 
and thought, as the anchor of political and mythical being. Their inhuman power, their complete 
indifference, must be contended with; but one too must not become mesmerized by our own 
fascination with their awesome capabilities as both destructors and creators. To do so would be to 
risk one’s sanity and life. Instead, one must come to terms with volcanic landscapes in some measured 
way. One must come to know the landscape (volcano) as an a priori condition and simultaneously 
take ethical responsibility for the various faces of human culture it engenders (myth and politics). 
Herzog dramatizes this contention in his final film that directly concerns volcanoes, Salt and Fire. 
Salt and Fire is a narrative film is centered around the abduction of a “scientific delegation” 
sent by the UN to investigate a rapidly expanding salt flat in South America. These salt flats are 
known to be expanding at an alarming rate. Importantly, this is also widely known to be a man- 
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made disaster. Led by Professor Laura Sommerfeld (Veronica Ferres) – who is accompanied by the 
lecherous, yet poetic Dr. Fabio Cavani (Gael Garcia Bernal) and the conscientious and exacting Dr. 
Arnold Meier (Volker Michalowski) – the scientific delegation has as its mission to collect data and 
discover precisely at what rate the salt flats are expanding. This “ecological disaster” is known as 
“Diablo Blanco,” the thinly veiled gloss of White Devil.49 Though the disaster is at present an 
unfamiliar term, Sommerfeld assures viewers that “Diablo Blanco will soon be a household name.” 
Before the delegation perform their research, however, they are kidnapped by Matt Riley (Michael 
Shannon), the CEO of “the Consortium,” a corporation that is according to Sommerfeld, 
“responsible for the Diablo Blanco disaster.” Riley – though he was not CEO when Diablo Blanco 
began – feels responsible for the disaster, even though Sommerfeld comes in some small way to his 
defense by stating it is “not a singular event” but instead has “developed over decades,” facts which 
can be checked and verified by scientific data and statistics. 
Diablo Blanco, however, is not the only ecological danger present in the film. Salt and Fire 
also uses the massive “dormant volcano,” called Uturunku, as a major plot device. At a crucial stage 
in the middle of the film, Riley explains to Sommerfeld that Uturunku will one day destroy the 
 
 
 
49 The Diablo Blanco is another sign that Herzog view’s face/landscape in a pragmatic manner much akin to Deleuze 
and Guattari. The latter assign “year zero” as the foundation of the “faciality machine,” simultaneous with the birth of 
Christ and “the historical development of the White Man” (A Thousand Plateaus 182). The ever-expanding “White 
Devil” in South America seems an obvious reference to the effects of colonialism geographically, politically, religiously, 
and economically. What is most threatening about the Diablo Blanco is its homogenizing effect - that it has the potential 
to turn all of the landscapes of the world into one giant sea of salt. What this actually does, Deleuze and Guattari argue, 
is to attempt to eradicate all other semiotic systems. “Our semiotic of modern White Men, the semiotic of capitalism, 
has attained this state of mixture in which significance and subjectification effectively interpenetrate...we must, however, 
assess the states of the mixture and the varying proportions of the elements” (ibid.). And, as presented below, it seems 
more than coincidental that Herzog houses Riley’s attempts to show Sommerfeld that there is more to her life and the 
world’s problems than a scientific study of the Diablo Blanco by showing her anamorphic versions of Rembrandt’s 
Descent from the Cross and the literal inner landscape found within the halls of the Santissima Trinità. 
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world. He claims that the volcano is expanding rapidly and they are already experiencing 
“permanent, around the clock tremors.” “When Uturunku erupts,” Riley declares, “our entire planet 
will be obscured for decades. It won’t matter if you live in the Arctic, the Himalayas, or Australia. 
We will disappear as a species.” To this Professor Sommerfeld replies: “I am more concerned with 
what we have created here, here and now: a gigantic salt flat that is expanding rapidly.” He counters: 
“So am I. But what may overtake it all is the fire lying underneath. We must face both. Salt and Fire. 
Here lies a monster on the verge of waking. My guess is one day soon, everyone will know how to 
pronounce ‘Uturunku’...Uturunku.”50 The characters thus face two impending problems and must 
find a way to face both the ever-expanding salt and the planet-wide threat of volcanic annihilation. 
This connection between salt and fire – between man-made and natural apocalypse – is a 
direct parallel to Salt and Fire’s ties between landscape and face, between social subjectivity and 
politics. An early scene where Sommerfeld and Riley speak for the first time illustrates and develops 
this beautifully. Blindfolded and handcuffed, Sommerfeld is led into a lavishly furnished room and 
seated. All of her captors wear ski-masks, their faces obscured. When Sommerfeld asks for the name 
 
 
50 This speech is the obvious inspiration for the film’s title, Salt and Fire, but it is also important to note that both of 
these phenomena are – at least to some degree – grounded in reality. The Diablo Blanco scenes were filmed at the Salar 
de Uyuni in Bolivia, the world’s largest salt flat at 4,086 square miles. The Salar de Uyuni is also the flattest area on 
Earth with an average elevation change of only one meter across its entire surface. Because of this, the Salar is used to 
calibrate the altimeters of Earth observation satellites. Uturunku, too, is a real, physical location rather than a fictive 
aspect of the film’s structure. Uturunku is an actual volcano in the Cordillera di Lípez mountain range in Bolivia, with 
two peaks that raise up either side of a fumarole field, a direct opening in the Earth’s crust. The highest peak is a 
staggering 19, 711 feet above sea level. Since 1992, satellite data has indicated that a major uplift of the ground is taking 
place centered around Uturunku, most likely an indication of an immense magma intrusion under the volcano. This has 
led contemporary scientists to believe Uturunku might be the site of large-scale volcanic activity in the future, possibly 
including “supervolcanic” eruptions and caldera formation. Riley is aware of these facts and kidnaps the delegation of 
scientists by and large to make these views known. But it is important to note that while the threat of supervolcanoes like 
Uturunku is indeed scientific fact, the Diablo Blanco is empirically fiction. The Salar de Uyuni upon which it is based is 
not man-made at all, but was formed by through sequential transformations in several prehistoric lakes and is not 
expanding. 
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of her captor, he replies, “as long as I wear this mask, I have no name.” To which Sommerfeld 
rejoinders, gesturing to Riley’s associate, “But I know the face of this gentleman.” Riley understands 
that she has indeed seen his associate, that the mask is superfluous. Calling him “Krauss” (tellingly, 
Lawrence Krauss, an actual theoretical physicist and cosmologist), the associate removes his mask. 
Yet, this confuses Sommerfeld due to the fact that when she met him initially, the man introduced 
himself as “Aristides.” The brief conversation that follows establishes an important initial 
connection: 
Sommerfeld: Krauss? You said your name was Aristides. 
Krauss/Aristides: In fact – if facts count here – it isn’t Aristides. 
Sommerfeld: So, it is Krauss? 
Krauss/Aristides: Yes and no. 
 
Sommerfeld: And how were you able to get here so quickly? 
Krauss/Aristides: We have our ways. 
Sommerfeld: And who is we? I would like to know. 
Riley: We? That is basically me. 
Krauss/Aristides: I am the brain. 
 
Sommerfeld: I’m leading a delegation; I’m responsible for its members. Where are they? Are they alright? 
Riley: I can assure you they are fine. 
Sommerfeld: I accept no assurances from an unidentified man with no name and no face. I want to see them 
now! 
Riley: Well, hopefully, the time will come when there are no more secrets between us. 
Sommerfeld’s position as a scientist and political representative shows her marked connection to the 
face and to names as a marker of individual identity. But Krauss/Aristides – and to a degree Riley’s – 
positions confound her, stemming as they do from a social subjectivity or multiplicity. Sommerfeld 
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wants a clear distinction between individuals, but none is given. Each of the men are “basically” a 
“we,” rather than an I. They do not take a transcendent subject position, but rather an immanent 
position within subjectivity, a subjectivity within time.51 
This novel, social view on subjectivity can also be linked back to landscape in a later scene 
focusing on anamorphosis. Still questioning the validity of Sommerfeld’s insistence on certainty and 
scientific data, her predilection for politics and faces, Riley presents Sommerfeld with an aesthetic 
example of his own position: an anamorphic version of Rembrandt's The Descent from the Cross52: 
Riley: You see, this is what your situation must look like to you: unclear, contorted. But if you move one step 
further everything falls into place. Everything makes sense. At least that’s what I think; it’s a question of what 
angle you choose to look from. 
Sommerfeld: That sounds like a banality. Like, like… 
Riley: Like what? I’m open to criticism. 
Sommerfeld: Well, I don’t want to sound insulting, but it sounds like a shallow pseudo-argument, like ‘all 
Africans have rhythm in their blood.’ 
Riley: I bow to you. May I be more precise about different angles, perspectives? 
 
Riley’s different angle is another anamorphic example from Rome in the Convent of Santissima 
Trinità. Here, a long corridor shows an idyllic picture of “a saint, sitting under a tree.” But as one 
walks down the corridor and their perspective shifts, the form of the saint changes. “The nearer one 
 
 
51 Riley underscores the multiplicity within subjectivity in a later scene, where he declares that “truth is the only daughter 
of time.” That is, for Riley – and by extension Herzog – human truths, including any sense of true identity are temporal 
subjective formations, processes of subjectification literally born of time, rather than being transcendent objective states. 
52 Supposedly according to Rembrandt himself, The Descent from the Cross portrayed “the greatest and most natural 
movement:” an unanimated body drawn toward the Earth with the full force of gravity. This work shows Jesus’ dead 
body being taken down after crucifixion, but does so in a stark realism that previous versions of the moment – such as 
Rubens’ Descent from the Cross – lacked. In Rembrandt, Christ does not appear heroic in the slightest, but as an ugly, 
dead weight: a body and nothing more being lowered after expiration. 
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approaches,” Riley states, “the more incomprehensible the forms become.” Yet, at a certain point, 
another shift in perspective occurs and things start to make sense once again, albeit in an entirely 
different way. Crucially, “the folds in the saint’s cowl” turn into a “vast, stretched out landscape.” As 
Herzog is so apt at reminding us, there are literal landscapes inside of the individual subject, ‘inner 
landscapes’ that only become sensible from a certain perspective, an aesthetic realm that lies buried 
within the politics of the face and even our means to obscure it. 
In this manner the two key characters in the film, Sommerfeld and Riley, are emblematic of 
their own respective landscape: the salt flats of the Diablo Blanco in Sommerfeld’s case and the 
volcano Uturunku in Riley’s. What is vital to underscore, is that, for Herzog and his characters, both 
of these ecological disasters must be accounted for and dealt with – one actual disaster in the case of 
the Diablo Blanco, which is expanding at up to “800 square miles every year” and could one day 
“cover the entire continent one day,” or even, as Riley speculates, “all landmass on the planet;” and 
one virtual disaster in the case of Uturunku, a real threat of annihilation that exits in time, but is not 
actually present. What the film makes clear is that a dialogue between the two positions must at all 
costs be established, the dangers of each noted and acted upon where they can. Riley seems to know 
this and takes the drastic measure of stranding Sommerfeld out in the Diablo Blanco with two Inca 
children, long enough for delirium to set in for her, for Sommerfeld to quite literally hear the sounds 
of Uturunku and begin to come to terms with its awesome power. This changes her perspective. As 
she states in one of her video recordings in the Diablo Blanco, “My wish to have my scientific 
instruments with me is vanishing. The ocean of salt around me changes my way of seeing things...it’s 
like an alien planet, but this is not a foreign world.” It begins to dawn on Sommerfeld that in order 
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to properly address the actual threat of the Diablo Blanco, she must also come to terms with 
Uturunku, which she accomplishes through her aesthetic, ecstatic experiences of the landscape. In 
order to address impending ecological disaster, she must come to terms with her own subjectivity in 
a new way. 
Riley’s side is no different. While he has a greater awareness of the situation than 
Sommerfeld initially does and understands the importance of facing both salt and fire, he knows he 
cannot change Sommerfeld’s mind without risking a part of himself. When Riley returns after many 
days to the Diablo Blanco to rescue Sommerfeld and the boys from their dire circumstances, it is 
revealed that the Inca boys are his own children. Raising his sons in his arms, Riley turns to 
Sommerfeld and croons, “You are part of the family now, so to speak.” Knowing that he will 
eventually very likely find himself in prison, Riley also takes the opportunity to reveal to Sommerfeld 
that he abducted her so that the eventual report to the UN would contain “something more than 
scientific data, graphs, and lifeless statistics. A report with something different in it.” Before leaving, 
point made, Riley also cannot resist the opportunity to reiterate the importance of perspective and 
landscape. In a series of humorous poses, Sommerfeld, Riley, and the two children utilize 
perspectival shifts to put themselves in ridiculous positions: held in each other’s hands, standing in a 
spoon as if they were about to be eaten like breakfast cereal, and even fleeing for their lives from a 
tiny toy Godzilla placed near the camera in order to appear enormous. As a parting gift Riley gives 
Sommerfeld a first-class plane ticket to Rome, just to see the anamorphic hallway in the Santissima 
Trinità for herself, and in person. 
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Salt and Fire in the end proves itself to be a call for the burgeoning relationships between 
science and art, between politics and social subjectivity, between landscapes (in particular the 
volcano) and faces, to be rigorously developed. Through this process, parallels between functional 
scientism and immanent art become obvious. By juxtaposing the salt of Diablo Blanco with 
Uturunku’s fire, Herzog seems to be arguing for a dialogue, or even a more passionate relationship as 
the sexually charged final scene alludes to, between science and art, as well as between transcendent 
and immanent modes of thought. Furthermore, it is not much of a stretch for one to see the director 
placing himself in Riley’s shoes. As Salt and Fire shows, the task of a filmmaker like Herzog seems, 
just like Riley, to accept the responsibility – even at the cost of going to prison – of providing new 
percepts and landscapes to his viewers. While this might seem to some a romantic or even 
sanctimonious task, Riley’s insistence on coming to terms with his own choices throughout the film 
hint toward some sort of confession, even if he never truly hopes to be forgiven.53 
In the end, volcanoes in Herzog serve not as a cinematic trope but as powerful percepts. 
 
Volcanoes are, empirically speaking, sites of both destruction and genesis, the potentiality for 
development and ruination for all life on the surface by supplying the a priori condition of 
firmament. The volcanic landscape has the temporal qualities of being both before and after the 
human; through volcanic landscapes we can both look into the past and predict the future. Volcanic 
landscapes also serve as monstrations for a subjectivity where “I is another.” Throughout his oeuvre, 
 
53 Can one not but see a correlation here to Herzog’s own life and work? Can one not see here a grounded pragmatism 
that still searches for a wider audience and effectuality? While it is fair to critique Herzog’s attitude – which can at times 
seem paint him as an outsider or even martyr – one must also pay attention to the myriad details and divided characters 
of his protagonists. Riley of course does have a face – which he reveals to Sommerfeld – and a politics. In fact, he is 
directly engaged as CEO of the Consortium. But his entire role in the film is dedicated toward turning attention back to 
spirit, to fire. 
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Herzog invokes volcanoes as a diagram for the cultural mechanics of human thought: the myths, 
politics, arts, and sciences through which we ground our self-conceptions and daily lives. Volcanoes 
in Herzog are as a result shown to be part of the preconditions of subjectification and its antecedent 
faces – the varied political and mythic forms human cultures take on. But volcanoes also inevitably 
lead beyond those same faces; they force something “in addition” to appear and transform those 
faces continually, consuming the old and ushering in the new. Volcanoes unceasingly bring with 
them the threat and promise of apocalypse, whether dormant or active. Volcanoes form literal 
surface – as Herzog himself attests, they are what create the physical “crust” of the Earth. Volcanoes 
hit upon the deepest parts of the human psyche, directly engage with the human soul and spirit, by 
creating surfaces that demonstrate “there’s nothing deeper than skin”54 for both the human and the 
Earth itself (Negotiations 87). Volcanoes reveal the surfaces of time. 
I would therefore like to suggest that volcanic landscapes in Herzog can be seen to operate 
under a single conceptual umbrella: volcanic (sur)face. The prefix sur- is derived from both Old 
French and Latin, where it took on several uses. By and large, it conveys meanings of “over,” 
“above,” “beyond,” or “in addition” to something, much akin to the Latin prefix “super-”. Take, for 
example, a surcharge – an additional fee tacked onto a standard charge – or even to survive – to live 
“beyond” an event that places something in mortal danger. Given my discussion of film and its 
 
 
54 This quotation, taken from Valéry, is one Deleuze is very fond of. He describes it as “a wonderful saying. 
Dermatologists should inscribe it on their doors” and then goes onto describe philosophy as “a general dermatology or art 
of surfaces” (Negotiations 87). In terms of mathematics, Reimann could also be invoked as a means to explain the 
differential geometry of surfaces. 
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inherent engagement with the problematics of spacetime and “reality,” one could also think of 
surrealism, which was conceived of as an artistic attempt to transcend the boundaries of 
consciousness and rationality by engaging unconscious creativity and performing irrational 
juxtapositions. Yet, sur- can also have the opposing meaning of “before,” “below,” or “under.” Sur- is 
not merely derived from super- in Latin, but also sub-. Take here, for example, surrogate and its 
synonym subrogate. Alternatively, something done surreptitiously is the snatching or seizing (rapere) 
done “under” and/or “before” (sub) the awareness if another. Volcanic (sur)face takes on both of 
these senses. Volcanoes create and destroy; they form (sur)face through their magma and lava, 
through their inner fire55 where the inner earth is “directly exposed” and threatens to break through, 
consuming what is and producing the preconditions for what will be. 
By combining these seemingly paradoxical positions, volcanic (sur)face takes on a single, 
concise definition: volcanoes are for Herzog the ur-landscape of thought. Just as the “direct” experience 
of their physical reality set the preconditions for our emergence as human beings, volcanoes 
simultaneously remind us of our inevitable extinction as a species on Earth. If Herzog’s cinema is 
grounded first and foremost in a non-ironic “grammar of images” and the time-image in particular, 
 
 
 
55 In his Psychoanalysis of Fire, Gaston Bachelard presents an account of fire that fits by and large well with Herzog’s own 
use, especially in terms of volcanic (sur)face. First, Bachelard states that fire is “a privileged phenomenon which can 
explain anything...an ultra-living element” (7). Fire is “inanimate and it is universal. It lives in our heart. It lives in the 
sky. It rises from the depths of the substance and offers itself with the warmth of love. Or it can go back down into the 
substance and hide there, latent and pent-up, like hate and vengeance. Among all phenomena, it is really the only one to 
which there can be so definitely attributed the opposing values of good and evil. It shines in Paradise. It burns in Hell. It 
is gentleness and torture. It is cookery and it is apocalypse...it is well-being and it is respect. It is a tutelary and a terrible 
divinity, both good and bad. It can contradict itself; thus it is one of the principles of universal explanation” (ibid.). In 
his conclusion, Bachelard states that his goal was to show that fire is, “among the makers of images, the one that is most 
dialecticized. It alone is subject and object (italics in original. 111). Herzog, for his part, seems more indifferent to the 
“good” or “evil” of fire, but more keenly interested and aware of its capacities for creation and destruction. Volcanic fire 
seems to function as an inhuman and indifferent Alpha and Omega. 
138  
the site where the virtual and the actual meet in the event of creation, volcanic (sur)face can be seen 
as the director’s attempt to come to terms with their functioning in terms of genesis and 
annihilation. Volcanoes are the escape route from crystalline economy, those violent eruptions that 
inevitably bring about and mark change. Volcanic (sur)face is, simply put, a manner of charting out 
our history and projecting our future. From the position of the present, volcanoes allow Herzog to 
look back into the past and forward into the future. In the volcano’s fire, one sees both beginning 
and end. The “direct” experiences of this inner landscape, of volcanic (sur)face as a percept in turn 
opens new avenues of subjectification. Herzog’s work on volcanic landscapes therefore underscores 
the differences between individual identity and social subjectivity, between linear and nonlinear 
conceptions of time. This new subjectivity, taken not as historic metaphor but as empirical fact 
overturns many critiques of Herzog’s aesthetic and political positions. Viewing Herzogian subjects as 
arising from nonlinear time does not free his films from the need of analysis and critique, but it does 
fundamentally alter their scope. By staring into the fire that moves beneath our feet and forms the 
preconditions of our cultural lives, Herzog’s volcanic (sur)faces demands a rethinking of ourselves as 
collective entities, with all the positive and negative consequences such thinking will bring about. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The Covenant of Connection: Informatics and Technological Theology in Lo and Behold 
 
Poetic Formula: “You Must!” 
 
As Western society has moved from a disciplinary model to a model of control,56 protocol 
has become the primary paradigm of organization, not only within information technology, but our 
everyday lives. And this includes first and foremost the way we find, direct, and produce 
information: through the use of computers and computer networks, most centrally the Internet. I 
contend that it is precisely the confrontation between cinema and informatics – humankind’s most 
specialized system of information and protocol – which will determine the “life or afterlife” of 
cinema lies at the heart of Herzog’s recent documentary, Lo and Behold. Moreover, I would like to 
argue that Herzog’s film presents just such a question which “goes beyond” traditional notions of 
information and protocol to informatics and challenges the moral demand “you must!” with a 
humanist ethics that peers deeply into our increasingly connected and informatically protocoled 
world. “If the cinema is an ontology,” Galloway contends, “the computer is an ethic” (Interface Effect 
 
 
56 Control is the primary paradigm under which political power flows across most of the globe today, inevitably bound 
up with and even indebted to the manner in which information is collected, analyzed, and put to use. The crux of the 
dilemma is that in the information age, the future itself has become our most prized possession, economically and 
personally, and controlling the future is a matter of controlling the present with informatic predictions. This is not a 
sudden change, but has come about through the rapid but steady development of computing technology and informatic 
networks that has been taking place for more than fifty years. Late in his life Deleuze went so far as to define the 
contemporary Western world as a “society of control.” A society of control is both an important contention and an apt 
term, but I would argue that it is more specifically the controlling of information that makes the world go around today. 
Whereas the former, disciplinary societies of the 20th century were mobilized and managed biopolitically, today bodies 
themselves have waned in importance and it is now the measurable and recordable interactions – the information that 
bodies generate – that holds primary political currency. By collecting information on bodies rather than directly 
organizing bodies themselves, control is all the more easily and indirectly exerted, not merely over individual actions, but 
down into the deepest spaces of human thought. For following flows of information becomes a bodily issue, a way that 
control can be exerted from within the individual, rather than imposed on them from an external source of power. And 
this is increasingly easy through connective electronic platforms, most centrally the Internet. 
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10). And, as Herzog demonstrates with his film, it is to our computerized and protocologically 
determined society that we must turn our critical consciousness if we are to develop an ethic 
appropriate to the physical realities we now face.57 Ethics and ethical behavior is no longer merely a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 Computer protocol has become such a prevalent, ubiquitous part of everyday life it now goes largely unnoticed. It is so 
prevalent, in fact, that Alexander Galloway refers to 21st Century Western society as an “algorithmic culture” predicated 
on drop down computer protocol. But protocol, just like information, has a definition and function that exceeds 
common conception. Computer protocol is not a simple command function as to the manner in which one must do 
something, but rather presents the path of least resistance as the most desirable option. Protocol does not present a 
specific command “you must do X,” but rather cries “you must!” and awaits compliance through personal choice. 
Protocol “controls” most efficiently by presenting the “freedom” of the easiest or seemingly best choice. And it does so by 
developing ever more homogenous and organized circuits. Protocol creates a decentralized system of control by unifying 
decision making and altering but also reinforcing the “good” of its own functioning through repetitions of a desirable 
goal. “You must!” because it is the easiest and therefore the best thing for you – not because it is what you want or even 
need. 
Galloway provides an excellent example of protocol by utilizing the analogy of driving. For example, when 
looking at a given “highway system,” there are a number of routes one can take between a point of origin and a given 
destination. However, along the route there are various signs and symbols that compel certain behaviors along the route, 
forcing one to “stop at red lights, stay between the white lines, follow a reasonably direct path” etc. (Protocol 7). And it is 
all of these material rules and “suggestions” for behavior that are the definition of protocol. One could, of course, ignore 
the rules of the road, but then must suffer the consequences. Today, one can see this even more clearly in the example of 
Google Maps, which suggests the “best route” based primarily on time of arrival rather than any other factor. If one 
wanted, for example, to simply take back roads to their destination, Google Maps loses much of its charm, even though 
the program itself attempts to mitigate this by supplying options like “avoid highways” or “avoid tolls.” The computer 
protocols that present the various routes can then be more concisely defined as “a technique for achieving voluntary 
regulation within a contingent environment” (ibid.). They are presented as the paths that one wants to follow, disguising 
their controlling capacity. 
What is key to highlight here is that these choices, controlled through protocol, correspond to human decisions 
within physical systems. As another example, Galloway speaks of a neighborhood where speeding has become a problem. 
Two options are presented for rectifying the situation: one is to decrease the speed limit and put up clearer signs that 
declare the speed limit enforceable by law, the other is to install speed bumps on the street. While one would commonly 
think of policing to be the protocological approach to the problem, they are so only in a very limited manner by merely 
being symbolic; it is in fact the speed bumps that are more efficiently protocological. As Galloway puts it, police 
compliance is at a fundamental level “nothing more than a polite request” and one could simply decide that the fines one 
might accrue were worth the experience of traveling at higher speed (Protocol 241). The speed bumps on the other hand 
are indeed fundamentally protocological because they “create a physical system of organization. They materially force the 
driver to acquiesce. Driving slower becomes advantageous. With bumps, the driver wants to drive more slowly. With 
bumps, it becomes a virtue to drive slowly” (ibid.). Protocol is always affective at the physical level; it is bodily affective 
and works directly on thought and desire by autocatalytically looping toward ever more homogenous definitions of the 
good, which flow directly out of the laws of a given protocological system. Protocol is, simply put, a physical system of 
decentralized control that functions by rerouting the flow of information in a given system. 21st Century ethics demand a 
deep understanding of protocol and its drastic effects on human society and individual desire. 
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covenant between the individual and a system of abstract law that they adhere to, but also involves a 
great number of physical practices centered most chiefly around the use of informatic devices. 
Embedded within the film’s full title, Lo and Behold: Reveries of the Connected World, one sees 
an allusion to the social subjectivity I have argued that Herzog maintains within his film semiotic: 
the world is immediately presented as a thoughtful, superjective entity, capable of reverie and 
perhaps even dreams.58 In short, the world is presented as the brain that forms through Internet 
connection, through the “free” exchange of information. The film’s main advertising poster and Blu- 
Ray cover attest to this, presenting a man in business attire whose entire head has been replaced by a 
globular mass of interconnected wires.59 Furthermore, the film’s title carries obvious biblical 
overtones, tying informatic science to religion and both to the function of reverie before the first 
frame. 
The phrase “lo and behold” comes from the 15th chapter of Genesis, concerning God’s 
covenant with Abraham [Abram], centered around the latter’s confusion over who should inherit the 
fruits of his labor, seeing as he was childless: 
 
 
 
58 Perhaps the most complete and systematic examination of reverie as concept can be found in the work of Gaston 
Bachelard. Critiquing psychoanalysis, Bachelard juxtaposes reverie and dreams, making an important distinction between 
the two terms: “Reverie is entirely different from the dream by the very fact that there is always more or less centered 
upon one object. The dream proceeds on its way in linear fashion, forgetting its original path as it hastens along. The 
reverie works in a star pattern. It returns to its center to shoot out new beams” (Psychoanalysis of Fire 14). This sort of 
“return to the center” through a “star pattern” is a key component to understanding the role of reverie in Herzog’s film 
and the form his investigations take, returning time and again to singular themes. Unfortunately, though Herzog chooses 
this term in his title, reverie is conflated with the dream at certain points in the film. When Herzog speaks of dreams, 
reverie, or imagination, he is essentially and perhaps unwittingly presenting varied forms of logic, which would have 
varied answers in terms of his singular object, the Internet. 
59 In order to see this image: 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiBp6eI_vzgAhURd98KHVjX 
D_AQjRx6BAgBEAU&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.indiewire.com%2F2016%2F12%2Flo-and-behold-werner- 
herzog-movie-poster-1201757439%2F&psig=AOvVaw1car-KnRJxkR5N2JITPMFz&ust=1552493187485892 
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1) After these things the word of the Lord came unto Abram in a vision, saying, Fear not, Abram: I am thy shield, 
and thy exceeding great reward. 
2) And Abram said, Lord God, what wilt thou give me, seeing I go childless, and the steward of my house is this 
Eliezer of Damascus? 
3) And Abram said, Behold, to me thou hast given no seed: and, lo, one born in my house is mine heir. 
4) And, behold, the word of the Lord came unto him, saying, This shall not be thine heir; but he that shall come 
forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir. 
5) And he brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to 
number them: and he said unto him, So shall thy seed be. 
6) And he believed in the Lord; and he counted it to him for righteousness. 
 
This Covenant is, of course, the foundation upon which the Judeo-Christian and Islamic faiths are 
grounded: the children of Abraham prospered and spread out, creating the cultures and histories of 
Europe and the Middle East, essentially founding the West itself. From it’s very first scene, Lo and 
Behold makes it clear that its subject is just such a revolutionary event, a true genesis on par with the 
Abrahamic Covenant in terms of potential impact – the Internet. Over a shot of students milling 
about on a sundrenched California quad, Herzog narrates: 
This is the campus of the University of California in Los Angeles. Today, no one of the students is aware that 
this is Ground Zero of one of the biggest revolutions we as humans are experiencing. One of the science 
buildings here is considered the birthplace of the Internet...The corridors here look repulsive, and yet this one 
leads to some sort of a shrine, reconstructed years later, when its importance had sunk in. 
This “revolution” of information technology and the Internet serves as a Covenant, upon which a 
new world can be founded. And it is quickly underscored that it is not simply one of Herzog’s 
stylizations that paints the creation of the Internet as a religious event. In the film’s initial interview, 
Leonard Kleinrock, a computer scientist at UCLA, relates the story of the birth of the Internet, 
utilizing similar language, charged with religious fervor: “We’re now entering a sacred location. It’s 
143  
the location where the Internet began. It’s a holy place.” Speaking of, and physically demonstrating 
the “military hardened” machine that sent the first message on the Internet, Kleinrock relates why 
Herzog chose his religiously inspired film title: 
This particular machine is so ugly on the inside, it is beautiful. It has a unique odor, a delicious old odor from 
all the old parts. It consists of modems, CPU logic units, memory, power supply: all the things you need to 
make an efficient computer work...It was from here that the first message was sent. A revolution began...and 
what was that first message? The first message ever on the internet was LO60, as in Lo and Behold. We couldn’t 
have asked for a more succinct, more powerful, and more prophetic message than ‘LO.’” 
Only now, that our world is so drastically affected by the Internet, so irrevocably entangled within 
the worldwide exchange of information, can we begin to come to terms with the new world the 
Internet has ushered in. Both in terms of philosophical reflection and the simple scale of how it has 
altered the everyday, the Internet has challenged the very conception of what it means to be human. 
As Herzog relates through graphic example, the daily data flow over the Internet is so vast it can 
truly be said to be astronomical: “No one at that time [early stages of Internet] had a clue about the 
explosion of information technology. Today, if we would burn CDs of the world wide data flow for 
one single day and stack them up in a pile, this pile would reach up to Mars and back. The Internet 
is already permeating everything.” And, of course, with the number of Internet users and connected 
devices rising daily, this is just the tip of the iceberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Kleinrock explains that this occurred by attempting to make the first server to server communication. The computer 
that sent the message required on computer to type LOG, with the computer finishing by typing an IN, to complete the 
login. The first two characters were properly sent, but then the computer crashed when attempting the type G, making 
the first message ever received over the Internet LO. 
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That the Internet has become a core part of our everyday lives is, of course, no exaggeration. 
 
Much of Lo and Behold focuses on just a few of the myriad ways that the Internet has been and 
continues to be utilized, leading to a massive range of innovations, many of which will further alter 
everyday life and make it more comfortable, but the film also explores the undesirable effects on 
society those innovations bring in tow. Herzog presents potentially positive examples such as a video 
game created by a team of computer scientists to aid molecular chemists and molecular biologists in 
data collection and problems with “molecular folding,”61 self-driving cars,62 and a team of soccer 
playing robots at Carnegie Mellon University that one day hope to challenge the FIFA World 
Champions and win by 2050.63 But he also demonstrates digital threats such as hackers and cyber 
 
61 Adrien Treuille, a computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon, explains how the video game community came together to 
solve issues involving molecular “folding” that holds back contemporary research in medical areas like cancer and AIDS, 
a game “created by science but scored by nature.” This is because the virtual molecules created within the game are 
actually synthesized in the Carnegie Mellon lab. Furthermore, there is the rather interesting system of “harmony” for a 
successfully assembled molecule in the video game and a “dissonance” for one with a compromised or impossible 
structure. This, perhaps oddly or perhaps tellingly, parallels in the Leibnizian problematics of folding and harmony, as 
presented in Deleuze’s conclusion to The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, and giving modern computer science and 
molecular chemistry a neo-baroque form for their own subjects and links them to music. In the face of such a problem, tens 
of thousands of people played the game and, though the film provides no detail as to how, solved the issue with folding 
the scientists had encountered. Herzog claims that “Within days the world responded. And it was beautiful.” 
62 Self-driving cars are addressed chiefly through the lenses of a virtual world that machine intelligence can “see,” as well 
as the increasing obsolescence of human labor. Sebastian Thrun, for example, believes education is the key as machine 
intelligence will make it all the more difficult to make a “contribution” in the future and people want to contribute to 
the world and their fellow humans as a fundamental drive. Thrun believes that the Internet makes possible open-sourced 
collaboration and provides a powerful platform for human innovation, even as that field continues to shrink. For his 
online course at Stanford, Thrun had 160,000 students. However, “The top 412 students, they weren’t at Stanford...the 
best performing Stanford student was number 413...that kind of opened my eyes. For every great Stanford student, there 
is 412 amazingly great or even better students in the world that don’t make it to Stanford.” Moreover, Thurn attests that 
cars have the ability through social networking to learn from each other in an unprecedented way when compared to 
humans. They quite literally learn from every mistake that any one of them on a shared network makes. The question for 
Herzog concerning self-driving cars, however, quickly becomes one of ethics. If a given car “literally sees a virtual world” 
by emitting light lasers and receiving input from their reflections, who takes responsibility for such vision. Herzog 
narrates: “The big question is does it understand an ethics of the human? Does it understand the values of human 
society?” The question for Herzog is “who is going to be liable for an accident? The onboard computer? Its designer? The 
GPS system? The Internet? Or the driver, who eats his breakfast?” These questions are not directly addressed in the film, 
but are left hanging for the viewer to ponder. 
63 These researchers are particularly fond of an individual robot that scores a great deal of goals, known as “Robot 8.” 
Herzog takes the opportunity within this scene to problematize human and machine relationships, asking a young 
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warfare64 and problematizes the issue of addiction to virtual worlds, as evinced in the shocking case 
of Tom, a young man that attempted suicide by drinking himself to death after he had gotten to the 
point of playing video games “16 hours a day, often drunk” and had lost his “will to live…[was] just 
waiting for the timer to run out” or in the scenes from South Korea where young people wear 
diapers while playing video games so as to not “miss points by going to the bathroom.” In typical 
Herzogian fashion, catastrophic events are also imagined in terms of the Internet and Herzog claims 
that in the event of massive solar flares – which have been scientifically determined to happen in 
cycles “every few hundred years” – much of digital technology would become useless and the loss of 
the Internet would likely cause a societal collapse.65 However, rather than dwell on these issues at 
 
 
 
researcher if he “loves” Robot 8 and finds, indeed, the young man does. But the scene is also utilized to demonstrate a 
live example of artificial intelligence in action, thinking computers “playing” and literally “seeing” a virtual world. 
Additionally, this scene likely serves as a good example of one reason Herzog maintains such an active interest in soccer 
and speaks often of it in his interviews. As Gregg Lambert notes, “the ‘goal’ in soccer is a perfect illustration of the nature 
of the cinematographic event. Although the various components and elements that come together as its condition (the 
ball, the players, the grid or field of play, the rules of the game, etc.), they do not take on the form of a direct causality, 
because the scoring shot is an effect that surpasses all of the former even though it presupposes their free and 
indeterminate coordination” (IST, 157). This scene, too, presents a cinematographic event driven through artificial 
intelligence. 
64 Herzog especially focuses on human error in these two areas, through interviews Kevin Mitnick “a demigod among the 
community of hackers” and security analyst Shawn Carpenter, who speaks cautiously about the large cyber attack known 
as ‘Titan Rain.’ Mitnick claims his easiest way into corporate security was his “good gift of gab” rather than his 
considerable hacking skills and that rather than personal monetary gain, he was essentially always after a “trophy.” 
Likewise, Carpenter compares his own security work to a game and places security issues fully on human shoulders: “It’s 
very rewarding. It’s like a puzzle: finding patterns within Chaos that shouldn’t be there. Humans are the weak link, not 
cybersecurity.” 
65 Lawrence Krauss, the cosmologist from Arizona State University that also appeared in Herzog’s Salt and Fire as 
Krauss/Aristides states: “If there is a solar flare, if you destroyed the information fabric of the world right now, modern 
civilization would collapse. Hundreds of millions of people will die, billions of people will die. The world will become - 
for people like you and me - unimaginably ugly...I suspect, however, that some individuals would survive.” Jonathan 
Zittrain, an internet scholar at Harvard Law, invokes “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs” and claims that “civilization is 
about 4 square meals away from utter ruin.” Lucianne Walkowicz of the Adler Planetarium in Chicago uses her screen 
time within Lo and Behold claims it is a matter of “when” and not “if” a significant solar flare will interfere with 
contemporary technology. The point of these doomsday imaginings seems to be the important, but old refrain for 
Herzog of keeping at least some ties to the Earth that supports human life and not becoming over-reliant on the Internet 
to organize our basic needs. 
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length, Herzog continually circles back to religious associations. In a small number of important 
scenes, Herzog focuses directly on the field of informatics and its ties to religiosity. And it is in these 
scenes that one uncovers hints at Herzog’s thoughts on cinema’s “life or afterlife.” 
The first important contention concerning these correlations comes by examining the death 
of Nikki Catsouras. Nikki, who had psychotic issues as a result of a brain tumor when she was 
young, had a car accident and was partially decapitated. Herzog relates the more problematic side of 
being “connected” via the Internet to utter strangers when such tragedies occur: “An early responder 
took photos of the nearly decapitated girl and emailed it to some friends. Almost instantly the 
pictures were out on the Internet and hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of people clicked on 
them.” Interviewing the grief-stricken family, Herzog first turns to Nikki’s father to relate the 
aftermath of her death. Visibly shaken, Nikki’s dad begins to slowly speak: 
The only thing the coroner told us was that a portion of her thumb had been severed in the accident and that 
she had head trauma, but they never gave us any detail. So I was focused on the thumb...I received emails with 
the pictures attached. It was a short time after the accident. It was disguised; I didn’t know who the email came 
from...The bad ones [emails] were very hateful...it said ‘Dead girl walking, woohoo daddy, I’m still alive...We 
were told that nothing could be done because there was no law in place for pictures of deceased people. When 
they pass away, their privacy rights go with them. 
One can easily empathize with such a difficult position and can only imagine how gut-wrenching it 
might be to receive such an email. Herzog, while aiming at being “respectful” of the family’s loss, 
refuses to even show a picture of Nikki within the film. Nonetheless, in an interview with Nikki’s 
mother, Herzog presents a position that he, through his semiotic, is obviously critical of: 
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I didn’t know such depravity existed in humans. Dogs treat their kind better than humans treat their kind. It’s 
just, there is no dignity or respect on the Internet because we’re not held accountable. Nobody is there to tell us 
not to. I have always believed that the Internet is a manifestation of the Antichrist. Of Evil itself. It is the spirit 
of evil. And I feel like it’s running through everybody on earth and it’s claiming its victories in those people that 
are also evil. 
This staging of the Internet as Antichrist loops back into the film’s title, problematizing the 
Covenant formed through the creation of the Internet. Does the Internet have an evil side? Is the 
new world it ushers in the apocalyptic world of the Antichrist? Is the Internet the first step toward 
“the end of time?” While Herzog lets such questions hang in the air for dramatic effect, he remains a 
director “indifferent” to the problem of Good and Evil, as subsequent scenes in Lo and Behold bear 
out (Cinema 1 185). The problem and dangers of the Internet are, for Herzog, not a moral issue of 
Good and Evil, but rather an ethical issue of use that has the potential to undermine humanist 
cultural, political, and religious organizations, as well as the notion of the human itself. 
Herzog addresses this humanist tendency within the film through an analogical juxtaposition 
of religious transcendence with leaving the Earth to colonize other planets. Some of these efforts are 
quite literal, as his interviews with SpaceX founder Elon Musk demonstrate.66 But perhaps the most 
telling scenario comes from a sci-fi-esque imagining. While in Chicago to interview Lucianne 
Walkowicz at the Adler Planetarium for the aforementioned scenes centered on solar flares, Herzog, 
 
66 Elon Musk takes a pessimistic view of Earth’s future and his efforts with SpaceX often seem to have the air of a last- 
ditch effort about them. After reflecting for a long time, Musk says, “I don’t think I have good dreams. I’m sure I have 
good dreams sometimes, but I don’t seem to remember the good dreams. The ones that I remember are the nightmares.” 
While it is not explicitly stated within the film, Herzog seems to be doubtful of Musk’s or other’s extraterrestrial 
endeavors. This is not because Herzog resists the effort - he often claims he would take a one-way ticket into space just to 
provide truly new images to humankind. But, at the present state of science, Herzog does not believe such missions will 
come to fruition until a number of terrestrial concerns, including climate change and the ethical use of technology, are 
properly addressed. 
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tongue pressed firmly in cheek, claims to encounter a strange scene and relates it to just this sort of 
transcendence: 
The skyline of Chicago. It looks devoid of its inhabitants. We have to assume that nearly everyone has left for a 
colony out there. The planetarium is the only point of contact. Inside, a monument for those who have 
levitated and left. [The camera hovers on the monument: an astronaut, giving a thumbs up] Yes! Things must 
be real good out there. [The camera switches back out to the shores of Lake Michigan, where monks in orange 
garb amble about looking at cell phones.] But then we met some stragglers left behind. They’re all on their 
smartphones. Have the monks stopped meditating? Have they stopped praying? They all seem to be tweeting. 
These monks, left behind and pining for a better life amongst the stars, have seemingly 
forgone even meditation and prayer – the very activities that defined them – in favor of the direct 
connection provided by their technology. They have ceased to be monks in all but the outer 
trappings of their robes. The essential point that Herzog appears to be making is not to condemn or 
shame the monks, but to highlight the need to remain Earthly, too, even as we potentially move out 
among the stars, that some level of religiosity is required to maintain a conception of humanness as 
we know it. This, perhaps, goes some way in explaining Herzog’s dubious and critical stance toward 
the efforts of companies like SpaceX and falls in line with the interview with Walkowicz that he 
tellingly shoots inside the planetarium – the “only point of contact.” In that interview, Walkowicz 
claims that “the idea that Mars [or any other planet] will somehow save us from the decisions we’ve 
made here is a false one. And it’s a little like saying you’re going to go live in the lifeboat, when, you 
know, even lifeboats need somewhere to land.” Once again, Herzog’s refrain is that we can never 
take our focus entirely off the land beneath our feet. Moreover, this is especially true if we do not 
wish to regress to the binary of Good/Evil in the human use of technology, to foresee only disaster 
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scenarios in which an artificial intelligence erases the need, or even existence of a human intelligence. 
Antithetically, Herzog never fetishizes scientific discoveries or sees in them the possibility of 
salvation, never sees in science the path to heaven. In the end, though he might be indifferent to 
Good and Evil, but much like Nietzsche, Herzog is certainly not turning a blind eye toward the 
differences of good and bad choices. 
Lo and Behold presents the ethical quandary that the Internet and information technology 
have recently produced mainly through the question of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is 
seen as a component in early interviews focusing on self-driving cars and soccer-playing robots, but 
only as the film develops does Herzog lead viewers to imagine a world where the human may or may 
not play a role. Herzog presents artificial intelligence as an open-ended problem with catastrophic 
potential, just like the solar flares that might unhinge modern technological society. But the 
progression of its development is not as straightforward as a cosmically inspired apocalypse and has a 
larger margin for preparation or even prevention. In section VIII of Lo and Behold, entitled 
“Artificial Intelligence,” Herzog shows the current limitations of AI, unfavorably comparing a “state 
of the art” robot operating through artificial intelligence to a “vastly superior” cockroach. 
Additionally, while science-fiction often paints disaster scenarios of AI rising up and superseding or 
even killing their creators, Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, on the contrary believes that the real threat 
of AI does not come from the AI themselves, so much as the clash between the relentless efficiency of 
AI and the imperfection of human desires, claiming: 
The greatest risk of AI is not that it will develop a will of its own, but that it will follow the will of people that 
establish its utility function, or its optimization function...even if its intent is benign it could have quite a bad 
outcome. For example, if you were a hedge fund or private equity fund and you said “Well, what I want my AI 
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to do is maximize the value of my portfolio,” then the AI could decide, “well, the best way to do that is to short 
consumer stocks, go long defense stocks, and start a war.”67 
Herzog, perhaps for dramatic effect, does toy with the more sci-fi notion of AI developing a will of 
its own.68 However, following Musk, it is the “utility function” or “optimization function” that 
Herzog’s humanism rallies against. Returning late in the film to a section of his interview with 
Sebastian Thrun, Herzog attempts to push back against informatics’ thrust toward ever-increasing 
utility and optimization: 
Sebastian: If you ask the question of whether there will ever be an Artificial Intelligent Machine that makes 
movies - absolutely yes69...I think almost everything we do we find machines doing better. And the reason why 
that’s the case is because machines just learn faster than people do. 
 
67 These potential dangers and innovations are covered in the recent popular book by Max Tegmark, a physicist at MIT, 
Life 3.0. Musk, who has a short review of the book and is quoted on the back of the dust jacket, seems to dismiss the 
autonomous development of an AI will and perhaps this is reasonable as such an event would be immediately and quite 
possibly irredeemably out of human control. However, Tegmark argues that this indeed could take place - and perhaps 
without even our knowledge. In his “Tale of the Omega Team,” Tegmark imagines how a small group of researchers 
might one day build an AI that utilizes control of cinema and the entertainment industry to gain a globally effective 
power over the world economy and world politics. (Life 3.0 3-22) For Elon Musk’s part, he takes this threat so seriously 
that he, along with Sam Altman, founded OpenAI – a (until recently) completely non-profit organization whose 
“mission is to ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity.” Their recent developments, such as 
GPT-2, carry potential threats and have been withheld from public circulation. This AI, for example, has the ability to 
generate “coherent continuations” to textual responses. That is, the AI is already able to produce text in response to a 
human generated prompt, but is able to do so well enough to pass as human communication. If this was widely and 
publicly released, the authenticity of human text on the Internet would by and large become impossible to determine. 
See: https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/ 
68 In an Interview with Danny Hills, the renowned computer scientist informs Herzog’s viewers “I cannot only imagine 
artificial intelligence evolving spontaneously on the Internet, but I can’t tell you it hasn’t happened already. It wouldn’t 
necessarily reveal itself to us.” Similarly, In an interview with Lawrence Krauss the cosmologist muses: “The Internet is 
nothing but connections. Will it have its own consciousness? Will it have its own set of rules? And, perhaps, in an even 
more scary realm, a science-fiction realm, will the Internet therefore make its own decisions? Will the decisions about 
how communication happens go out of human hands? That’s certainly a possibility. But since we don’t even understand 
consciousness, I’m hesitant to make any predictions. And I think anyone who claims they know what’s going to happen 
with the Internet is not worth listening to.” 
69 This idea is fleshed out in Ari Folman’s 2013, The Congress. This beautiful and well-executed film is based around the 
character Robin Wright, played by the eponymous actress, who signs a contract with “Miramount Studios.” This 
contract allows for the studio to make a complete digital scan of her body and mannerisms, which in turn allows them to 
program her in as a leading actress in studio film productions. On Wright’s end, she is agreeing to never act again as the 
studio does not want her to be in competition with her digital avatar. She does so to secure enough money to support 
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Herzog: But they cannot fall in love, as we can. 
 
Sebastian: And will it be useful for machines to fall in love? Would we want to have machines that are just like 
people? I would say no. Honestly, if my dishwasher came to me and said ‘I’ve fallen in love with the 
refrigerator’ and as a result I have no time to wash the dishes, I wouldn’t like that dishwasher. 
Thrun seems to treat the question as idle or unimportant. For Herzog, however, the question of 
staging some resistance to the pure positivism of machine functioning through something like love, 
something that has illogical and unpredictable elements at its core, is a key problematic of the 
problematic present and uncertain future. Utility and optimization in informatics therefore not only 
apply to the coded protocol of informatics and artificial intelligence themselves, but also the problem 
of human logic through their steady encroachment into our daily lives and identities, into the very 
way we think and into the human as concept. While Herzog asks what differentiates human and 
artificial intelligence by using the trope of love, Lo and Behold doesn’t linger on love as a core topic. 
Instead, if Herzog provides anything resembling an answer to this problematic, it comes yet again 
from another interview, and yet again under the guise of religion. As Sam Curry, a security analyst, 
relates: 
We’re going to have a revolution not only in our technology, but in our theology. We don’t even have a name 
for it, but it’s around the Internet, it’s around building machines that think for us. And I think we’re due for 
another shift in our morals and our definition of what it means to be human. We’re right just at the beginning 
 
 
herself and her ill son, Aaron, who is suffering from “Usher syndrome” and is slowly losing his sight and his hearing. 
One parallel with Herzog is that Usher syndrome is the leading cause for deafblindness, a topic he explored in the 1971 
documentary Land des Schweigens und der Dunkelheit; The other parallel with Lo and Behold is that the very logic of such 
an Artificial Intelligent Machine that could make movies would force upon the human viewer a logic that was only 
capable of auto-reinforcement of its own strategy and would eliminate the human need for things like “love.” This is 
addressed in detail throughout the remainder of The Congress and demonstrates the probable progression of filmmaking 
if the fundamental protocols of Artificial Intelligence cannot be given or develop the human ability to act out against the 
unified, linear logic of utility and optimization functions. 
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of that. And so you can see us just trying to kind of feel out and invent this new society and invent these new 
ideas of what’s right and wrong. What can we depend on each other for? And what can we expect from each 
other?...I think it’s an incredibly creative time in human history, not just technologically but also morally and 
culturally. 
Given the tone and placement of this scene, one can fairly assume that Herzog agrees with Curry’s 
assessment. What this new theology might look like, what the morals and ethics of a future that is so 
heavily bound up with the Internet might be, however, is not directly given within Lo and Behold. 
Direct political commentary, too, seems to be more of a leaning toward fundamental questions 
concerning information technology rather than any explicit stance we should take. Nonetheless, 
Herzog does underscore that a new theology has been born along with the Internet, a new Covenant 
has been made, and though he leaves his viewers to contemplate this idea for themselves, he also 
explores two avenues of thought that might gesture in the right direction. 
The first manner through which Herzog addresses a new theology of technology is, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, through reverie and dreams. Near the end of Lo and Behold and set with a backdrop 
that includes computer images of brain scans and an MRi machine, Herzog speaks with Marcel Just, 
an expert in the psychology of the brain and neuroimaging, and Tom Mitchell, a computer scientist 
specializing in machine learning, or as their title within the film states “Brain Researchers” at 
Carnegie Mellon. This interview introduces two new aspects of our discussion of informatics and the 
Covenant created through the birth of the Internet: 
153  
Herzog: The Prussian war theoretician, Clausewitz70 – Napoleonic times – once famously said ‘sometimes war 
dreams of itself.’ Could it be that the internet starts to dream of itself? 
Tom Mitchell: Great question...to think about dreaming, there may be two aspects. One is what I’ll call 
awareness - when you wake up and you say, ‘oh, I was just dreaming this’ and you know it. Another aspect is 
just some kind of pattern of activity that emerges, not because of some external stimuli, but just because of 
something going on in unpredictable patterns. I think already the Internet has the second of those, has 
unpredictable patterns all the time. They cause things like Flash Crashes on the financial markets. Um, so we 
have plenty of kinds of currents running around in the Internet that are unpredictable, in some cases 
unstoppable. 
Herzog: Imaginative? 
 
Tom Mitchell: Now it comes to: what do we mean by imaginative?...We call a person imaginative if they come 
up with ideas that we didn’t think of and that we nevertheless admire. Usually, admiration is part of it. So, for 
the Internet, so far, it’s mostly just unpredictable. I haven’t seen anything the Internet did on its own that I 
admire yet. 
That is to say that for Herzog and Mitchell, the Internet might have the stirrings of dreams, but no 
self-reflective apparatus through which they might be interpreted. The Internet and its “currents” of 
unpredictable data flow create unforeseen events, but the Internet cannot dream. The Internet is at 
present statistically and creatively unpredictable, but, as of yet, it has not spontaneously produced 
the self-reflective awareness that allows for human dreams and the aspects of time that awareness and 
dreams entail. Furthermore, the Internet’s creativity lies solely in modulations to its functions; 
 
 
70 Carl von Clausewitz developed a “philosophy of war” in his major work, Vom Kriege, that is still relevant and utilized 
today. In fact, in a different section of his interview, Sam Curry, quotes Clausewitz’s most popular aphorism “war is the 
continuation of politics by other means.” By utilizing dialectical methodology, Clausewitz was able to unpack the 
psychological mechanisms at play within war, many of which have seen little change since Napoleonic times. The parallel 
with Herzog seems to stem chiefly from Clausewitz’s penchant to view and describe war almost as if it were an entity or 
organism unto itself, much akin to Herzog’s view of the Internet, the brain for Deleuze, or Whitehead’s superject. 
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operating through a plane of reference, the Internet lacks an interval, a negative space within itself 
that, as far as we now, is necessary for what Mitchell calls “awareness” and the processes of 
subjectification that define each of us as individuals. But the central point is that through its 
connections, which are ever increasing, one day this might well occur, either spontaneously or as the 
result of human ingenuity. As Lawrence Krauss notes in the closing scenes of the film: 
That’s one of the wonderful things about the future: you don’t know where it’s gonna go. And the Internet is - 
like most results in science - out of control...Becoming your own filter will be the challenge of the future. 
Because the filter isn’t provided to you. There’s no controls on the Internet. No matter what governments do, 
no matter what industries do, the Internet is gonna propagate out of control. And people will have to be their 
own controls. This unpredictable future of the Internet could be good or bad, but it is not Good or Evil.71 
What Herzog ultimately stresses in terms of the Internet are ethics and personal control, because the 
Internet is going to follow its own path – and potentially even pursue its own dreams – no matter 
what humans do. But there are concerns and courses of action concerning human interaction with 
and on the Internet that can be concisely formulated and precisely stated. Herzog utilizes the 
commentary of Kleinrock to relate the problem: 
I deeply regret the fact that deep, critical thinking – an imaginative thinking, a creative thinking – is lost. In my 
opinion, computers – and in some sense the Internet – are the worst enemy of deep, critical thinking. Our 
youth of today are using machines to basically replace their examination of the things they’re observing. 
[cupping his hands together] They don’t understand what they’re looking at, what they’re hearing, and what 
 
 
 
 
 
71 Interestingly, one finds most of the pessimistic views of the future of the Internet within the efforts of those who are 
trying to “escape” Earthly problems through space exploration. At one point, Herzog turns back to Elon Musk: “[reflects 
for a long time] I don’t think I have good dreams. I’m sure I have good dreams sometimes, but I don’t seem to 
remember the good dreams. The ones that I remember are the nightmares.” 
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they’re learning. They depend upon the Internet to tell them and decipher it. They look at numbers instead of 
ideas. They fail to understand concepts and this is a problem. 
In addition to these strong statements by Kleinrock, Herzog himself seems to take the point of view 
that immersive technologies are detrimental to the development of truly critical thought. As an 
interview with Lawrence Krauss points out, it is these conceptual and critical tools that will become 
ever more important in the future, and Herzog appears to agree.72 In a world where the access to 
information is as simple as a Google search, creative thought – in the guise of new concepts in 
philosophy, new affects and percepts in art, and new functions in science – waxes in importance and 
impact; creative thinking becomes an ever more important measure to engender any sort of 
resistance, any critical stance, to the overwhelming and self-reinforcing power of numbers. Yet at the 
same time, creative thought becomes all the more difficult to produce. The reign of numbers in 
corporate and economic life continually force such creative capacities to the margins of society and 
undercut efforts that do not adhere to the self-reinforcing market strategies that hold sway today. 
One might then ask how or even if such a confrontation between informatics and cinema 
can be fought, how creative thinking in and for the future might be fostered. In simple terms, in its 
confrontation with informatics, a cinema like Herzog’s answers this challenge of informatics with a 
metaphysics.73 If cinema hopes to continue to have a “life” rather than simply an “afterlife” as a 
 
 
72 “Whether we use science or Ancient Greek or philosophy, it’s those tools that are important. Those are the things that 
people are going to be able to use in the future. The actual information they learned in school won’t be important. 
Because, it will be dwarfed by the information that’s coming out on the Internet every single day.” – Lawrence Krauss 
73 It is no coincidence here that Deleuze thought of Herzog as “a metaphysician. He [Herzog] is the most metaphysical 
of cinema directors (although German Expressionism had already been imbued with metaphysics, this was within the 
confines of a problem of Good and Evil to which Herzog is indifferent)” (Cinema 1 185). As we will demonstrate below 
in our analysis of Lo and Behold, Herzog is to this day continuing to challenge science with a metaphysics and an appeal 
for a new logic, largely through the collaborative efforts of art, science, and philosophy. 
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reanimated corpse devoid of thought, enslaved to industry, and operating under the logic of 
informatic positivism, such a metaphysics will need to be built, step by step, always taking into 
account the findings of scientific fields – including informatics – yet ceaselessly staging questions 
that go beyond such findings. Lo and Behold poignantly demonstrates this need by carefully probing 
a great number of ways in which information technologies affect our lives today and might 
fundamentally alter them in the near future. 
The challenge to form sites of resistance to the unifying, binary logic of informatics can 
therefore be seen as a way to “reformulate science according to the rules of metaphysics” and is “as an 
act of resistance to the unifying logic of scientific thought with respect to a single historically specific 
point of view” (Gaffney 8). That is, the metaphysics of cinema fights back against the fossilization of 
a future which “becomes alienated from its ontological root in the virtual” by including the virtual 
field itself as a necessary component for the formation of time (Gaffney 14). This in turn means that 
one must construct a superjective metaphysics, a metaphysics which includes time-images, where one 
thinks of “subjectivity as process, that is, as a ‘machinic’ production of thought and matter that takes 
place behind the scenes of the actual” (ibid.). One must devise a means to address the world as it 
now is with the realities of informatics and the Internet: connected, multiple, transnational, 
controlling. 
The concern of such a metaphysics would not be to paint philosophy, or cinema for that 
matter, in a better light than science or to undercut science’s importance or effectuality. Science, 
including informatics, of course, “really does work,” largely because it is “goal oriented,” but it too 
cannot do so without virtual elements, even if it prescinds them from its plane of reference to form 
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functions (Gaffney 23). But to push this line of thinking further, it is also important to note that 
informatics – spurred on by cinema’s metaphysical insistence – must do this to itself by continually 
seeking to create new functions that invalidate or challenge the preexisting knowledge of the actual, 
material universe and our ability to implement that knowledge within the field. Science, including 
informatics, “in its bifurcations...undergoes many catastrophes, ruptures, and reconnections” that 
can radically alter even fundamental axioms74 (What is Philosophy? 127-128). Copernican 
Revolutions happen and the ultimate concern of cinema’s confrontation with informatics in 
particular, cinema’s future “life or afterlife,” will lie in its ability to forge a metaphysics and a 
structural semiotic that takes account of the virtual and remains empirical. Only in this manner 
might it aid in the fight against informatic positivism and hierarchical control that we see appearing 
in every stratum of society. 
In Lo and Behold, Herzog suggests at least one area for possible resistance to such 
homogenizing force. An early scene with Ted Nelson, labeled an “Internet Pioneer” by Herzog, 
provides the hope that rearranging the links on the networks of the Internet might have profound 
and potentially beneficial consequences. Interviewing Nelson in his houseboat home, Herzog states: 
Back to the very early times, times of speculative concepts of a connected world. In the early 60s, many years 
before the first Apple personal computer, a young thinker, Ted Nelson, had his own ideas about creating a 
computer network. The Web as we know it took a different route. But Nelson’s ideas are still dormant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 One must only think of the Copernican Revolution, the founding of Newtonian physics, or the discoveries of 
relativity and quantum mechanics to underline this point. 
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This acknowledgement of the dormancy of Nelson’s ideas are the closest one gets in Lo and Behold 
to Herzog voicing full-fledged support for his interviewee’s thoughts.75 Herzog is aware that Nelson’s 
visions of intertextual links never materialized on the internet and that “by some he was labelled 
insane for clinging on.” Yet for a semiotic philosophy of cinema like the one Herzog has employed 
throughout his career, Nelson vision shows great promise. Despite Nelson’s detractors labelling him 
“insane,”76 Herzog declares that “to us, you appear to be the only one around who is clinically sane.” 
Nelson’s “sanity” stems from his system of links that allow computer users to trace textual quotes 
back to their original sources, taking an almost philological approach to information. But, by tracing 
these informational lines multi-directionally, Nelson’s horizontal linking also allows for unforeseen 
connections to different works to emerge, creating new and unanticipated encounters. Therefore, 
Nelson’s idea for the web can be envisioned as something in spirit more like a “tapestry” than the 
current Web’s hierarchical chain of connections. Links would open up to an ever-branching relation 
of textual sources, rather than forming a unidirectional chain. In his own words, Nelson explains: 
 
 
 
 
75 Ted Nelson is perhaps best known for his work on Project Xanadu, a computer network with a very simple user 
interface that utilizes hypertext to link writings to their source. Yet, perhaps more importantly for our topic of the 
philosophy of cinema, he is also the creator of several often-utilized neologisms within computer science, including 
hypertext, hypermedia, and transclusions. Nelson’s core idea is that links should be two-directional, rather than one as 
they are in the current Internet. As Nelson said, “HTML is precisely what we were trying to PREVENT— ever-breaking 
links, links going outward only, quotes you can't follow to their origins, no version management, no rights management 
"Ted Nelson's Computer Paradigm Expressed as One-Liners". 1999. Retrieved July 3, 2011). Or, put in more general 
terms by one of the creators of VR technology, Jaron Lanier, “A core technical difference between a Nelsonian network 
and what we have become familiar with online is that [Nelson's] network links were two-way instead of one-way. In a 
network with two-way links, each node knows what other nodes are linked to it...Two-way linking would preserve 
context. It's a small simple change in how online information should be stored that couldn't have vaster implications for 
culture and the economy. (Who Owns the Future, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013. p. 227). 
76 Nelson seems firm in his convictions and states “there are two contradictory slogans: one is that ‘continuing to do the 
same thing and expecting a different result is the definition of insanity.’ On the other hand, you say, ‘if at first you don’t 
succeed, try, try again.’ I prefer the latter, because I don’t want to be remembered as ‘the guy who didn’t.’” 
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It was an experience of water and interconnection. I was with my grandparents in a rowboat in Chicago, so I 
must have been five years old, and, I was trailing my hand in the water. And I thought about how the water was 
moving around my fingers and opening on one side and closing on the other. And that changing system of 
relationships, where everything was kind of similar, kind of the same, and yet different...that was so difficult to 
visualize and express. And just generalizing that to the entire universe – the world as a system of ever-changing 
relationships and structures – struck me as a vast truth. Which it is! So, interconnection and expressing that 
interconnection has been at the center of all my thinking and all my computer work has been about expressing 
and representing and showing interconnection among writings especially. Writing is the process of reducing a 
tapestry of interconnection to a narrow sequence. And this is in a sense illicit...this is a wrongful compression of 
what should spread out. In today’s computers they’ve betrayed that because there is no system for decent cut 
and paste and they’ve changed the meaning of the words cut and paste and pretended it was the same thing. So, 
a guy named Larry Tesler, whom I consider to be a good friend, nevertheless changed those words and I 
considered that to be a crime against humanity and he doesn’t understand why because humanity has no decent 
writing tools. In any case, this is the problem of interconnection and representation and sequentialization, all 
similar to the issue of water. [Now demonstrating his technique to Herzog on his computer, inside] So here we 
have a parallel presentation that shows a quotation connected to its original context. ‘In the beginning God 
created the heaven and the earth.’ What where is that from? That’s from the King James Bible. We can step 
down to the next quotation… ‘Adam and Lilith immediately began to fight.’ And that is from The Alphabet of 
Ben Sira. And so, as we pull back, we can see successive pages coming up to connect with their sources or with 
their linked content. 
That the hypertextual examples are drawn from first the book of Genesis and second from an 
apocryphal text that alters the typical story of human creation within the Christian tradition are 
most likely one of Herzog’s stylizations. Keeping Nelson’s commentary in line with his inspection of 
a possible technological theology, Herzog demonstrates how Nelson’s hypertext – even or perhaps 
especially to a non-canonical source – both gives context and performs hermeneutic reevaluation by 
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linking back to the original text, but also leads outward toward the developing a nonlinear approach 
to accessing information. Information accessed in this way, and even the unpredictable patterns of 
information flow on the Internet itself, would be a fundamental way to fight against the “illicit” 
nature of teleological linkage and protocol, those “wrongful compression[s] of what should spread 
out.” That is, this new system of linkage to source material also performs a re-linkage. It actively 
encourages bifurcations that always lead back toward origins and simultaneously builds toward an 
indiscernible or unpredictable line of information by always having another “and” beyond the 
current link; it introduces a divergent aspect of temporality that resists the self-reinforced “present” of 
contemporary informatics that claims ownership of the future within itself through its slogan of “the future 
is now.” 
What Nelson is succinctly describing is a realist and material ontology functioning through 
nonlinear dynamics and applying it to computer science, more specifically to the Internet. Yet, we 
must always keep in mind that the application of this new methodology cannot be supported 
indefinitely. If a technological theology is indeed being created currently, it would of course be vital 
not to simply map the pitfalls of Christian conceptualization onto a technological or technocratic 
future. Nelson’s hyperlinks would offer some sort of resistance to the current model, but they are not 
inherently “better” or, when examined over the long-term, more ethical.77 While it is difficult to 
 
77 DeLanda’s A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History provides an excellent introduction to nonlinear dynamics. 
Furthermore, this work has a key passage that parallels our commentary here. While DeLanda is focusing on 
historiographic commentary, his essential point on the ethical value of the nonlinear model and meshworks is exactly that 
which we are supporting here. Nelson’s hyperlinks and other approaches to modern informatics are susceptible to being 
read in an ethically ambiguous light. An extended passage DeLanda highlights the need for a more moderate approach to 
the underlying ethics of any reading of informatics and its importance within cinema: “If this book displays a clear bias 
against large, centralized hierarchies, it is only because the last three hundred years have witnessed an excessive 
accumulation of stratified systems at the expense of meshworks. The degree of homogeneity in the world has greatly 
increased, while heterogeneity has come to be seen as almost pathological, or at least as a problem that must be 
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know whether Nelson would agree, a new conception of informatics based on his links would not be 
non-teleological tout court; this is not merely an impossibility at present, but an ethical disaster that 
utterly undermines human choice and ignores the importance of good and bad decisions of Internet 
usage that Lo and Behold explores. To have an ethics necessitates resistances; additionally, having an 
ethics demands a conceptualization of and inherent value in the human itself. As a nonlinear model 
Nelson’s hyperlinks resist hierarchical protocol through their stratigraphic temporalities and his new 
system of linkage and re-linkage finds its greatest strength; yet it must be added to and reconciled 
with the former system and not replace it wholesale. Just as Deleuze’s concept of the time-image has 
not invalidated the movement-image or changed its effectuality, but rather provoked a crisis within 
it through its direct exposures of time, so too do Nelson’s hyperlinks merely supply an important 
challenge to systemic protocols rather than override them as a revolutionary event. 
This horizontal rather than vertical model of links in turn has serious implications for 
cinema. Applying this model to montage and cinematic morphology, we come to realize that a new 
system of linkage and re-linkage is formed through non-hierarchical hyperlinks. “A whole new 
system of rhythm, and a serial or atonal cinema, a new conception of montage” would emerge as a 
practical necessity from the application of the conceptual apparatus of Nelson’s hypertext to the 
 
 
eliminated. Under the circumstances, a call for a more decentralized way of organizing human societies seems to 
recommend itself. However, it is crucial to avoid the facile conclusion that meshworks are intrinsically better than 
hierarchies (in some transcendental sense)...It is crucial to avoid the temptation of cooking up a narrative of human 
history in which meshworks appear as heroes and hierarchies as villains. Not only do meshworks have dynamical 
properties that do not necessarily benefit humanity (for example, they grow and develop by drift, and that drift need not 
follow a direction consistent with a society’s values), but they may contain heterogeneous components that are 
themselves inconsistent with a society’s values (for example, certain meshworks of hierarchies). Assuming that humanity 
could one day agree on a set of values (or rather on a way of meshing a heterogeneous collection of partially divergent 
values), further ethical judgements could be made about specific mixtures of centralized and decentralized components in 
specific contexts, but never about the two pure cases in isolation” (Nonlinear History 69). 
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concept of montage (Cinema 2 214). And, indeed, what is most striking is that upon reflection this 
is precisely the type of linkage and montage that Herzog employs throughout Lo and Behold. 
Continually circling back to interviews, linking and relinking them to other interviews and his own 
narration, tracing back to theological undercurrents and linking images serially, Herzog’s film 
performs a tracing of cinematic thinking rather than a declarative utterance. In short, Herzog’s film 
performs a sort of reverie on its object, the Internet, allowing for some elements of its becoming to be 
shown rather than to make declarative statements about the Internet’s being. 
In the end, Lo and Behold performs a final confrontation for Herzog with his core 
problematic of “a new grammar of images.” By encountering informatics cinema faces the possibility 
of its life or afterlife. The afterlife of the cinema lies in its incorporation and acceptance of informatic 
logic, reducing the cinematic experience to an autocatalytic reinforcement of market strategy with 
profound biological, aesthetic, and political consequences. The life of cinema, if it is to have one, lies 
in producing a corresponding morphology and syntax to the grammatical changes it has undergone 
in its development. Cinema today, much like theory itself, is tasked with aiding in the creation of a 
new logic that can account for the networked reality of the individual within a global economic 
system. Serial or atonal montage must be theorized and a new taxonomy of rhythm must be 
developed if cinema is to live. At the juncture of information and protocol, the future of cinema 
emerges. And it will be a human or an inhuman future. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Kantian Formula: “a disorder of all the senses” 
 
If the possibility for a human ethics lies within the purview of the cinema it appears to be an 
utterly foreign one from a classical perspective. Instead, I would like to conclude that cinematic ethics 
must be distilled from the circuitous repetitions of spacetime, from spacetime’s form, function, and 
definition, those nonlinear times and nonmetric spaces that humankind now envisions in both theory and 
experiment. A cinema like Werner Herzog’s, tasking itself with working on a new grammar of 
images, aids this endeavor by utilizing the cinema as a way to think and to autocatalytically change 
the way we think. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to supply physical examples – chiefly from the 
field of physics – to lend support to the realist ontological views that Herzog’s cinema maintains. 
Herzog is, of course, neither philosopher or physicist, and, to reiterate from my introduction, it is 
important to note that it is not a matter of Herzog “doing” some theory. Instead, looking at both 
Salt and Fire, Herzogian cinema utilizes empirical facts to always attempt to reach beyond what is 
currently known. Herzogian cinema strains to the largest and smallest realms of human thought, 
always on the lookout for dignified spaces for human beings to inhabit, for modes of being, acting, 
and changing in the world that hold some sliver of hope for an ethical stance. And he does so most 
forcefully by creating spacetime formations that reflect empirical reality so far as he is able to perceive 
it, by forging time-images in the film sequence and revealing its complicated political nature through 
his characters and their choices. 
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Space and time are, empirically speaking, a unified field, and in the end we must always 
think them together. Yet, while we know this fact, we have yet to effectively or rigorously think it 
and philosophers, including Deleuze, have long favored time over space in their meditations. The 
Bergsonian temporalities that Deleuze bases his taxonomy on helped to provide general relativity 
with the metaphysics it lacked; Deleuze’s own contribution beyond Bergson comes chiefly through 
theorizing time-images, which, as I have demonstrated, provides quantum mechanics a metaphysical 
conceptualization in turn. In Herzog’s cinema, however, the spatial takes precedence over the 
temporal, without forgetting the latter’s lessons. From “inner landscapes” to the volcanic (sur)faces I 
have sought to explicate, Herzog’s focus remains on the land beneath our feet, our place in the 
world, our world in vast space of the cosmos. Herzogian spaces are not merely two-dimensional 
figures, but rather multi-dimensional surfaces, and, much like Deleuze’s temporal taxonomy of 
cinematic images, Herzog’s grammar of images utilizes surfaces to pose questions into the nature of 
space itself and its ethics. Herzog’s work demonstrates the pressing need for an advancement in the 
theorizations of cinematic space and underscores its ethical potential. 
In a brilliant, succinct essay that focuses on the intensive nature of Deleuzian space, 
including cinematic space, Thomas Kelso makes an important contention that paves the way for this 
process to begin in earnest. Kelso writes, “A Deleuzian formula: Absent God = empty space = the 
virtual. The virtual, in turn, equals what Deleuze calls ‘the spatium,’ and paradoxically, but 
necessarily, it is not empty at all, but ‘full of intensive ordinates’ like the univocal being of Spinoza” 
(121). That is, the virtual field – which I have linked directly to the quantum field – is not merely 
the site where time is produced, where we can view it “in the pure state” of its emergence, but also 
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“where” space too is produced. And, it is important to mention, this sort of intensive space “in itself” 
as opposed to the extensive space we can more easily see and measure is not wild philosophical 
speculation but rather mathematical fact: it merely exists at the quantum level. By studying 
Leibnizian differential calculus, for example, the mathematician Carl Gauss “realized that the 
calculus, focusing as it does on infinitesimal points on the [curved, two-dimensional] surface itself, 
allowed the study of the surface without any reference to a global embedding space,” that is, without an 
a priori actual space to be embedded in (Virtual Science and Intensive Philosophy 4-5). This 
mathematics laid the groundwork for future theories that would become in the hands of Planck, 
Einstein and Bohr, among others, general relativity and quantum mechanics. That is, it was the 
mathematical study of multidimensional surfaces that led to modern theorizations of space. Gaussian 
mathematics advances “the totally new concept that surface is a space in itself” and that surfaces can 
therefore be virtual and even must be virtual before space becomes actual (ibid.). According to 
DeLanda, while introducing the notion of “virtual space” in this manner may seem “like an 
inflationary ontological move...when seen as a replacement for laws and essences it actually becomes 
deflationary, leading to an ultimately leaner ontology” (Virtual Science and Intensive Philosophy 
35). Such a “lean ontology” sees the actual spaces of Firstness, of quality, emerging from the 
probabilistic, virtual realm of Zeroness, the underlying quantum field that gives rise to the material 
universe. The virtual field then becomes for DeLanda a “picture of a relatively undifferentiated and 
continuous topological space undergoing discontinuous transitions and progressively acquiring detail 
until it condenses into the measurable and divisible metric space which we inhabit,” which is in turn 
“a powerful metaphor for the cosmic genesis of spatial structure” (Virtual Science and Intensive 
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Philosophy 49). Ultimately, this leads DeLanda to conclude that the virtual continuum, or as I have 
argued, quantum field, “cannot be conceived as a single, homogeneous topological space, but rather 
as a heterogenous space made out of a population of multiplicities, each which is a topological space 
on its own. The virtual continuum would be, as it were, a space of spaces, with each of its component 
spaces having the capacity of progressive differentiation” (Virtual Science and Intensive Philosophy 
72). The virtual, too, therefore, must have its own geometry. That means, even though direct 
representation of such a space is not possible, indirect analysis of each level, each topography, is 
indeed possible. 
The potential geometry of a “space of spaces” is precisely the point to which Herzog’s cinema 
leads us.78 Today, the philosophy of cinema has as its chief aim a spatial theorization that aligns with 
contemporary empirical understandings of spacetime. Furthermore, Herzog’s transcendental 
problematics – stemming from the fact that “time is out of joint” in his cinema – have great social 
influence by informing our notions of identity and its creation, the particular way in which each of 
us takes form through a finite but seemingly innumerable number of interactions. Herzog asks us to 
question all of those surfaces that make us up, both individually and socially and what role the 
 
 
 
78 I would argue that Herzog’s cinematic work should be most closely associated with the emergent field of quantum 
gravity. Quantum gravity is an attempt to theorize the as of yet unknown but underlying relationship between the 
macrophysics of general relativity and the microphysics of quantum mechanics, the biggest and smallest scales of human 
thought. Strikingly, many of the scientists working in this field relate their findings, just as I have throughout this 
dissertation, just as Herzog does in his cinematic efforts, back to grammar. Carlo Rovelli writes, “Nature...is what it is...if 
our grammar and our intuition do not readily adapt to what we discover, well, too bad: we must seek to adapt them...We 
must not allow ourselves to be confused by an inadequate grammar” (Order of Time 98-99). And quantum gravity can be 
seen to be precisely that: an adaptation of our understanding of grammar in the face of evidence garnered through 
general relativity and quantum mechanics. Furthermore, by continuing scientific research and – as I am arguing Herzog 
seeks to do in his films – by monstrating these findings through the cinema, as well as creating a philosophy appropriate 
to those findings that offers a pointed metaphysical critique, the space for an ethical politics perhaps emerges. 
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cinema plays in creating those forms. Herzog’s work demonstrates that, for each of us, our identity is 
essentially a point of view that interacts with the physical world in a limited way, therefore “the 
world is reflected in each one of us through a rich spectrum of correlations” which in turn 
“elaborates the information we receive in a way that is strictly integrated” (italics mine. Order of Time 
151). While it risks stating the obvious, films like Herzog’s reveal that our identities are quite 
literally in-formed by physical processes within and outside of ourselves, the interactions of which we 
are integral to. Yet, secondly and more importantly, Herzog’s work shows that this is achieved by 
breaking the information we receive into smaller and more manageable pieces, by making our 
human selves the measure of things. This process, too, has a physical, specifically biological, basis 
and lies behind all semiotic function, for it is “the structure of our nervous system” wherein 
“networks of neurons...form dynamic systems that continually modify themselves, seeking to predict 
– as far as possible – the flow of information intake” (ibid.). That is to say, the particular informatic 
makeup of the individual is distilled and reinforced through discrete interactions with other sources 
of information: quite literally, the I is an effect of others, the I is an affect in the Spinozist sense. But 
this realization inevitably comes with an ethical choice. Herzog’s films remind us that a given 
identity is not just a sum of information determined by another, but rather an autocatalytic 
conglomerate of all of the interactions with the others that make it up: the trillions upon trillions of 
“in-forming” processes that trace and transform the identity through neural stimulus.79 And it is our 
 
79 This process can and should be seen as a direct parallel to Herzog’s notion of the man at the end of Herz aus Glas, “the 
first who doubts,” and sets out to discover new land. Physically speaking, there is a dubito ergo cogito that precedes cogito 
ergo sum. As Rovelli writes, “the starting point” of identity formation “is not a hypothetical a priori that is immediate to 
the experience of existing as a subject. It’s a rationalistic a posteriori reflection on the first state of the process in which 
Descartes had articulated a state of doubt: logic dictates that, if someone doubts something, they must have thought 
about it. And that, if they can think, then they must exist. It is substantially a consideration made in the third person, 
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responsibility to not simply move blindly forward where the whims of these processes might take us, 
but to take an active and selective role in them, to be our own filter of information. 
Herzog performs this task most directly by working on a new grammar of images: his own 
highly idiosyncratic, but unapologetically non-ironic way of looking at what he considers to be an 
indifferent Nature and conceptualizing a space for the human within it. From early films such as 
Herz aus Glas on up to his volcanic and informatic meditations in recent work, Werner Herzog asks 
of his viewers to think deeply about the world around them, the worlds within them. In Herzog’s 
view, as I have shown, inner landscapes emerge from outer realities, but paint them a different hue in 
the process. Thinking large and thinking small, deeply problematizing time and intensely 
contemplating space, Herzog’s films forcefully demonstrate that one cannot only think with the 
cinema, but that one might even hold out the hope of thinking differently with it. 
Herzog and his films are, of course, not answers to much of anything, but they do pose valid 
questions. One is unlikely to ever discover much of a political thrust in his oeuvre, but one does find 
within it a grand analysis of political machinery. Likewise, though the director offers few suggestions 
of how he believes one should live, Herzog continually traces the possibility of a human ethics that 
emerges to challenge the overwhelming forces of Nature, those physical systems that we confront 
and at times control and perpetuate. And, in the end, this is why Herzog – and why the entire 
cinema of time-images – strives so hard to monstrate and repeat spatiotemporal perspectives. In 
order to address the superjective problems that our century faces, the problems of a connected world 
 
not in the first, however private the process.” For Rovelli, “thinking of oneself as a subject is not a primary experience: it 
is a complex cultural deduction made on the basis of many other thoughts...we are the reflection of ourselves that.” In 
Kantian terms, “I is another” before, through the mechanism of doubt, it is capable of becoming a separated “I.” The I is 
created by autocatalytic neural stimulation, from “in-formed” interpersonal interactions (Order of Time 153-154). 
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where each of us is ethically beholden to billions we will never meet, perhaps – just perhaps – a new 
grammar of images and the new image of thought it entails might aid in our collective struggling. 
Steadfastly refusing to ignore the unceasing change of empirical reality, working on the grammar of 
images amounts – like any creative work, be it art, science, or philosophy – to testing the limits of 
human knowledge and exceeding them. 
We know not what we must think, but only that we must. 
And our understanding of the grammar of images grows. 
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